Development of Japanese Marketing Background Japan is one of the very few foreign countries where the marketing philosophy is well-understood, widely accepted, and effectively applied

Development of Japanese Marketing Background Japan is one of the very few foreign countries where the marketing philosophy is well-understood, widely accepted, and effectively applied. Japanese marketing management success has been described as a "classic textbook case" of applying the marketing philosophy-carefully studying consumer wants and needs in international markets, developing products incorporating desired features, and putting effective marketing programs into place to support them (Morita 1983, Nakanishi 1982). But Japanese marketing is rooted in a much different orientation than American marketing, for it emphasizes a definite international dimension. To survive Japan has to import almost all of its raw materials, process them, and export finished products. Moder Japanese companies, therefore, have increasingly become internationally attuned, used to competing in world markets, seeking international product acceptance, and striving to achieve market share (Fukui 1972; Pempel 1982, pp. 296-313). For example, in the 1960s Japanese marketers conducted extensive marketing research studies on a worldwide basis, seeking out profitable market opportunities, knowing full well that they did not have the present capabilities of serving them (Morita 1983, Young 1979). An international focus became one of the important factors shaping the marketing mix, particularly in the 1970s, as Japan increased its competitiveness in world markets. Research and development, product planning, pricing distribution, and advertising activities all had a definite international focus. By contrast, American companies chose an internal domestic focus and exhibited very little interest in emerging international opportunities, particularly in "totally foreign" markets such as those of Japan. The result is that Japan in the 1980s may be far better prepared to capitalize on global market opportunities (Dentsu 1978; Holthus 1983, pp. 65-66; Morishyma 1982). In addition to an international orientation, Japanese management is characterized by its pragmatism and flexibility, which may partially explain why the marketing philosophy was embraced and absorbed so readily by Japanese businesses ("Kaigi in. . ." 1981; Morishyma 1982, p. 52; Shimaguchi 1978; Torii 1982). Japanese managers look for new approaches, techniques, methods, and processes, and indeed, search restlessly for that which is moder, up-to-date, new, and different (Fields 1983b, pp. 14-15). But it would be erroneous to believe that the impact of embracing new Western marketing concepts and ideas was to Westernize and radically alter fundamental Japanese constructs. For example, the result of applying the marketing philosophy has not been the Americanization of Japanese business methods and approaches, but rather the Japanization of American marketing. What has occurred is the modification and adaptation of selected American marketing constructs, ideas, and practices to adjust them to the Japanese culture, which remains intact. And what emerges is a different marketing approach, one that is uniquely Japanese but which incorporates important marketing concepts that apply (Fields 1980b, 1983b, pp. 30-45; Shimaguchi 1978; Torii 1982; Yokota 1980). Understanding four related concepts which are always at work in this adjustment process can help outsiders understand Japanese marketing approaches and practices, namely, pseudo harmonism, eclecticism, exceptionism, and economic nonfunctionality (Dentsu 1978, Nakane 1970, Rohlen 1974, Shimaguchi and Lazer 1979). Pseudo harmonism emphasizes the importance of maintaining harmony while at the same time acknowledging the existence of an underlying current of discord and disagreement, such as those engendered by an economic rationale. It is the philosophy of expressed gemeinshaft but implied gessellschaft. Eclecticism also emphasizes the human harmony aspects of decisions but underscores the ever present implied trade-off of economic costs. Exceptionism, which is deeply imbedded in Japanese philosophy and stresses exceptions to policies and procedures that are established, makes for numerous paradoxes and seeming inconsistencies, but also permits great flexibility, adaptability, and change. Economic nonfunctionality emphasizes that marketing actions consider individual human factors rather than merely economic efficiency and business profits. Yet, business acknowledges that economic factors are always part of the process, particularly in the long run (Dentsu 1978, pp. 180-182). These four concepts are rooted in such sociocultural factors as the vertical and group oriented structure of Japanese society (Nakane 1970). Japanese tend to identify themselves by organizations such as the section division, company or company group (vertical structure), or by groups to which they belong (group oriented structure). Westerners, by contrast, identify themselves as individuals (individualism), or by occupations and professions (horizontal structures) (Chio 1983; Morishyma 1982, pp. 86-87; Norbury and Bownas 1980; Vogel 1979)
