Chapter 12: Nuremberg, Tokyo and Modern International Criminal Law
329
willingness to outlaw such behaviour.
13
Where prior attempts to prohibit war had
formally failed, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument
of National Policy, also known as the Kellog-Briand Treaty or Pact of Paris,
14
outlawed
recourse to war entirely. However, not even the Pact of Paris specifically penalised
aggression and, hence, it can hardly be asserted that as a matter of positive
international law the perpetration of aggression entailed with certainty the personal
liability of the culprit. The IMT in its judgment made reference to the aforementioned
instruments, to which Germany was a party, the result of which was to denunciate
the waging of aggressive war as well as certain methods of warfare, and nonetheless
found that the crime of aggression had been established under customary law.
Interestingly, the Tribunal attempted an analogy with the 1907 Hague Conventions
and its annexed Regulations, stating that neither the Hague Regulations expressly
penalised the breaches contained therein—that is, much like the Pact of Paris—but
went on to say that breaches of this nature have long been prosecuted by national
courts.
15
This analogy hardly supports the Tribunal’s argument, since it is an example
of a legal instrument having attained the status of customary law through consistent
and continuous State practice, whereas the same cannot be said of the crime of
aggression. A number of scholars, such as Finch, rejected the argument that the crime
of aggression could have been established by reference to unratified treaties and
resolutions of international conferences that were not sanctioned by subsequent
national or international action. He argued, moreover, that if aggressive war in
violation of international treaties was a crime entailing individual responsibility,
then such responsibility should also encompass those in the UK and France that
compelled Czechoslovakia to consent to German aggression, as well as those Soviet
officials that were responsible for the invasion of Poland in violation of their non-
aggression pact with Germany of 23 August 1939—although Germany had herself
invaded Poland 16 days earlier.
16
Other jurists, nonetheless, were of the view that
the waging of an aggressive war was an international crime.
17
Since a war of aggression could only be committed by persons in the highest
echelons of authority and after formulating a plan to that effect, the Tribunal set out
the parameters of criminal participation in crimes against peace. First, it held that
the conspiracy charge could only apply to the crime of aggressive war, although the
indictment had applied it to all the offences in the Charter. It rejected the prosecution’s
argument that any significant participation in the workings of the Nazi Party since
its inception in 1919 was evidence of involvement in a conspiracy to commit the
offences that were within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, holding that the conspiracy
must not have been too far removed from the time of decision and of action.
18
The
13
On 24 September 1927, the Assembly of the League of Nations unanimously adopted a resolution
regarding wars of aggression, whose preamble expressly stated that such wars constituted
international crimes. See IMT judgment, reprinted in 41
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