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Soviet Empire:
The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism,
(New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1967), 123.
100
empire.”
258
Enver purposed to unite all separate forces of the Basmachi groups. And,
he dreamed of founding a Central Asian Muslim state. Enver’s dream did not find
enough support from Central Asians and did not create the same impact as it did for
Western Turkes upon Central Asian Muslims, because it was difficult to persuade
and encourage Central Asians regarding Pan-Turanism like Western Turks. Although
Jadids were, in one sense, influenced by Pan-Turkist and PanTuranian ideas through
the Tatar Muslim intellectuals’ opinions; the pan-Turanian dream in minds of
Bukharan and Khivan Jadids was a bit different from the one in minds of Western
Turks. For Bukharan Uzbek intellectuals and elite, pan-Turanism meant greater
Uzbekistan, so it was same with Enver’s dreams of unifying all Turkic Muslims in
West and East under one flag. After taking the leadership of the Basmachi groups, he
gave an ultimatum to the Soviet leaders to withdraw their forces from Turkistan at
once.
259
Moscow responded to him by sending Red Army. Enver sent his emissaries
to afghan emir to demand aid for his resistance. Afghanistan responded to Enver’s
demand and sent a thousand Afghan troops to Enver.
260
These Afghan troops served
as Enver’s special guards during his resistance. There are also claims around British
support for Enver’s movement in spite of enough and strong evidence about this.
Some said-with what truth we do not know that-Enver received funds and arms from Britain; the only thing certain is
that the Basmachi had English rifles and ammunition, possibly obtained earlier British agents in Turkistan.
261
The Basmachi movement strengthened after Enver’s participation. Although
Enver had some problems with tribal chieftains in the beginning, he succeeded in
creating excitement against the Soviets in the early times. Enver Pasha’s activities
258
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,
Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in
Central Asia
, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 178.
259
Allworth, Edward et al.,
Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule
, ed. Edward Allworth, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 252.
260
Coates, Zelda K. and W.P.,
Soviets in Central Asia,
(New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers,
1951), 80.
261
Coates, Zelda K. and W.P.,
Soviets in Central Asia,
(New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers,
1951), 80.
101
also enabled the movement to strengthen more and attract more supporters who were
discontent under suppression of the Soviet regime. The soaring resistance of
Basmachi forces after Enver’s arrival in the area and the Soviets’ suppression over
the new government of Bukharan Peoples’ Republic caused a government crisis. The
prominent leaders of the new regime’s government shifted to Basmachis’ side. For
example, Mirza Abdulqadir Muhiddinov, one of the chief leaders of the Young
Bukharan Party, Muhiddin Maqsumov, and the republic’s minister of police and their
supporters shifted to the side of Basmachi rebels. Basmachi revolt strengthened
towards the end of 1921 in spite of domestic clashes among separate groups inside
the movement.
262
For example, Abdul Hamid Beg, minister of war and Ali Reza Beg,
minister of interior joined Enver’s front. Even, Osman Khodzhaev, president of
republic, left Bukhara secretly in order for attending the Basmachi revolt.
263
This
event weakened the efficiency of the republic and added power and legitimacy of the
Basmachis and increased fame and the position of the revolt. The efficiency of the
movement began to be felt inside the government of the new regime in Bukhara.
Even, Fayzallah Khodzhaev was attempted to assassinate in summer 1922 and Enver
was suspected of this attempt.
264
On the other hand, the incapability of uniting the
separate groups and continuous rivalry among tribes were preventing Enver’s
dreams. Also, Enver’s personal ambition and lack of tact caused his partners to
disobey his authority and side against him.
265
He used the title of “Commander in
chief of all Muslim Troops, the son in law the Caliph and representative of the
262
Allworth, Edward et al.,
Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule
, ed. Edward Allworth, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 251.
263
Ibid, 252.
264
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans., Islam
and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in
Central Asia
, (London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 179.
265
Ibid, 179.
102
Prophet.”
266
This benefited him to establish a strong authority among the rebels and
tribes, besides it was helpful to enable unity in the region. On the other hand, he
collided with the ex-Emir, who was the most prominent advocate for the Basmachis,
because of the use of title of “Emir of Turkistan”. Enver’s use of this title in his
orders angered ex-Emir Alim because of the fear of shadowing his authority. “His
signing of orders with the pompous title of ‘commander in chief of all Muslim
troops, so in law of the Caliph, and representative of the prophet’ put him on bad
terms with the emir, Alim Khan. Gradually, his coalition force fell to pieces, and he
came to the point of battling with his former allies”.
267
The prominent Basmachi
commanders Ibrahim Beg Lakai, loyal to the emir, left the Enver’s command.
268
Enver was killed in a sudden attack of the Red Army units in the morning on 4
August 1922 in Baljuvan, a village in eastern Bukhara.
269
His struggle did not last so
long, but it did leave an effect which would last more. He became a symbol of dream
for unity between Western and Eastern Turks.
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