These factors help explain the close bonds that continue to exist among manufacturers and unprofitable wholesalers, distributors, or retailers who, despite their poor profit records, are maintained as members of a manufacturer's distribution system. They may be carried for an extended time period and even given generous assistance, although the manufacturer is, at the same time, attuned to profits. It may be quite evident that the relationship must be broken, but a propitious time will be sought. For example, a wholesaler may be dropped when the president of one of the firms retires, or new conditions arise. In a similar manner, unprofitable salespeople are not fired except under conditions of extreme financial difficulty; rather, support and assistance is offered to try to make them more effective ("Japan: A Nation. . ." 1981, Shimaguchi 1978, Yoshioka 1983). In addition, three important differences between Japanese and American companies, which are rooted in significant market factors, must always be considered. As compared with the U.S., Japan is: * More homogeneous, although some regional differences do exist. These are, however, much less pronounced than in the United States. * Largely a middle-class market, and the differentials between the lowest and highest income classes are far smaller. * Geographically a very small area, which makes it much easier for companies to remain in close touch with markets. This facilitates transportation, communication, and distribution (Dentsu 1978, pp. 1-20; Fields 1983b).

Stages in the Development of Japanese Marketing Table 1 depicts the five general stages in the development of marketing in Japan: premarketing, marketing awareness and interest, marketing acceptance, marketing expansion, and global marketing.2 The premarketing phase (1946-1953) was a period of creating adequate supplies of products to satisfy basic consumer needs. Included was the transfer of technology, including marketing technology, from the more developed countries and of improving the poor image of Japanese products. Random sampling and the rudiments of marketing research, particularly surveys, were introduced as a direct result of the work of Dr. Edward Deming, and the Japan Society of Commercial Sciences was founded. During the 1953-1964 phase of marketing awareness and interest, executives and academicians began to pay attention to marketing as a discipline, its approaches, and management implications. Two associations important to the development of marketing, the Japan Productivity Center (1955) and the Japan Marketing Association (1957) were established, and the first marketing research agency and first marketing periodicals appeared. The economic climate of the time was characterized by rapid growth, increasing liberalization of trade, and the emergence of the first consumption revolution. The latter saw a general change in both consumer philosophy and consumption behavior from an orientation of saving, postponing purchases, and conserving, to one of mass consumption spurred on by the widespread use of advertising to support mass production and distribution. Several American marketing books were translated and summarized on such subjects as marketing management, marketing principles, product policy, marketing research, and sales promotion. In 1953 Mr. Tsuyoshi Hamano, a former executive vice president of Toshiba, published the first Japanese marketing book, Marketing. Since no equivalent term existed in Japanese, the term marketing was translated literally and became part of the Japanese language. The discipline became firmly imbedded, and in 1963 Professor Shoji Murata of Keio University conducted one of the first Japanese university marketing courses. The third phase of marketing acceptance and diffusion occurred from 1964 to 1969. It marked the growth of consumer affluence, the emergence of luxury markets and a high consumption society, which further spurred the acceptance of marketing approaches. Japanese manufacturers made a concerted effort to diversify their domestic product lines and also to cultivate international markets. Distribution received increasing attention with the development of the Association of Voluntary Chains and the Tokyo Distribution Center. The 1970-1973 period, the fourth phase, saw extension of the marketing domain and its responsibilities. Japanese marketing thought became concerned with the effects of the oil boycott, environmental pollution, quality of life, and consumerism issues. This led to the development of social marketing thought as marketing managers were confronted with the challenges of new societal issues. The last period, from 1974 to the present, is one of global marketing. Japan has been paying increasing attention to international markets, emphasizing its interfaces with other countries, paying attention to the reduction of trade barriers, signing orderly market agreements, and rationalizing trading approaches. During this era some of the basic markets have matured, the oil shocks had their great impact, exports were emphasized, and Japan offered keen competition in a broader set of products and generated trade surpluses, resulting in rising global nationalism and protectionism. Among marketing managers greater emphasis is placed on marketing strategy and strategic planning. Japan's worldwide marketing success is recognized by all industrial countries as it prepares to cultivate the market opportunities of high technology markets and knowledge industries.
