Press, 1983); W. B. Fisher, The Cambridge History of
sity Press, 2003).
Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979
The overthrow of the shah of i
ran
, m
oham
-
mad
r
eza
p
ahlavi
(1919–80), in 1979 by popu-
list forces led by Ayatollah r
Uhollah
k
homeini
(1902–89) established the Islamic Republic of
Iran. This revolution has been regarded as one
of the most significant in modern history, along
with the French Revolution of 1789 and the Rus-
sian Revolution of 1917. What makes the Iranian
Revolution unique is the important role played
by religion. Even though antishah sentiments
were held by a wide spectrum of urban Iranians,
Islamic revolutionary symbolism, together with
anti-Western sentiments, played a major role in
uniting the opposition. Moreover, the creation of a
Shii revolutionary government under Khomeini’s
leadership inspired radical Islamic groups in
many Muslim countries during the 1980s and
1990s. The revolution was also a factor in several
Persian Gulf wars during this period. Many Irani-
ans emigrated to the United States as a result of
the revolution.
Bolstered by development assistance from
the United States and increased
oil
revenues, the
shah’s government pushed a program of aggres-
sive social and economic reforms in the 1960s
and 1970s to make Iran a modern nation in accor-
dance with Western standards of progress. These
reforms sought to promote industrialization and
land reform, improve
Women
’s rights, and support
the establishment of Western-style coeducational
institutions. It was reminiscent of m
UstaFa
k
emal
a
tatUrk
’s modernization program in t
Urkey
dur-
ing the 1920s. The program was implemented in
an authoritarian manner without seeking popular
support and was plagued by inflation, land specu-
lation, and spiraling unemployment. Jalal Al-e
Ahmad (d. 1969), an Iranian writer, condemned
the increased Westernization of his country and
called it a disease—gharbzadegi (Westoxication).
The United States, through its widely acknowl-
edged support for the shah, was increasingly seen
as being the source of this “malady.” Iranians
objected to the land reforms, rapid sexual integra-
tion in schools and the workforce, compulsory
Western dress in public contexts while traditional
religious forms of dress such as the veil or chador
were banned, using the pre-Islamic Achaemenid
solar calendar in place of the Islamic lunar
cal
-
endar
, and giving preferential treatment to West-
ern—first British, then American—business and
diplomatic interests. The more the resistance to
the shah’s modernization projects grew, the more
the shah’s secret police force, SAVAK (notorious
for illegal and violent methods), compelled com-
pliance and repressed dissent. Growing disaffec-
tion with the shah’s rule among diverse sectors of
Iran’s population testified to the increasing sense
of internal corruption of the Iranian national
character, expressed in Shii terms as seduction by
the West for ephemeral material benefits. Many
Iranians felt they were losing their Islamic identity
and culture.
Intellectuals such as a
li
s
hariati
(d. 1977),
imprisoned by the shah in 1964, and religious
authorities such as Ayatollah Khomeini, forced
into exile by the shah in 1964, gave religious
shape to the political forces aligning in opposi-
tion to the shah. Both Shariati and Khomeini
maintained that Islam must play a revolutionary
role against tyranny, capitalism, corruption, and
Western influence. Khomeini in particular was
speaking as a leading member of the Twelve-Imam
Shii
Ulama
, who believed that they acted as repre-
sentatives of and deputies for the last Shii Imam
(the 12th divinely appointed descendant of the
prophet m
Uhammad
) until his messianic return
from Occultation (
ghayba
) at an undefined time
in the future to eradicate injustice and corruption,
inaugurating an age of universal Islam before J
Udg
-
ment
d
ay
. Moreover, the Twelver jurist who was
acknowledged by his juridical peers and the rest
of the Shii community (
umma
) to be the supreme
aUthority
was believed to have divine investiture
(nass) and infallibility (isma) in matters of religious
law and everyday life. An ayatollah so recognized
was known as the marjaa al-taqlid, or “source
of imitation.” Further, Khomeini, in a series of
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