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In this section it is not necessary to take a stance on what is sufficient and necessary
for morality or moral judgement. Even if we concede to Harris that moral
judgement properly so called necessarily involves deliberation from a moral stance,
we can still be concerned about the effects of interventions that affect cognitive and
affective capacities that feed into and are related to moral agency. For example,
indiscriminately decreasing the capacity to react with
anger might decrease the
disposition for unjustified violent action as well the ability to be enraged at injustice
and act on it. Whether or not injustice angers us can still be relevant for our moral
agency, even if we accept that what makes the act moral or immoral is not that it
results from anger, but rather relates to the appropriate justification based on moral
reasons and reasoning.
This approach is consistent with the psychological and neuroscientific view of what
psychologists call ‘moral emotions,’ without committing ourselves to meta-ethical
positions such as emotivism (Stevenson, 1937; Ayer, 1937) or to intuitionism
(Haidt, 2001). The downside of such a wide and loose use of the ‘moral’ is that it
risks clouding the debate. But there is also an advantage to drawing the ‘moral
sphere’ widely. This wider use of ‘moral’ allows
us to look at a range of
interventions that affect the underpinnings of moral agency and reflect on whether
the intervention is beneficial for moral agency specifically.
The proposed way of using ‘moral’ is perhaps not the most intuitive. We might
assume that moral enhancement makes people better moral agents. However, it is a
way analogical to the use of the term ‘cognitive enhancement.’ Cognitive
enhancement is often understood as a beneficial change to our cognitive capacities
(e.g. Harris, 2007). This does not mean that every cognitive enhancer would make
for wiser, more knowledgeable or better thinking agents. To a large extent, whether
something is a cognitive enhancement is contingent on what kind of skill or
cognitive capacity the agent needs enhanced and to what end the enhanced capacity
is used. Increasing sustained and focused attention
may be a great cognitive
enhancement for those who need to focus on similar tasks for hours. But the same
drug may ‘inspire’ hours of cleaning, as is sometimes reported by students using
Ritalin or Adderall (Vrecko 2013). If the enhanced cognitive capacities are used to
acquire false beliefs, we may end up with agents who are no wiser than before. The
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same intervention can also bring more harm than good if what is needed is flexible,
wider attention, as is the case at some stages of
a creative process or when
reflecting on wider implications of a thought or idea. Thus, where ‘cognitive
enhancement’ is usually used in a sense that implies a possible benefit of a certain
kind, it is open to questioning about whether this particular cognitive enhancer is
truly resulting in better deliberative capacities, knowledge or prudential benefit. It
makes sense to apply an analogical understanding to moral enhancement.
The assessment of whether or not an enhancement is ‘beneficial’ can be done from
the perspective of morality, but may also be based on a prudential evaluation. The
next section further explores the interplay of various ways in which an enhancing
intervention might be beneficial.
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