Hcss report

negative (factual) military events (red) 
tend to dominate all other trends. However, its peaks are frequent and quite high in 
terms of score. They occurred particularly in early 2007, around February and March 
2008, in the second half of 2009 (July and August), the second half of 2010 (June to 
August), and the first few months of 2012.
Russia
Overall Trends
FIGURE 2.13: TOTAL RUSSIAN ASSERTIVENESS IN % OF REPORTED TOTAL FOR FOREIGN ACTION, 01/1980 – 08/2013
Since 1980, Russian assertiveness has been steadily rising (though less than Chinese)
by about 20% – and it is at a higher level today than it was in the late Soviet period 
under Gorbachev. This rise, however, is much less pronounced than in the Chinese 
case, with even a period of overall stabilization and slight decline from the end of the 
1990s until 2005/6 (late Yeltsin, early Putin years). Since 2005 we once again observe 
more oscillation with a few peaks.
The highest peak occurred in 1989, which can be easily explained by the events that 
marked the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. The data suggest that there 
had been more frequent peaks and more irregular oscillations over the years during 
which Yeltsin was in power (1991-2000) than after that. This is indeed a sober reminder 
of the often tense relations between Russia and the West even during the Yeltsin 
years, which is all too often portrayed in overly rosy terms. The two main peaks we 
0
0.05
1980 1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010 2012
0.10
0.20
0.15
0.30
0.25
% of r
eported 
fo
reign action
Total
Linear (Total)

---

22
STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014
see in this period occurred in September 1994 and August 1995, corresponding to the 
first Chechen War and the continued Russian military offensive.
The last years of the Yeltsin period were characterized by a somewhat declining 
assertiveness, which only regained – but did not really exceed – its previous level 
under President Putin’s first two terms in office. President Medvedev’s term started 
with the biggest spike during the war against Georgia in August 2008, but then 
declined to late-Yeltsin levels. Since President Putin’s return to power in 2012, we 
once again see a marked increase (but we point out that our data stopped in August 
2013 and that many of the data points that are used in the press and the specialized 
literature today postdate this period).
FIGURE 2.14: TYPES OF RUSSIAN ASSERTIVENESS IN % OF REPORTED TOTAL FOR FOREIGN ACTION, 09/2003 – 08/2013
When we then zoom in onto the different types of assertiveness, the Russian data 
appear to show a more balanced distribution than the Chinese. Although the overall 
pegging order (first diplomatic, then economic, then military) remains identical, the 
gaps between them are different. The ‘