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physics, but the pill also happens to act directly on her neural circuitry governing
mood and emotion—causing Esperanza to feel depressed most of the time.
Contrast this with the case of Ernesto, who has a similar level of learning difficulty
but does not experience any obvious side-effects. However, because he is now able
to learn so much more effectively, he becomes lonely—his old friends will not play
with him because now ‘he is too smart’. Despite the efforts of teachers and parents
to improve the situation, Ernesto becomes increasingly isolated. In Ernesto’s case,
although there are no straightforward adverse effects, an improvement in an aspect
of cognitive function causes a behavioural change that brings about a net loss in
wellbeing.
Consider another example, somewhat akin to the theme of Keyes’ (1966)
short
story
Flowers for Algernon
. Esther has severe learning difficulties. She does not
realise that she lacks certain capacities. She is a cheerful person and a pleasure to be
around, and she enjoys life. She does not display challenging behaviour and so does
not require any medication. A new drug comes onto the market
that has been shown
to improve cognitive function in people with less severe mental disability. Esther’s
mother decides to try this drug, and there is a marked improvement in Esther’s
cognitive abilities. Unfortunately, the improvement is not significant enough to
enable her to be more independent: although she
understands her environment
better, there is no great change in her wellbeing. However, for the first time, she
starts to notice the jokes that people make at her expense, and she is acutely aware
of her limitations. Although, as Mill (1859) famously wrote, it may be ‘better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied,’ in some cases the cost of knowledge or
reflective awareness may be too high.
As the example of Esther demonstrates, there may be some cases where
intervention in cognitive capacities is beneficial in the narrow sense, but not in the
wide sense. In this situation we could say that intervention is an enhancement in the
narrow sense, but not an enhancement all-things-considered.
The cases of
Esperanza and Ernesto demonstrate the importance of predicting and estimating
costs and benefits. Despite the fact that cognitive enhancement
may
have
significantly negative effects on someone’s life, like those experienced by
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Esperanza and Ernesto, it can be argued that enhancement, in such cases (cognitive
enhancement narrowly understood), usually brings more benefits than harms (in the
wide sense) and is therefore worth pursuing. Education
is important in our societies;
high academic performance often translates into better career prospects and brings a
number of other benefits. Thus, our experience with a number of instances of
enhancement may lead us to say that cognitive enhancement (narrowly understood)
is most likely to be in a person’s interest.
Analogically, the multiple ways of assessing whether an intervention in the moral
sphere is an enhancement mean that interventions in the moral sphere that are
attempting to improve certain function or generally
improve moral agency are
subject to further ethical assessment.
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