From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

Australian Financial Review
in
April 1994, Gareth Evans, the minister for foreign affairs, invited me to speak
candidly about Australia. I took him at his word. Australia, I said, was “a lucky
country with an embarrassment of riches”. Australia had high consumption, low
savings, low competitiveness, high current account deficit and high debt, with
most of its exports in minerals and agricultural products. I believed more reform
was unavoidable if the Australians wanted to complete the restructuring of their
economy and compete.
The 
Financial Review
editors who had invited me gave much publicity to my
frank comments. But the tabloids were indignant. They were part of the problem.
The country’s popular media, including a TV series produced by the Australian
Broadcasting Corporation in 1991, had portrayed the economic achievements of
East Asia as “a Third World hell-hole of sweatshops, sex tourism and repressive
regimes”. They completely ignored the reality that an increasing number of
Taiwanese, after studying and working in the United States, were bringing home
American technology and knowledge to build their own Silicon Valley in
Taiwan.
I replied to their media at the Australian National Press Club in Canberra.
They had failed to inform Australians about the transformation of a region of
nearly two billion people from agricultural backwardness to industrial and high-
tech societies. These countries, including China, were producing millions of
engineers and scientists. R&D in Japan had enabled the Japanese to launch
satellites into space and to probe the mysteries of genetic engineering. These
developments went unreported in Australia. The American media, on the other
hand, had publicised the industrialisation and high growth in East Asia.
Although Australian academics were well-informed, the people were not. Their
ignorance made it difficult for any Australian government to gain popular
support for changes in its policy on economic direction and immigration.

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Whether Australia’s destiny is tied to Asia’s suddenly came to the fore with
the crisis in East Timor. It was triggered off on 27 January 1999 when
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas made a dramatic announcement after a
cabinet meeting chaired by President Habibie that there would be a “popular
consultation” for the people of East Timor to determine whether to accept
special autonomy or become independent. That public statement changed the
fate of East Timor, with long-term consequences for Indonesia and Australia.
Both Alexander Downer, the Australian foreign minister, and Prime Minister
John Howard were known to have easy relations with President Habibie. Unlike
Suharto, Habibie spoke English and was open to persuasion, especially on East
Timor.
Australia’s leaders wanted to be rid of the thorn of East Timor that
bedevilled Australia-Indonesia relations. They had suggested the “New
Caledonia solution” to Habibie. (There the French had offered a referendum in
1998 for either continued association with France, or independence after a 15-
year period of preparation.) The president had recounted to Mah Bow Tan (see
chapter 17) how the Australian ambassador, John McCarthy, had discussed the
New Caledonia solution with him. Habibie had told McCarthy that he would not
agree to East Timor having a 15-year transition to independence, with
Indonesian economic support during this period. If they rejected autonomy, they
would be out on their own. Indonesia was not going to play “rich uncle”.
Habibie said Howard subsequently sent him a letter that contained Habibie’s
ideas, whereupon he scribbled a memo to his key ministers on 21 January 1999,
asking them to study whether it was wise for the MPR (People’s Consultative
Assembly) to decide on letting East Timor respectfully separate itself from the
Republic of Indonesia. He attached Howard’s letter which emphasised that East
Timorese opinion was insisting on an act of self-determination. It took Habibie
less than a week to decide on the choice of autonomy or independence for East
Timor. In May an agreement was signed in New York between Indonesia,
Portugal and the UN to provide for a ballot on 8 August 1999. In June the UN
Security Council adopted a resolution establishing UNAMET (UN Assistance
Mission to East Timor).
But in February 1999, soon after Ali Alatas’s startling announcement, the
Indonesians began to arm the pro-integration militias. Killings and intimidation
of those favouring independence became daily occurrences. Despite all the
difficulties, UNAMET conducted a ballot on 30 August, when almost all voted.
When the result was announced on 4 September that nearly 80 per cent had

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voted for independence, hell broke loose. The country was systematically
devastated and its population uprooted: 250,000 were moved to West Timor, the
rest fled into the hills.
Under tremendous international pressure for a week, Habibie finally invited
international peacekeepers to restore order. The UN Security Council adopted a
resolution authorising the deployment of a multinational force to East Timor
(InterFET). Inevitably, it had to be led by Australia; the nearest base for
InterFET was Darwin. Australians learnt yet again how emotional their
Indonesian neighbours were.
Publicly, the Indonesians stated their preference for Asean troops. Privately,
lower levels of the TNI disagreed, hinting there could be casualties. The US
secretary for defence announced that he would send only a communications and
logistics support group, not combat troops. Australia had to lead the pack.
Fearful of being seen as an army of 4,000 white troops supported by 1,000
mainly white New Zealanders, Australia sought Asian support, primarily from
the countries of Asean. At an APEC meeting in Auckland in September, Prime
Minister John Howard asked Singapore to participate and Prime Minister Goh
agreed. So Singapore committed itself to providing a medical team, military
observers, liaison officers, logistics support and two LSTs (Landing Ship Tanks)
– 270 men from a population of three million.
The day after the UN Security Council authorised InterFet, the Singapore
Armed Forces (SAF) team arrived in Darwin. Our SAF mission commander,
Colonel Neo Kian Hong, flew into Dili with the InterFET commander, Major-
General Peter Cosgrove, to meet the Indonesian Restoration Operations
Command in East Timor. And when the first wave of InterFET forces arrived in
Dili on 20 September, there was a Singapore face in Cosgrove’s team.
The