Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

7.3. 
Moral praise and blame 
7.3.1. Black vs. the God Machine 
The God Machine has parallels with Frankfurt’s counterexample to the 
incompatibilist ‘principle of alternate possibilities’ (PAP)
22
. Beginning on page 
835, Frankfurt asks us to consider a following example: 
‘Suppose someone -- Black, let us say -- wants Jones to perform a certain 
action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but 
he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until 
Jones
is about to make up his mind what to do, and does nothing unless it 
is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is 
going to decide to do something 
other 
than what he wants him to do. If it 
does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, 
Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he 
does do, what he wants him to do. ... Now suppose that Black never has 
to show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to 
perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In 
that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral 
responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if Black had not 
been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. It would be quite 
unreasonable to excuse Jones for his action ...on the basis of the fact that 
he could not have done otherwise. This fact played no role at all in 
leading him to act as he did. ... Indeed, everything happened just as it 
would have happened without Black’s presence in the situation and 
without his readiness to intrude into it.’ 
Frankfurt describes his argument as one which shows that one can be morally 
responsible even if one could not have done otherwise. It is interesting to consider 
the implications of the God Machine for the ascription of moral blame and praise: 
in the God Machine World, we never know whether someone is or is not 
22
According to the principle of alternate possibilities, a person’s act is free if and only if 
that person could have done otherwise. 

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praiseworthy for their lack of acting grossly immorally. This would certainly 
change the way we think about morality with respect to grossly immoral acts.
There remains a question about the value of knowing whether refraining from a 
grossly immoral action was praiseworthy or not, vis-à-vis considering the moral 
weight of the averted harms of immoral acts. Moreover, the worry about being able 
to ascribe moral blame and moral praise in the God Machine scenario seems to be 
putting the cart before the horse. If we see the accuracy of our ascription of moral 
blame and moral praise as having a solely instrumental value in promoting (via 
rewarding with praise) or discouraging (via expressing blame) certain acts, by 
praising everyone indiscriminately, we can assure that the deserving are rewarded. 
Inaccurate moral praise for those who indeed formed the intention would only 
encourage the kind of thinking and predisposition that lead to forming a bad intent, 
yet we may rest assured that this would not result in grossly immoral acts anyway, 
since the God Machine would intervene if such intention was formed again.
There are two crucial ways in which the God Machine scenario differs from 
Frankfurt’s thought experiment. Firstly, in Frankfurt’s scenario, Jones’ actions are 
attributable to Jones since Black did not exert his influence on Jones. If Black was 
going to act is such a way to make Jones refrain from acting immorally, and he had 
to exert force to cause Jones to refrain from such action, Jones would not be 
considered to be praiseworthy for refraining. The God Machine scenario is more 
ambiguous because there is no obvious external coercion as would be the case if 
Black threatened Jones with a gun, or employed persuasion which would still leave 
Jones’ being able to consider the influence - instead the God Machine acts directly 
on intentions without the knowledge of the influenced actor and thus, in Harris’ 
words ‘bypasses morality’. The influence itself cannot be modified or responded to 
by the agent, at least not in a conscious way. I examine the implications of that in 
later parts of this chapter. At this moment let us focus on the second way in which 
the God Machine scenario differs from Jones & Black thought experiment – the 
issue of the problems created by the fact that the intervention happens without 
agents’ knowledge.

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The God Machine scenario could undermine the value of moral praise. The first 
way this could happen relates to the undermining of reliable self-knowledge coming 
with the God Machine scenario. Since in Savulescu and Persson’s (2012a) world, 
the person forming such an intention would not know that this intention has been 
changed by an authority outside of herself, all those subject to the God Machine 
interventions – both those who would have ‘changed their mind’ and those who 
would not – would have good reasons to doubt whether they deserve praise. 
Another way in which the value of moral praise could be undermined would be 
analogical to a situation when students are indiscriminately praised for their effort 
and hard work, even though some of the students did not study at all while others 
did. It matters to us that the praise is deserved and given on the basis of a roughly 
accurate assessment of reality. Thus, even though there were some instrumental 
reasons for continuing to praise, ultimately the undermining of the value of such 
praise could plausibly lead the God Machine society to abandon any talk about 
praise and blame, at least in so far as that includes taking credit for living in a 
society without grossly immoral acts. Those whose moral actions were 
praiseworthy could perhaps still freely choose to do the right thing, yet, when the 
stakes are high, their actions would cease to be a subject of moral praise. 
23
However, perhaps the above worry is overblown, given that a) we normally do not 
expect nor give praise for refraining from grossly immoral actions, b) we presently 
are also not certain about the extent to which the apparent moral behaviours (or lack 
of grossly immoral acts) of others are due to their virtue, and c) perhaps the God 
Machine could be treated as an instance of moral luck. Let us consider these 
reservations in turn.
It could be argued that the undermining of praise for refraining from grossly 
immoral actions in the God Machine society is unimportant because we normally 
do not give praise for not doing great evils anyway. Our unwillingness to kill an 
innocent person is something we expect and may see as a morally good thing, but 
not something deserving of moral praise. It then becomes irrelevant (for our doubts 
about moral praise in the God Machine scenario) whether the inability to kill an 
23
Although so far this section has simplified the issue of praise and blame in relation to 
action, this way of elucidating the implications of the scenario shed light on why we could 
find the God Machine scenario not only alien but also troubling. 

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innocent person is due to insurmountable squeamishness, strongly held values or 
preferences, or the God Machine– as we would not give any praise anyway. The 
question of moral praise and blame in relation to a person’s preferences seems to 
become more important when we consider an intention to act rather than refrain 
from acting. The question of moral praise and blame in relation to a person’s 
preferences seems to become important when we consider those actions one intends 
to commit rather than those actions one refrains from committing.
However, this seems not to be the case when a temptation (a