Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

6.3.7.
 
Conclusions
The discussion of Ricoeur’s view of the compositional constraints put on narrative 
illustrates a problem that many narrative views are facing: the problem of striking a 
balance between positing criteria that will make identity truly narrative on the one 
hand, and maintaining descriptive accuracy as well as a link between narrative 
identity structure and the ability to lead a full and flourishing life on the other. I 
have argued that the homophony criterion is too stringent, as it may come at the 
cost of discarding valuable parts of experience, while the dialogical-self may fulfil 
the functions Ricoeur assigns to a homophonic narrative: the mediation between 
sameness and selfhood, structuring and making meaningful the voluntary and 
involuntary aspects of the internal and external, setting an environment in which 
life-plans are constructed and enacted. 

---

128 
6.4.
 
Arguments against the strong ethical narrative view and the strong 
psychological narrative view 
In earlier parts of this chapter we considered two approaches to narrative identity 
and examined their application to the effort of drawing normative conclusions. 
However, one can also criticise the view (sometimes referred to as the ethical 
narrative view) that a coherent and continuous narrative is necessary (or at least 
necessarily highly conducive) to a flourishing life. Vice’s objection is a direct 
response to the strong ethical narrative claim that we 
ought 
to think of ourselves as 
protagonists in our own stories if our lives are to have any meaning at all (Vice, 
2003, p. 101). Vice argues that if we take the narrative view ‘seriously’ and 
‘literally,’ it requires that we cast ourselves as ‘characters—usually the 
protagonists—of the stories we tell or could tell about ourselves’ (2003, p. 93).
Moreover, Vice sees this view of one’s life as having potentially harmful 
implications. Vice argues that if we try to mould ourselves to fit a narrative and 
conceive of ourselves as a particular ‘character’ (which she thinks the narrative 
view recommends) then we are likely to be more prone to self-deception, and may 
undermine who we really are in our efforts to fit the trappings of a specific 
preconceived character. Vice argues that in doing so we run the risk of constraining 
autonomy and being inauthentic, since those who try to live up to the standards of 
their perceived identity are limited to making choices consistent with that perceived 
identity.
A crucial issue here concerns the stringency of the criteria required for the creation 
of a specifically narrative identity. Mackenzie and Poltera (2010) reject the 
conception of narrative self-constitution that underpins many “story-telling” 
critiques, such as those of Strawson (2004) or Vice (2003). For example, Strawson 
(2004), suggests that narrative self-creation involves thinking of oneself as if one 
were a character in a novel, or ‘thinking of oneself and one’s life as fitting the form 
of some recognized genre’ (p. 442). Mackenzie and Poltera (2010) argue that 
criticism of the sort advanced by Strawson and Vice present narrative accounts as 
more rigid than they are.

---

129 
However, it may be that Strawson’s and Vice’s arguments apply more readily to 
some demanding accounts of narrative identity. For example, Ricoeur’s (1984, 
1985, 1988, 1992) account of narrative identity is sometimes seen as imposing 
stringent criteria of structural unity of the story and homophony (single, unified 
authorial consciousness). On the one hand, critics argue that these stringent 
compositional criteria could lead to meaningful and important experiences going 
unnoticed, being trivalised or repressed under the Ricoeurian approach (e.g. as in 
Muzak, 2007). Giving examples of multi-cultural experience and cultural dis- or re-
location, Maan (2010) suggests that a widening of structural requirements (e.g. 
allowing a multitude of voices) would allow those ignored but important parts of 
experience to be integrated into a process of creative re-assignment of meaning. On 
the other hand, Ricoeur’s approach can be seen as a response to a perceived 
postmodern fracturing of the subject. Loosening the criteria too much risks making 
the narrative indistinguishable from a description or a dream sequence, thereby 
resulting in the loss of what makes a narrative identity specifically narrative. This 
discussion, rooted in the literary tradition, has its analogue in discussions within the 
field of narrative psychotherapy (e.g. Hermans, 2003, Hermans and Dimaggio, 
2004).
Even if the full blow of Vice’s and Strawson’s claims here are taken only by the 
more demanding narrative views, other aspects of their critiques remain relevant to 
approaches based on a more flexible narrative account. Contrary to what Mackenzie 
and Poltera (2010) argue, they cannot be easily discounted. Vice and Strawson can 
be seen as advancing two points. The first questions the universality of the 
psychological narrative thesis, and the second questions the necessity of attaching 
value to consistent narration, as in the ethical narrative thesis.
First, the empirical and conceptual question is whether people do indeed think 
about themselves in narrative terms. Vice (2003) questions the 
psychological 
narrative thesis
and argues that while some people may think of their lives and 
themselves in narrative terms, few do; and those who do, tend to do so only when 
they are being particularly reflective (p. 97). I am uncertain whether this is 
empirically true, and the strength of the argument will depend on the identity 
criteria posited by a particular theory of narrative identity. However, it is plausible 

---

130 
to posit individual differences in cognitive styles which influence the tendency for 
individuals to create life-narratives generally and identity-constituting narratives 
specifically. Perhaps a conceptually and methodologically sophisticated empirical 
philosophy study will shed light on this issue. In the absence of convincing 
evidence, it is plausible to assume that there are some people who understand their 
own lives through an elaborate narrative and in fact explicitly evoke it on a regular 
basis, there are other people that re-construe and evoke an otherwise transparent 
self-narrative only when prompted by circumstances, and there are yet others who 
do not construct their lives through and in a narrative that would fulfil criteria for an 
identity-narrative of a given narrative view even if they use stories to communicate 
meaningful experiences (Strawson, 2004). The latter sort of people may not be