Government and Competition
Government
There are three widely held misconceptions about the relationships between government and marketing in Japan. First is the notion that the main reason for Japan's marketing success is government protection and direction of business, manifest in the form of Japan, Inc. Second is the belief that Japanese markets are effectively closed to international competition and cannot be penetrated by outside companies. Third is the widespread notion that Japanese companies do not compete among themselves but act in consort or as "monopolies" in the form of large, vertically and horizontally integrated organizations-Zaibatsu. The actual situation, in reality, is considerably different (Abbeglen 1977, Drucker 1983, Fukui 1972, Holthus 1983, van Rooyen 1983). Governmental agencies such as MITI can and do exert directional influence and, indeed, act to stimulate or deter industries. But they do not rule by decree, or direct and dictate, nor do they have the authority to do so, and highly centralized, governmentdirected planning does not exist (Fukui 1972, Pempel 1982). Rather, they use an administrative guidance procedure built on a consensus of what is deemed best for all concerned. The very objectives of various governmental agencies, such as MITI, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the Fair Trade Commission, as well as those of respective bureaucrats, vary greatly and do conflict (Davidson 1983). Compared with U.S. marketers, however, Japanese marketers do work closely and harmoniously with governmental agencies. Japanese marketing executives work hard at maintaining excellent working relationships with government officials and inform them of key projects and strategies that fall in their respective areas of interest (DeMente 1981, "Japan's Industrial. . ." 1977, Morishyma 1982). The relationships are deemed to be particularly beneficial and effective in establishing a new industry or developing a new market. And often the perceptions and concerns of the public and private sectors do correspond, partly because of the homogeneity of Japanese society (Pempel 1982, pp. 46-85). Japanese marketers, unlike their American counterparts, view harmonious government relationships as an important factor in developing the marketing mix. And while most markets are relatively free and do exhibit keen competition, Japanese marketers have different perceptions about the government's role. Yet Japan's growth, particularly in the past decade, is rooted in the initiatives of the private and not the public sector
.
Competition
While Americans often see Japanese companies as cooperating rather than competing, the facts do not support this contention. And unlike European industries, Japan does not merely have one or a few large companies specializing in each industry. For instance, while the U.S. has four automobile manufacturers, Japan has seven, although MITI, from 1963 to the present, has attempted to gain exemption from the antimonopoly laws to create but three large auto firms. They maintained that these companies would be better able to compete with foreign rivals. MITI failed, however, because the smaller auto manufacturers, such as Honda and Mazda, succeeded in fighting off such attempts and, indeed, through aggressive competition, established their market niches. The smaller companies still remain competitive, and seven of the world's twenty largest auto producers are now Japanese. The most typical Japanese situation is that of a number of companies with similar product lines aggressively attempting to gain favor by competing in mass markets. Competition is keen, and although Japanese companies generally regard duplication as inefficient, Japanese marketers recognize that competitive pressures have generated efficiency (Totoki 1983). Japanese executives have expressed the feeling that having survived fierce domestic competition, the international competition becomes far easier to deal with (Morita 1983). It should be noted that the Japanese concept of competition does not correspond with that of the U.S. (Totoki 1983). Japanese marketing executives speak of "hard and fair competition," words used to connote the resistance to mergers and takeovers that are so much a part of U.S. business practice. They are not acceptable strategies to either Japanese labor or management, which is understandable in the light of such practices as lifetime employment (Morishyma 1982, Pempel 1982). Moreover, the U.S. merger movement has a connotation of monopoly for the Japanese (Hamano 1982). The hard and fair competition concept also refers to the many limits set by smaller retailers on larger ones, such as space, building, and hours of operation limits, to curb excessive competition that would result in such low prices that they are driven out of business. But the hard and fair competition idea permits marketing arrangements, such as price and advertising discounts, that would likely be considered illegal in the U.S. As in every country, some Japanese markets, such as agriculture, are protected. But Japan also suffers from an image rooted in its protective activities of the 1950s and 1960s when