Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

7.5.4. What is a good state of mind worth? 
Agent Smith: You must be able to see it, Mr. Anderson. You must 
be able to know it by now. You can’t win. It’s pointless to keep 
fighting. Why, Mr. Anderson? Why? Why do you persist?
Neo: Because I choose to.
The Matrix Revolutions
Hall’s Brain Implant and the God Machine scenario question the value of a certain 
state of mind if the actions remain the same – a question raised by Harris (2014a) in 
How Narrow the Straight
. Provided that the device functions properly and the 
neural markers for violent outburst are established with sufficient accuracy in Hall’s 
Brain Implant scenario, whether he exercises self-control or the device acts, the 
result ‘in the outside world’ will remain the same. Savulescu and Persson agree 
with the spirit of Frankfurt’s conclusion about the implications of 
overdetermination cases and claim that ‘[f]reedom of will or action is not 
indispensable for moral responsibility’ (2012b, p. 115). Recall Harris’ response: 
Agents are quintessentially actors; to be an agent is to be capable 
of action. Without agency, in this sense, decision making is, as I 
claimed and argue now, both morally and indeed practically 
barren—literally without issue! Decisions to no effect are 
pointless from the moral perspective; for what is a good state of 
mind worth, if it makes no difference to the world?’ (2014a, p. 
249) 
How does this bear on Hall’s Brain Implant case and the God Machine? It appears 
to follow from Harris’ position that if there is no difference in the resultant action, 
there is no moral difference between Hall 
a)
exercising self-control, 
b)
acting under 
the influence of the cingulate brain implant, 
c)
refraining from harming someone 
had he been plugged into the God Machine with his knowledge and consent and, 
d)

---

159 
being plugged into the God Machine without his knowledge or consent. I think that 
such conclusions would be misguided.
Despite the same outcome, the way that the decision is made influences (and I think 
rightly so) the ascription of moral responsibility. Two actions that appear the same 
‘in the world’ acquire a different sense depending on the intentions behind them, 
whether the action was deliberate and on the context. The fact that unintentional 
killing is not murder, benefiting someone accidentally is not helping, and making 
inadvertent mistakes that others subsequently learn from does not amount to 
teaching 
sensu stricto,
demonstrates that the same action may have different moral 
meanings. In this sense, actions and intentions are joined, and the intention is 
relevant to the judgement about the character of action.
This link in interpreting what the action consists of transfers to issues of moral 
responsibility. Thus, the actions that agents are responsible for are not merely 
actions understood as occurrences in the external world with no regard to agent-
causation and intentions. If I have harmed someone while trying to help, I may be 
guilty of negligence, stupidity or harmful ineffectiveness, but not an act of malice. 
Consider a hypothetical case in which I have harmed someone while trying to help. 
Assuming that my action was justified to the best of my knowledge, that I have not 
been negligent and that the help backfired through no fault of my own, I am not 
morally responsible for the outcome – although I may be responsible causally.
This line of argument leads to the conclusion that there is a difference between 
actions that have the same consequences in the world, if the intentions differ – at 
least for the purposes of moral responsibility. Take I1, I2 to be intentions and A1 
and A2 actions in two possible worlds. For the purposes of moral responsibility, A1 
does not equal A2 where I1 leads to A1 and I2 leads to A2, even if the external 
observer cannot discern the difference between A1 and A2. In Frankfurt cases, 
Jones’s murder of Smith is a different event depending on whether it comes about 
through Jones acting on his own accord or through the intervention of the Black’s 
mechanism. Van Inwagen (1978) presents the same argument, referring to 
intention-action composites as event-particulars and general behavioural outcomes 

---

160 
as events-universals, and arguing that we are responsible for event-particulars.
31
A 
somewhat similar point presented in relation to obligation in Frankfurt cases and 
immediately applicable to considering the PAP was presented by Rowe (1987, pp. 
43-64). Rowe draws on the notion of agent-causation and argues that there is a 
relevant alternative possibility in Frankfurt cases. An alternative to Jones’s agent-
causing the murder is Jones’s not agent-causing the murder. He further argues that 
this is precisely the kind of alternate possibility that is relevant to Jones’s moral 
responsibility. Jones’ obligation not to agent-cause a volition to murder Smith is 
discharged when the mechanism pre-empts his powers of agent-causation. Since 
this alternative is available to him, he is morally responsible for murdering Smith 
under the terms of PAP.
32
33
For the purposes of moral responsibility assessment, it 
makes sense to consider the action caused by the God Machine, the action caused 
by Hall’s brain implant and the action resulting from Hall’s self-control as 
relevantly different actions. Thus, a state of mind is worth quite a lot in moral 
responsibility currency, and it is relevant not only for freedom of choice (as Harris 
argues) but moral action properly so called.
Moreover, in thinking about ‘what is the good state of mind worth if it makes no 
difference in the world’, the discussion seemed to overlook an important difference 
– in the agent. Consider Joe, who lives in an oppressive authoritarian regime. He 
does not resist the regime in any active way, not wanting to endanger his family. 
Does it make a difference in the world that Joe complies with the Party’s policies, 
disagreeing with them but judging that it is better not to resist? Even if we may 
argue that Joe should have done something to act against the political system and 
judge it as a moral failure that he does not do so, I think that it still makes a 
difference whether he complies willingly or unwillingly. Even if it does not matter 
for anyone else, it makes a difference for, and to, the agent. Consequently, even if 
outcomes seem to be the same in the outside world, they are not – agents 
themselves are not somehow separate from the world and their inner life, the 
31
For a critical discussion see: Hunt (2000). 
32
A similar argument is presented by Naylor (1984, pp. 249-258). For a similar argument 
in the context of deontic ethics see: Speak, D. (2002). 
33
Admittedly the following argument is subject to objections and the issue of the 
importance of ‘flickers of freedom’ is contentious. For the purpose of the current argument, 
however, it is sufficient to outline the importance of intentions and actions for moral 
responsibility ascription and moral action 

---

161 
meaning they make of things and the attitudes they take to events makes a 
difference 
in the world
. Perhaps that difference is small in the grand scheme of the 
utilitarian calculus of all the souls (although do not tell it to poor Joe), nevertheless, 
it is a morally relevant one.
34
Not counting that difference at all is to treat the agent 
as if he or she was not there.
One could argue that perhaps it would be better for an agent not to resist and suffer 
inner struggle. That perhaps depends on individual psychology and the weight 
given in a moral calculus to well-being vs. maintaining one’s values even if one 
decides not to act on them. Whatever Joe’s outcome of that calculation, it is largely 
irrelevant for the point I am trying to make: that the difference in an agent is 
morally significant and sufficiently so to make for morally significant alternatives.
An objection could be made that this account stretches the notion of ‘moral action’ 
too far. However, in 
Moral Enhancement and Freedom
, Harris eloquently argued 
that what matters (and should matter) in moral enhancement is not only whether 
people do good, but that they do good from the moral perspective. An event-
universal, to use Rowe’s language, is either a merely morally relevant action or a 
moral action, depending on what kind of event-particular it is an instance of. Here I 
wish to extend this point, and argue that it not only matters that a good action is 
done from a moral perspective, but that the mechanics of the agent’s choices is also 
important.