and edited by Aisha Abdurrahmann Bewley. (The
Mansour H. Mansour,
The Maliki School of Law: Spread
and Domination in North and West Africa 8th to 14th Cen-
turies
c
.
e
. (Bethesda, Md.: Austin and Winfield, 1995).
mamluk
Mamluk means “thing possessed” in Arabic and is
usually used to refer to a military slave. Mamluks
were introduced into the Islamic lands by the
Abbasid caliphs al-Mamun and al-Mutasim in the
early ninth century
c
.
e
. Al-Mamun (r. 813–833)
seized the throne after a civil war and, feeling he
could not rely on the loyalty of the traditional
army, he turned instead to slave troops. His
younger brother, al-Mutasim (r. 833–842), spear-
headed this project of acquiring slave soldiers,
and he continued the process when he became
caliph
upon al-Mamun’s death. Reliance upon a
mamluk military elite is one of the unique char-
acteristics of medieval and early modern Islamic
government. It continued under the Ottoman
sultans until the end of the 19th century.
Mamluks usually came from Central Asia or
eastern Europe, where they were purchased as
young boys who were either prisoners of war or
sold into
slavery
by their families who knew the
potential for power and prestige that awaited them
as mamluks. Upon their purchase the mamluks
were converted to Islam, placed in a dormitory
with fellow mamluks, and launched on an
edU
-
cation
that included some religious instruction
but focused primarily on the military sciences,
in particular the cavalry. Upon “graduating” from
this program the mamluk was manumitted, but
he remained in a close bond of loyalty to his pur-
chaser, a caliph,
sUltan
, prince, or high mamluk
officer. This bond was considered comparable to
the relationship between father and son.
The strength and appeal of the mamluk system
lay in the high military acumen of the mamluks
and their complete loyalty and devotion to the
ruler who had purchased and trained them. That
this loyalty was essentially personal constituted
the system’s chief drawback. It therefore strength-
ened the rule of one caliph or sultan, but loyalty
was not necessarily or easily transferred to his
successor. With this in mind, hopefuls often spent
their time as princes purchasing and training
their own mamluk troops. The ability to pull off
a smooth transition of power, however, depended
not only on the strength of the prince’s mamluks
vis-à-vis his predecessor’s but also on his ability
to convince at least a few of these latter mamluks
to swear an oath of loyalty to him. Thus a system
initiated to strengthen the military and preserve
the empire also brought with it real risks. Under
the Abbasids, the mamluk Turkish commanders
accrued more and more authority, on occasion
even killing the caliph. Although this state of
affairs was denounced by the
Ulama
and political
theoreticians, no ruler could circumvent his own
need for mamluks.
Reflecting the overall strength and appeal of
this system, in e
gypt
and s
yria
mamluks ruled in
their own right from 1250 to 1517, making their
regime, rather aptly named the Mamluks, one of
the longest and most durable Islamic regimes of
the medieval period. The very nature of the sys-
tem ensured that only the most capable rose to the
highest positions of power, a characteristic that
served all sides for many centuries.
See also a
bbasid
c
aliphate
; d
elhi
s
Ultanate
;
J
anissary
.
Heather N. Keaney
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