Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

6.3.4.
 
Deficit in integration between multiple self- or other-
representations as an example of a narrative not fulfilling the 
homophony criterion 
What Dimaggio and Semerari call a deficit in integration between multiple self-
other representations illustrates how the authorial consciousness can be fractured. 
Dimaggio and Semerari give an example of a hypothetical male patient who tells of 
an episode with a friend as a main character; in that one life episode, he describes 
the person as tender, affectionate, loving, and loved. A few minutes later, in the 
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Similarly, Lysaker and Lysaker (2002) note how schizophrenics’ stories can be barren, 
cacophonous or disorganized. The case of schizophrenics is widely discussed test-case for 
narratives in the discussion about narrative identity.

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same session, he relates another episode involving the same person, who is now 
seen as being intrusive, violent, lacking in respect, and detested. If the patient is 
challenged too quickly, ‘But a few minutes ago you described another side to this 
person,’ the patient might reply, ‘Who, me? I have never thought that worm to be 
worthy of anything. She’s just a worm, and I want to get rid of her.’ Such replies 
can have a paranoid streak to them. He might say, ‘You’re poking fun at me, 
Doctor, just like all of them. You’re against me. You take her side. You don’t 
respect me either. You couldn’t care less about what I’m saying.’ (Dimaggio and 
Semerari, 2001, p. 13) This paradigmatic example demonstrates how two stories 
that cannot be fit into one coherent narrative can signal an underlying problem in 
attributions and interpretations (which presumably should be carried out with the 
help of an identity forming narrative).
The first question that arises is to what extent the switching between incompatible 
representations is necessarily a symptom of pathology (for simplicity, as indicated 
by the presence of externally noticeable harm or distress). Are the self-perception 
inconsistencies of Dimaggio and Semerari’s patient harmful mainly because they 
are ultimately rooted in an inconsistency in a person-narrative, or because they 
bring problems that come with switching between differently valenced emotions 
and involve distress and rage? Dimaggio and Semerari analyse psychotherapy 
transcripts, so their examples are bound to include examples of harmful narratives. 
A structurally similar inconsistency, however, could be referred to in different 
circumstances as a rich perception of the world.
Secondly, we could ask to what extent incompatible representations translate into a 
disrupted identity narrative? At times, our representations of ourselves might be 
inconsistent. For example, we might see ourselves as overburdened and swamped 
with family and professional obligations when we are tired, but see ourselves as 
capable of juggling the multiple demands of a full and busy life when rested and 
energetic. Anything that changes our emotional state radically can effect that 
change in perspective and so the same question may be asked about the effects of 
biomedical enhancement. Mood states can be seen as packages: they include 
representations and evaluation of the world, physical postures, ways of walking, 
easy or more difficult access to certain memories, acceptance of a differing level of 

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risk, etc. If moral and social enhancement is to be effective in any way, it will likely 
change our behaviours and dispositions by changing one aspect of our state or a 
propensity to be in one or another state. However, since our states are packages, the 
change in emotions will likely result – at least sometimes – in a change in one’s 
stance towards the world and oneself. If the change is of a sufficient magnitude 
and/or quality, this may result in one authorial voice being present at one time, and 
a different at another. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent that would be ethically 
problematic above and beyond ordinary changes in mood. This elucidates two 
problems with the application of narrative identity theories that require one 
authorial voice to be present – a) a lack of ways to evaluate whether the single-
authorial voice has dissolved, and b) confusion over the ethical importance lacking 
a homophonic structure.