party decided they did not want a nuclear Pacific and took a strong anti-nuclear
stand. They were prepared to jeopardise their ANZUS treaty with the United
States by refusing to allow any nuclear-powered ship or any ship carrying
nuclear weapons to sail through New Zealand waters or dock in its ports, in
effect blocking off the US Navy. It was an astonishing reversal of their
traditional attitudes. In October that year, when I met Lange in Singapore, I told
him that nuclear warships frequently passed through the Straits of Malacca and
the Straits of Singapore, that we recognised the risks of nuclear accident but the
US naval presence in the region had given us 30 years of stability. He remained
unconvinced. For him and his party, a non-nuclear world was the only way to a
secure future.
In Canberra in 1986 Bob Hawke asked me to convince Lange that their long-
term interests were best served by ANZUS. When I visited Wellington, I again
argued with Lange that his anti-nuclear policy was overcautious, but did not
change his mind. Jim Bolger, then the opposition leader, however, agreed with
me that small countries like Singapore and New Zealand would have room to
manoeuvre and make progress only if the United States continued to maintain
the world balance. He added, “New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stand would only
hasten its disintegration.” But when he became prime minister in November
1990, public opinion made it impossible for him to reverse this policy. New
Zealanders had decided to opt out of the troubles of the world, for the time
being.
As Labour prime minister, Lange instinctively felt he had to champion the
underdog. But on economic reforms and opening up the economy to market
forces, he could be persuaded because his finance minister, Roger Douglas, was
a convinced free-market man and carried his prime minister with him during his
first term of office. However, during his second term, Lange, under pressure
from his cabinet and party colleagues, backed away from the more unpopular
reforms. This delay prolonged the agony for New Zealand farmers,
manufacturers and consumers.
In December 1984 Lange announced, without any prior consultation, the
cancellation of Singapore’s General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) status for our
exports. In doing so, New Zealand had moved sooner than America and the
European Community. When our foreign minister explained to him that while
our loss through the cancellation of GSP in New Zealand would be marginal, we
would suffer grievously if the Americans or Europeans followed them and did
the same, Lange accepted the argument and restored our GSP status.
Without a large store of gold, diamonds, coal, uranium and other minerals
that provide Australians with a comfortable living, New Zealanders did not have
the “lucky country” mindset. When the price of their food exports fell in the
1980s, Lange and Douglas reduced price supports for farmers and made New
Zealand more competitive. It was to the great credit of Prime Minister Jim
Bolger that when his National Party returned to power in 1990 he continued
these liberalisation policies.
I never had any dispute with the New Zealand leaders, not even Bob
Muldoon, who could be aggressive and heated in arguments. In my experience
the New Zealanders can be depended on to honour their undertakings.
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