75
During the era of Provisional Government, it was not very possible for
enforcement and implementation
of reforms in Bukhara, because both the
Provisional government and Turkestan Committee were not strong and forceful
enough for solving that question. Firstly, Russia was inside the war and dealt with
the fronts. There was not military force to enforce the Emir and operate in the region
for the acceptance of the demands. In addition, the position of the public opinion was
another preventive factor. The reforms did not have
advocates among the native
population in the patriarchal Bukharan society. For that reason, the implementation
of reforms required deployment of Russian troops in Bukharan lands, however it was
not very possible at that time when Russian armies were in battles on German and
Austrian fronts. Even, a probable intervention of Russian forces in Muslim areas of
Central Asia might cause Afghan intervention.
192
According to S. Becker, “the use of
Russian troops might provoke a general uprising throughout
the Moslem areas of
Russia and raise the threat of Afghan intervention in Russian Central Asia”.
193
In
addition, the Provisional Government centered in Petrograd was not sufficient to
analyze the situation of Bukhara and evaluate the developments properly. “The
Provisional Government installed on the ruins of the monarchy was very divided and
uncertain about what solutions might settle the national problem”.
194
In Turkestan
and the khanates, the Provisional Government was far from responding to the reform
demands of the indigenous population. For example,
a group of exiled Jadids in
Samarkand came to express their national ideal to Alexander Kerensky, the prime
minister of the Provisional Government. Kerensky’s reply to the Jadids was: “I know
Turkistan and its population well. I believe in your loyalty and reject the rumors
192
Becker, Seymour,
Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924
,
(London &New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 196.
193
Ibid, 196.
194
Carrere D’Encausse, Hèlene, trans.,
Islam and the Russian Empire Reform and Revolution in
Central Asia,
(London: I.B.Tauris-Co Ltd, 1966), 121.
76
about disturbances supposedly being prepared among you against Russia. But I warn
you that if such
an eventuality were to occur, I should take the most far-reaching
measures of coercion.”
195
Because the government had some many difficulties and
problems that it had to deal with under the conditions of the war, they could not
focus on Turkistan and Bukhara. So, the problems and
conflicts in the Turkistan
region and Bukhara were not prioritized by Kerensky and his friends. Kerensky
expected indisputable loyalty and dependence from these protectorates of the old
regime in his government’s era without focusing on the reasons of questions
increasing instability in the region.
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