Hcss report

diplomatic type
’ is the one that experiences 
the strongest increase over time. The ‘
economic type
’ rises as well, particularly 
between September 2008 and August 2011, though this increase remains modest and 
less pronounced compared to the diplomatic rise. Economic peaks are only arising 
significantly in January 2007, in the second half of 2009, and in August 2011. And 
interestingly enough, the ‘
military type
’ is the least important one and has been 
slightly decreasing since 2003. 
0
0.04
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
0.08
0.12
0.16
0.02
0.06
0.10
0.14
% of total r
eported 
fo
re
ign action
Linear
Linear
Linear
Diplomatic
Economic
Military

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HCSS REPORT
23
The first two Putin administrations (2000-2008) are marked by an increase in the 
overall assertiveness, which remains limited, but had been standing out by the number 
of peaks and a greater intensity in terms of oscillation since January 2006.
The years 2007 and 2008 witnessed a new increase in Russia’s overall assertiveness, 
particularly in January 2007 (the Russia-Belarus energy dispute), September 2007 (the 
expedition to the Arctic, the ambush of Russian troops in Chechnya, etc.), and August 
2008, which corresponds to an impressive ‘military’ peak too (the Russo-Georgian 
war). Interestingly, there is a strong peak as Medvedev takes over the Presidency in 
May 2008 (overall), which coincides with the highest ‘military’ peaks as well. These 
‘military episodes’ occurred in August 2008 (as mentioned), July 2009 (the Sino-
Russian exercise Peace Mission 2009 and the launch of Russia’s new submarine-
launched ballistic missile), and in the second half of 2010 (the publication of the 
Russian Military and Defense Doctrine).
After a rather steep decline through 2010, a new rise in overall assertiveness can be 
identified. This rise further accelerates after Putin once more assumed office as 
President in 2012. Interestingly enough, the ‘military type’ of assertiveness follows a 
downward trend from 2009 until August 2013.
FIGURE 2.15: LEVELS AND TONES OF RUSSIAN MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS IN % OF REPORTED TOTAL FOR FOREIGN ACTION, 
09/2003 – 08/2013
0
0.010
0.015
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
0.025
0.035
0.045
0.005
0.020
0.030
0.040
% of total r
eported 
fo
re
ign action
Level 3 (P/NRM)
Level -3 (NRM)
Level -6 (NFM)
Level 6 (P/NFM)

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24
STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014
Military Assertiveness: Levels and Trends
Similarly to the Chinese dataset, GDELT identified fewer Russian