From Third World to First The Singapore Story pdfdrive com

Jakarta Post
reported that the US secretary of state,
Madeleine Albright (then in Africa), had phoned Gus Dur early the day before to
“convey Washington’s view” that Megawati should be elected vice-president.
Megawati won convincingly by over 396 votes to 284. That saved Indonesia
from a second round of disorder.
The end result was the best in the circumstances. Gus Dur, the new president,
had lost his eyesight. He had suffered two strokes in 1998, but was sufficiently
alert and nimble on 20 October to move swiftly to maximise his chances. After
Habibie’s accountability speech had been rejected by the People’s Consultative
Assembly, Gus Dur garnered most of the pro-Muslim votes that would have
gone to Habibie. Within a week of his election he quickly appointed a cabinet
for national reconciliation in which all major political parties and the armed
forces were represented. It may not be the most efficient government because of
the wide power sharing, but it may help to heal the wounds self-inflicted in 17
months of bloody clashes: pribumi against Chinese, Muslims against Christians,
Dyaks and Malays against Madurese, Acehnese separatists against the
Indonesian military. Gus Dur and Megawati have two daunting tasks: to repair
the social fabric of Indonesian society and restart the economy.
During the Suharto era, to avoid misunderstanding with the president or his

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aides, we did not meet Indonesian opposition leaders. Unlike the Americans and
West Europeans, we did not cultivate Suharto’s opponents – Megawati
Sukarnoputri, Amien Rais or even Gus Dur. Our close ties were with Suharto’s
ministers and the TNI. They, especially Ali Alatas, the foreign minister, and
General Wiranto, the defence minister and TNI commander, helped to stabilise
bilateral relations during Habibie’s presidency. However, between January and
April 1999, S.R. Nathan, then director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic
Studies (IDSS), later, from September 1999, our president, invited Indonesian
political party leaders to address his institute, with full local and international
media coverage. During their visits, Singapore ministers met the speakers at
lunches and dinners to understand their position and establish rapport. In this
way, we got to know Gus Dur (later president), Megawati Sukarnoputri (later
vice-president), Amien Rais (later chairman of the People’s Consultative
Assembly) and Marzuki Darusman of Golkar (later attorney-general in Gus
Dur’s cabinet).
This had angered Habibie and his aides who publicly expressed displeasure
at our interfering in their internal affairs. IDSS pointed out that it had invited
Golkar representatives to speak; Marzuki Darusman had done so, and IDSS had
repeatedly invited Golkar’s chairman, Akbar Tanjung, who had not been able to
come. This did not placate Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie’s foreign policy
adviser. She accused Singapore of being pro-Megawati.
I had met Gus Dur in Jakarta in 1997 when he addressed a private meeting
where he explained the role of Islam in Indonesia and assured investors that it
was not of the Middle East variety. He was a good speaker, fluent in English,
well-read in Arabic and highly intelligent. It did not occur to me then that he
would become president and inherit Suharto’s Indonesia after a Habibie
interregnum.
The night he was sworn in as president, both Prime Minister Goh and I sent
him our congratulations. We did not want any doubts about our support for their
new president.
Soon after his election, he summoned all Asean ambassadors to inform them
that he would visit all the Asean states beginning with Singapore. Addressing
our ambassador, Edward Lee, he said pointedly, “Indonesia wants good relations
with Singapore and hopes Singapore will support its recovery.” He went on to
explain his vision of the future: China, India and Indonesia, three of the world’s
most populous countries, would come together; Japan and Singapore would
provide financial and technological support. Then Asia would be less dependent

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on the West.
Before he came to Singapore, his foreign minister, Dr Alwi Shihab, an able
and practical man who had been a businessman and also a visiting professor of
divinity at an American college, called on Edward Lee at the Singapore embassy
to demonstrate that Indonesia was not taking a big brother attitude but wanted
sincere cooperation. Edward Lee assured him that Singapore would help, but
that there were limits to the financial and technological capabilities of three
million Singaporeans. Singapore did not have the resources of America or Japan
to restart the Indonesian economy. Alwi Shihab told him that we could act as a
catalyst to bring back confidence to Indonesia. Hence my first meeting with Gus
Dur as president of Indonesia was warm and constructive.
Prime Minister Goh met President Gus Dur at the airport on 6 November
1999, and had good discussions before and during lunch. Then, before a packed
audience of 500 businessmen and diplomats, Gus Dur gave an impressive
display of his political grasp and the skills expected of the new president of
Indonesia in an era of greater openness and accountability. When I called on
him, he invited me to be a member of his international advisory council for
Indonesia’s economic recovery, an honour I could not refuse. He talked of
ethical standards and clean government. I said if he expected his ministers to be
honest, they had to be paid so that they could live up to their status without
corruption. His coordinating minister for economy, finance and industry, Kwik
Kian Gie, who was present, told George Yeo, our minister-in-attendance, that he
had just discussed this sensitive issue with his president, sensitive because they
could afford this only for top people, not across the board.
We had an 
empat mata
meeting for an unrestrained discussion. His vitality in
spite of his age, two strokes and a hectic morning was reassuring. His sense of
humour was never absent. His demeanour was that of a president in complete
command of the situation. The Muslim parties that had elected him would
become more realistic by having to deal with the problems and through
interaction with him. They would not be the same after five years. He wanted the
prime minister and me to receive his vice-president, Megawati, and help her gain
as much experience as possible. He said he had a good relationship with General
Wiranto, and a clear view of how the military’s role should gradually evolve. He
knew that there were many incompatibles in the cabinet, especially in the
finance and economics sectors. These problems would be sorted out. He was
determined to make the government coherent and consistent.
His sense of humour was matched by a realistic appreciation of self. He

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joked, “The first president of Indonesia [Sukarno] was crazy about women; the
second president [Suharto] was crazy about money; the third president [Habibie]
was just crazy.” His daughter who accompanied him asked, “What about the
fourth president?” Without missing a beat, he said, “
Wayang
” (a performance,
theatre). In one word, he summed up his role in Indonesia. He was confident he
could play the part of president of Indonesia in the new era of openness to the
media and the NGOs (non-government organisations) that wanted 
reformasi
and
democrasi
.
However, Indonesia has undergone a sea change. Power is no longer
centralised in the hands of a president backed by an all-powerful ABRI. The
election had thrown up a large number of small Islamic parties but together they
did not form the majority. Megawati’s party won 34 per cent of the votes, the
largest single bloc. Amien Rais, leader of a Muslim party with 7 per cent of the
votes, skilfully cobbled together a coalition of Muslim parties into a “Middle
Axis” that made deals with other groups and won him the speakership of the
People’s Consultative Assembly against Megawati’s candidate. The Middle Axis
also blocked Megawati from the presidency by voting for Gus Dur, a traditional
Muslim leader of central and east Java. Although a Muslim cleric, Gus Dur is
acceptable to the nationalists because he has always stood for the separation of
religion (including Islam) from the state. However, he was elected president only
because of the votes of Muslims in the Middle Axis. Suharto had kept Islam in
check until the late 1980s when he started to cultivate the Muslims to counter
ABRI’s influence. Habibie, as president, actively nurtured and helped them
mobilise support for his re-election. Having entered the corridors of power,
political Islam is now a major force in Indonesia and will remain so. The
challenge for Indonesia is how to maintain a balance that will enable its people
of diverse races and religions to unite as one nation based on the credo of their
founding father, President Sukarno, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika
(unity in diversity),
enshrined in their national crest.

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