Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010

Japan-US Relations Solves Prolif

A strong US - Japan alliance is necessary to prevent proliferation in Asia which would lead to miscalculation, preemption, and retaliatory war.
Friedberg 94 (Aaron L., Associate Prof. of Politics and Internat’l Affairs at Princeton and Director of Research Program in International Security at Princeton’s Center of International Studies, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter, p. 5-33, ) ET

If the prospective costs of war appear unduly high and the benefits sufficiently low, the nations of Asia could remain at peace, regardless of the differences in their domestic structures and the weakness of some of the linkages between them. In Asia, however, even these elemental forces for caution and restraint may prove to be insufficient. To begin with, while nuclear weapons already serve to dampen the dangers of war between Russia and China or China and India, they are not yet evenly distributed across the region. Not all the states that feel themselves threatened by hostile nuclear forces have thus far been either able or willing to acquire matching capabilities of their own. In several cases this is not for any lack of trying; after many years of arduous effort Pakistan and North Korea may soon have operational nuclear forces. For the time being, Japan and South Korea have chosen to continue their Cold War policies of taking shelter beneath the U.S. nuclear umbrella, although their willingness to continue doing so will depend on the intensity of the threats they perceive and their faith in American security guarantees. In the foreseeable future Taiwan could also have both the means and the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Assuming for the moment that an Asia with more nuclear powers would be more stable than one with fewer, there would still be serious difficulties involved in negotiating the transition to such a world. As in other regions, small, nascent nuclear forces will be especially vulnerable to preemption. In Japan the prevailing "nuclear allergy" could lead first to delays in acquiring deterrent forces and then to a desperate and dangerous scramble for nuclear weapons.68 In Asia the prospects for a peaceful transition may be further complicated by the fact that the present and potential nuclear powers are both numerous and strategically intertwined. The nuclearization of Korea (North, South or, whether through reunification or competitive arms programs, both together) could lead to a similar development in Japan, which might cause China to accelerate and expand its nuclear programs, which could then have an impact on the defense policies of Taiwan, India (and through it, Pakistan) and Russia (which would also be affected by events in Japan and Korea). All of this would influence the behavior of the United States. Similar shockwaves could also travel through the system in different directions (for example, from India to China to Japan to Korea). A rapid, multifaceted expansion in nuclear capabilities could increase the dangers of misperception, miscalculation, and war. Even a successful transition to a many-sided nuclear balance would not necessarily guarantee peace. As during the Cold War, nuclear armed states would, of course, remain free to use force against lesser opponents, although by doing so they might run the risk of colliding with one another. As to the possibility of war among the nuclear powers, it is not obvious that nuclear multipolarity will necessarily be as stable as nuclear bipolarity. Forces adequate for deterring a single opponent (by appearing capable of absorbing its first strike and then hitting back against it with overwhelming destructive power) might not be sufficient to deter two or more opponents acting together. The members of such a nuclear alliance might be more inclined to believe that, if they teamed up to attack their common enemy, they could diminish its forces to the point where each could afford to absorb a fraction of the resulting retaliatory blow. These calculations could prove to be mistaken, with disastrous consequences all around but, as Stanley Hoffmann pointed out almost thirty years ago: "The more nuclear powers there are, the more uneven . . . their stage of nuclear development, the more complicated calculations will be [and] the more dangerous yet likely misperceptions will become. "69.

Japan-US Relations Solves Heg

JASA collapse would destroy U.S. hegemony
Kazuhisa 99 (Ogawa, analyst of international politics, Japan quarterly, p. 22) ET

No country in the littorals of the Pacific and Indian Oceans even begins to approach Japan in meeting conditions for a power-projection platform. One year after Japan notifies the United States of its intention to terminate the alliance, the United States would lose leverage and with it, most of its capability to project military power over half the world. Short of power-projection capability, the United States would be hard-pressed to remain the world’s sole superpower. Despite its colossal economy, diversified nuclear arsenal and qualitative advantage in conventional forces, the United States would be just one among several great powers, America’s power differential with respect to China, Russia, and other major powers would be much smaller. This has been generally acknowledged by U.S. governmental policy advisers in semi-official meetings. Then, by the way of reports, I convinced the Japanese government leaders of the significance of the American’s agreement.
US-Japan alliance is critical to sustaining US hegemony
Green 03 ( Prof @ Penn State, “Japans’ Reluctant Realism”,p. 9-10) ET

At the same time, however, this study also suggests that U.S. policymakers can no longer assume Japan's automatic compliance with U.S. diplomacy—and certainly cannot assume Japanese passivity. In order to sustain its own position in Asia, the United States will have to do more to demonstrate reciprocal support for Japanese diplomatic initiatives. The United States will have to frame its policy toward East Asia and multilateral organizations in terms that give Japan responsibilities at all stages of diplomacy—from conceptualization, to funding, to implementation on the ground. And at each stage, the United States will have to raise the bar of expectations on Japan—giving more responsibility, but insisting on more sharing of the risk. The United States will have to establish agreement with Japan on strategy and allow for divergence in tactics. In short, the United States will have to sustain a focus on Japan when its help is not required for U.S. diplomacy, so that Japan is more forthcoming when its help becomes essential. If U.S.-Japan diplomatic cooperation breaks down or drifts, Japan may not go the way of Gaullism, but U.S. leadership in the world will be less effective. The United States will lose leverage in its bilateral relationships with other Asian countries and in multilateral institutions as Japan joins in ad hoc coalitions with Europe, or even Russia and China, to constrain U.S. unilateralism; or as Tokyo refuses to fund U.S. initiatives. Tokyo's confidence in the U.S. commitment to Japanese security will wane, leading to more hedging strategies, redundant indigenous military capabilities, and exacerbated tensions throughout Asia. Concern about U.S. unilateralism will lead to more legal and political constraints on the use of U.S. forces based in Japan. Frustration with the asymmetrical aspects of the alliance could mount to the point that U.S. forward presence becomes at risk. Diplomatic leadership sharing, in short, is a critical complement to the core military aspect of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.