its markets were in fact closed to the rest of the world. This image is now exacerbated by Japan's large trade surpluses, which leads to the criticism that international companies are essentially closed to non-Japanese business (Holthus 1983). But Japanese markets can be penetrated effectively if American corporations adopt a long run perspective and treat them like an R&D project, apply the marketing philosophy just as Japanese businesses did in entering American markets, and work hard at implementing effective strategies (Dentsu 1978, van Rooyen 1983, Yoshioka 1983). Japanese markets have been described as being analogous to a walnut, for the "walnut's rich and nutritious contents are covered by a hard shell. Once one cracks the shell, one may enjoy the tasty contents. But to extricate the meat in its entirety one must carefully maneuver around a complicated and fragile internal structure. Without an understanding of the inner complexity, one may be able to obtain only small crushed pieces of the meat"

Marketing Organization, Decisions, and Strategies

Organization
Ownership in American corporations is clearly established, for it is in the hands of the shareholders. In Japan, however, company members rather than shareholders are deemed to be the "real owners." There is no literal direct translation in Japanese of employer and employee, or owner and employee; rather, the words shain, meaning member of the company, or jugyoin, meaning the members engaging in the business, are used. It is the collective concept of the company that is referred to, whereby all members are deemed to own the company and the company members, in turn, refer to the company they work for as wagasha, meaning our company or my company. This approach, of course, has significant implications for responsibility-authority relationships, employee motivations, and decision-making processes (Murata 1983, Ouchi 1981). The previously mentioned caveat of the existence of paradoxes that can mislead by pointing up apparent similarities and disguising differences between U.S. and Japanese companies is particularly relevant to a discussion of the organization of marketing activities (Chio 1983, Sullivan 1983). It must be noted that in Japanese companies, substance need not follow form, organizational position is not equated with authority, and authority cannot be deduced from an organization chart. Marketing functions and responsibilities tend to be loosely defined, with the existence of overlapping responsibilities that do not fit neatly into departmental units. Japanese personnel, moreover, do not see their duties as being tied to one functional area, either within or outside of marketing ("Kaigi in . . ." 1981). Whereas American marketers such as marketing researchers, advertising, or sales managers tend to identify with their professions, Japanese marketers identify with their companies. While American companies hiring marketing personnel pay particular attention to such factors as educational background, industry experience, accomplishments, and technical capabilities, Japanese companies place more emphasis on human factors. They see the main marketing management duties as being involved with developing people, getting them to agree, cooperate, work harmoniously, and contribute as much as they can to the company (Rohlen 1974). Hiring marketing personnel is not just a matter of buying marketing skills but of establishing a most important relationship, often for a lifetime, between the company and the employee, whereby the employee becomes an integral part of the company (England 1983, Takezawa and Whitehall 1981). Therefore, Japanese companies do not hire university graduates as marketing experts and bring them in at middle management levels. Rather, they start them at the bottom (Nagata 1981, Takezawa and Whitehall 1981). Marketing and sales managers spend much of their time looking after and counseling subordinates and helping distributors, wholesalers, and retailers become more effective (Shimaguchi 1978). This in turn generates harmony and loyalty, which denotes a basic perceptual difference between American and Japanese executives. Japanese marketing executives consider marketing activities to be primarily units of human activity, while American executives perceive them mainly as impersonal business, sales, and profit activities (Nakajima 1981, Takezawa and Whitehall 1981, Tanouchi 1983). For example, in American companies, marketing is considered to be an area of business specialization delegated to a group of experts and professionals, the marketing staff, who are well-versed in marketing approaches, models, and techniques, and are aware of the profit levels to be achieved. The marketing department's espoused marketing philosophy may or may not be accepted by other functional areas in the company. In Japanese companies, by contrast, responsibilities for marketing are in the hands of a broader but less sophisticated and technically trained group of managers. The marketing turf is not solely the responsibility of the marketing department, for other departments accepting the company's philosophy and the logic of the marketing concept and its approach to business become directly involved in applying it throughout the organization. It is a group responsibility, with a group approach for the performance of marketing activities resulting (Morishyma 1982, Nakane 1970). In U.S. companies, marketing specialists, often armed with MBAs and with experience gained at other companies, are hired for middle and top marketing management positions. By contrast, in Japan, hiring and job assignments are more ambiguous and flexible and are not predicated on the basis of specialization. Rather, people are classified by seniority or by the class of employees with which they were hired, and they progress through the marketing organization as a group (Chio 1983, p. 85-86; Nagata 1981). They tend to assist each other rather than to engage in aggressive competition on an individual basis in order to stand out and make their personal mark. American marketing departments are more logically and neatly designed and have greater specificity, clearcut lines of authority and responsibility, and also greater rigidity. Japanese marketing departments are more confusing, ungainly, group oriented, and less structured, but they are also more flexible. Since overlapping marketing responsibilities occur in Japanese businesses and group participation is stressed, members of the board, the president, and executives from nonmarketing areas may all participate very actively in marketing operations such as sales promotion programs and marketing research. In gathering marketing information, the participation of marketing personnel from such diverse areas as distribution, sales, advertising, and merchandising, as well as personnel from nonmarketing areas such as production and finance, in addition to marketing research specialists, is encouraged (Murata 1983, p. 4). The information gathered by all groups is relayed to top management, and while it is usually less scientific, and its quality is probably not as good as that which might be collected by marketing research experts alone, its overall value may be high because of its breadth and scope. An interesting difference can be noted in the organizational reaction to the occurrence of a major marketing error or an ineffective decision. When this happens in the U.S., it is not unusual to single out the individual marketing executive in charge, or to blame a specific department or a consultant for the error. Indeed, often the person(s) so identified may be fired and top management may feel that it has discharged its responsibility. In Japan, by contrast, when employment involves a lifelong relationship, marketing personnel recognize they will have to live with their major mistakes, adjust, and make the best of it. The department or group concerned, therefore, accepts the responsibility as a group and acknowledges its errors. Blaming one person, particularly someone else, is not tolerated, and the focus becomes one of working out the error as effectively as possible.
Decisions There is still much confusion about the decision-making system of Japanese companies, Ringi-sho, and the role of logic and emotions in the process. Many observers have noted that in Japanese companies, decisions move from the bottom up, while in American companies, they flow from the top down. But that is much too strong and broad a generalization, and some of the confusion exists because proposals for decisions are mistaken for the decisions themselves (Chio 1983, pp. 87-88; DeMente 1981; Doktor 1983; Ohmae 1982b). Proposals for decisions may emanate from all management levels of a company, top, middle, and lower, as well as from workers. The nature of a proposal, however, and its scope differs by management level (Chio 1983). And before a proposal is made, everyone involved is assumed to be aware of the situation, to have the relevant information, and to have been consulted. Consensus building occurs throughout the process, mainly through informal face-to-face meetings, and top management largely provides guidance. The previously mentioned vertical structure and group-oriented behavior promotes consensus building (Nakane 1970, Shimaguchi 1978). While many different opinions and conflicting interests exist among group members, particularly in the initial decision process stages, pseudo harmony, eclecticism, and exceptionism come into play, generating consensus both in reaching a decision and in its implementation (Shimaguchi 1978). And by the time a formal proposal for a decision is presented, since all concerned have had an opportunity to express an opinion and influence the proposal, they are expected to approve it. Reaching the actual decision per se usually becomes a mere formality. But this does not mean that decisions are made at the bottom of the organization. Far from it. As the president of a very large Japanese enterprise explained laughingly, decisions were indeed made at the bottom, but when he did not agree, he merely turned his hanko (signature stamp) upside down and sent the proposal back "until they got it right." In reality, top management decides and plays an important but not exclusive or dictatorial role in making marketing decisions.
The very process of reaching a decision in this manner is, of course, time consuming. Once the implementation stage is reached, however, then the process can move forward swiftly, in a coordinated manner, since all concerned have been involved, are informed, and are psychologically committed to cooperate in carrying out the decision. They are emotionally committed since throughout the whole process, marketing management patiently advises, guides, and persuades, and the members concerned develop a feeling that the decision is their own idea. Loyalty, commitment, cooperation, and coordination flow logically. While economic considerations are the basic elements of marketing decisions, human factors always play a most important role (England 1983, Ouchi 1981a, Shimaguchi 1978). In sales promotion, for example, an approach termed illogical logic or the logic of emotions is sometimes used. In this case, a logical analysis might indicate that a proposed program cannot accomplish the desired marketing objectives and that any additional analysis and strategizing would only serve to underscore the futility of attempting to implement the promotion program. But through persuasion and emotional appeals, marketing management may encourage the marketing organization to at least try. And by so doing, and gaining emotional commitment of the staff, unanticipated good results may be achieved. As a result of the logic of emotions, the initial unattainable objectives may even be realized. A specific form of this approach is based on the Japanese love for festivals, which have great emotional appeal for all company members as well as customers, who are invited to participate. All may get caught up in the process, as emotions tend to surge and build, and amazing marketing results accrue. To the Western mind, this emotional approach to sales promotion decisions may seem a bit strange (Fields 1983a, pp. 74-75). However, it has been very effective, although it does not replace but complements the more logical and rational use of such sales promotion techniques as premiums, sales prices, gifts, and coupons. A similar emphasis on emotion is noted in a comparison of Japanese and Western world advertising as they relate to consumer decisions. Dentsu, in an extensive study of Japanese advertising, concluded that while Western advertising tends to be more verbal, direct message, and logical, Japanese advertising is emotional, suggestive, and indirect (Sadafumi 1978, pp. 1-10). The effective emotional appeals of soft music, beautiful scenery, and soft voices among Japanese are well-documented, as is the emotional tendency of Japanese consumers to choose products and brands because of a manufacturer's good works and favorable image (Fields 1983a, Sadafumi 1978). The logic of the emotion is a basic Japanese marketing theme.
Marketing Strategies
The basic approaches to setting marketing goals and determining strategies by Japanese companies is quite different from American companies, largely because of their unique communications and problem solving processes. Japanese marketers tend to be more intuitive, subjective, communications and human relations oriented, while American marketers tend to be more logical, scientific, data, systems, and procedural oriented (Fields 1983a, Tanouchi 1983). Because of their culture, training, length of time with one company, and interaction with other company members, Japanese marketers become sensitive to the thought processes of fellow managers and are able to communicate clearly in nonverbal terms (Fields 1983a, Toshitani 1982). For example, they are capable of intuitively identifying company goals and strategies and the logical implications that flow therefrom without explicitly developing statements about them as Americans would. They are skilled at moving very rapidly to the selection of the most efficient ways of proceeding without explicitly developing strategy statements (Ohmae 1982b). To do this they maintain close contact all through the process with all concerned; perhaps, as some Japanese executives suggest, such an approach is only applicable in a closed, structured situation where members of a group know, accept, and respect each other and have essentially a deep sense of belonging, an active participation in company decisions, and a good idea of what is taking place (Morishyma 1982, Nakane 1970). As a result, Japanese companies place less reliance on the formal and conceptual aspects of formulating marketing goals and strategies and more emphasis on the implementation and human relations aspects than do American companies (Murata 1983). Because they develop a tight set of company values and beliefs that are well-understood, communicated, and accepted, loose, human oriented structures, processes, and systems are used. This contrasts with the more rigid, logical, prescribed marketing procedures of American firms. Yet, Japanese marketing activities are still goal oriented, directed, and coordinated, and Japanese organizations are able to move swiftly toward their understood objectives. They generally have strengths in implementing rather than formulating marketing strategies. Effectiveness in implementation can be explained by three situations in which Japanese companies may find themselves. First, in the majority of them, middle managers and lower level employees play a substantial role in interpreting and carrying out the marketing philosophy. Characteristically, Japanese companies have large numbers of dedicated middle managers who are carefully trained and promoted gradually from the lower ranks, have lifetime employment, and are thoroughly familiar with the company. They have internalized its philosophy and policies, are able to communicate without great formality, and translate them into effective marketing plans and programs (Tanouchi 1983, Toshitani 1982). While Japanese companies rely more on middle managers, U.S. companies rely more on top management to implement the marketing concept. Second, in some companies top management develops activity norms which incorporate the company's value system and provide general but not explicit guidelines for marketing operations. Thus, even though a company's marketing strategies and policies are not specified, behavioral guidelines are understood, and employees do work in a spontaneous and flexible manner to implement marketing programs (Tanouchi 1983, Toshitani 1982). Third, there are other companies that still have an active founder whose charisma and leadership qualities provide the stimulus for aggressive marketing operations. Many of the newer mass merchandise retailers fall into this category (Nakanishi 1982). But it is feared by some Japanese executives that the dominance of a strong implementation orientation rather than a strategy formulation emphasis results in a tendency to neglect innovation, creativity, and change. The criticism is often raised that some Japanese companies pay too much attention to the present and to what is, in the form of implementation, rather than to future opportunities and what could be the strategic element. It should not be concluded from the above, however, that Japanese executives do not formulate strategies. They do, but perhaps not in the explicit or written manner common in U.S. companies (Murata 1983, Tanouchi 1983). Rather, strategies are implicitly understood and firmly supported by all parties concerned. Japanese marketing strategies are flexible, to reflect changing local conditions and even short-term goals. But in general they tend to be longer range in nature, since Japanese stockholders and financial institutions do not press for short-term profitability. Thus, Japanese companies may take years to gain entry to a market and achieve planned market share, an approach that has paid off handsomely in international markets. Yet, as compared with some of the leading large Western companies, Japanese companies often feel they are at a disadvantage in formulating strategies, especially in comparison with extremely large American multinationals, when they are in turbulent market environments (Hamano 1982, Woronoff 1979). Some feel that the differences in the relatively low levels of profits being realized by Japanese companies reflect U.S. strengths in strategy formulation (Kahn and Pepper 1979).
Concluding Comments
Japanese marketing began with a definite international dimension and international factors remain as important considerations in designing the marketing mix. Although Japan has embraced Western ideas and approaches, what has occurred is the Japanization of American marketing and not the Westernization of Japan. Four related sociocultural concepts rooted in the vertical and group structure of Japanese society underlie marketing management operations: pseudo harmonism, eclecticism, exceptionism, and economic nonfunctionality. As compared with American markets, Japanese markets are more homogeneous, largely middle-class, and geographically smaller and closer. The marketing discipline in Japan progressed through five stages: premarketing (prior to 1953), marketing awareness and interest (1953-1964), acceptance and diffusion of marketing (1965-1969), expansion of the marketing domain (1970-1973), and global marketing (1974-present). The current phase emphasizes marketing strategy, strategic planning, and the cultivation of global marketing opportunities. Three widely held misconceptions about government marketing relationships are that government protection and direction are the main reasons for Japanese marketing success, Japanese markets are closed to competition and cannot be penetrated, and Japanese companies do not compete but get together and act as "monopolies." Among Japanese companies the "real owners" are deemed to be the company members and not the shareholders. Marketing functions and responsibilities tend to be rather loosely defined, and Japanese personnel do not see their duties tied to any one department or functional area. Indeed, all managers and executives may participate actively in marketing activities, for they are considered group activities. Marketing management's main duties are developing and counseling people, getting them to agree, cooperate, work harmoniously and effectively, and looking after and helping subordinates, dealers, distributors, and retailers. Marketing activities are seen primarily as units of human activity rather than as impersonal costs, sales, and profits. Decisions do not automatically move from the bottom up, since proposals for decisions may emanate from all levels, giving everyone concerned an opportunity to express opinions and a chance to build consensus. The decisions per se involve significant top management inputs and discretion. Once a decision is made, implementation can move forward rapidly because all concerned have been involved and have become psychologically committed. Japanese executives tend to be more intuitive, sub jective, communicative, and human relations oriented in setting marketing goals and determining strategies. They place less emphasis on the formal aspects of formulating marketing goals and strategies and more on the implementation and human relations aspects. Effectiveness in implementing marketing programs is based on heavy involvement of lower level and middle managers in interpreting and carrying out the marketing philosophy. Japan's penetration of Western markets is neither a sudden or recent phenomenon, but is the result of a logical series of steps begun about 25 years ago. It was the neglect of consumers and markets by American companies that gave Japanese firms an invitation to establish themselves in the U.S. The initial emphasis on low price, quality, and careful marketing targeting, bolstered by the learning effect, marketing knowhow, and demanding consumers at home helped Japan emerge as a world class marketer.