Conference Myths in south-eastern European textbooks 22-24 October 2014, Tirana Myths in south-eastern European textbooks

Enis Sulstarova studied sociology from 1996 to 2000 at the Middle East Technical University, in Ankara, Turkey. After completing his undergraduate studies he was enrolled in a master program in political science and public administration in the same university, where he finished a study on the Albanian nationalism in 19^th and 20^th centuries. Upon returning to Albania in 2002, he worked for several years at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, a local NGO. From 2007 to February 2013, Enis Sulstarova has worked as a lecturer of sociology and political science in Aleksandër Moisiu University in Durrës and University of Tirana. In 2011 he completed his doctorate thesis in sociology on the articulation of the idea of Europe in the public discourses in Albania during both interwar and post-communist periods. His fields of interest are nationalism, politics of identity, citizenship and orientalism. Enis Sulstarova has published four books in Albanian language, as well as several book chapters and articles in English publicationsmainly on the nationalist and orientalist discourses in Albanian modern history, but on other topics as well. In March 2013 he joined the Georg Eckert Institute as a Marie Curie fellow researcher, through a scholarship provided by Gerda Henkel Foundation.
Current research project
EnisSulstarova’s post-doctorate research at GEI it titled “Shifting National and European Identities: Islam in Educational Textbooks and Public Discourses in Post-Communist Albania (1990-2012)”. It builds on and extends his previous research on the political and cultural discourses that have shaped modern Albanian identities.


"Myths and events in history textbooks of Albanian language areas during the First World War"

PD Dr. Dieter Nehring
 

The presentation of events during the First World War is in the textbook

history of schools generally subordinate to the description of other
historical facts, but still meaningful. The paper focuses on the main events
of the First World War in Albanian language areas, which are relevant to the
textbook history. It exermines how they contribute to the formation of
myths, binding national history into a regional and international context in
a specific manner. Based on a broader conception of myth-making the paper
attempts to compare different stand and focal points and to highlight
therefore myths types. It is further aimed to strengthen or even to show
approaches to a common denominator in the presentation of textbook history.


PD Dr. Dieter Nehring (Humboldt University Berlin)

Studied Slavic and Albanian languages, literature and history and translation at the Humboldt University of Berlin, and the universities of Belgrade and Kosovo (1972-78)
Assistant/researcher at the Institute for Slavic Studies at Humboldt University (1976-1999)
PhD in Albanian at the Humboldt University (1984)
Habilitation in Slavic and Albanian studies (1999)
Lecturer at the Charles University in Prague, the Humboldt-University of Berlin and the University of Prishtina (2002-2010)

Research assistant at Georg Eckert Institute (2010-2013)


Collective Narratives of the Interethnic Conflict in Kosovo

Mimoza Telaku

Individual paper abstract

The aim of this research is examination of the collective narratives of Albanians and Serbs about the interethnic conflict. The focus of this research is conflictual narratives of these interethnic conflicts. The armed conflict in 1998-1999, NATO intervention in 1999, Kosovo independence declaration in 2008 and other preceding historical events/conflicts are perceived and justified differently by these ethnic communities. The current interethnic tensions are deep-rooted from the experiences, education and intergenerational transmission of the memories and myths about abovementioned events. As these two ethnic groups still have incompatible attitudes and different aspirations for the future of Kosovo, the normalization of the interethnic relations seems far away. The levels of nationalistic attitudes, which are very high and prevent improvement of interethnic relations, are mostly influenced by the collective memories and interpretation of the interethnic conflicts. This study is based on qualitative research methods. The collective narratives are collected from the focus groups from different sites in Kosovo. The target of this research is Albanian and Serb ethnic communities in Kosovo.

Mimoza TELAKU

PhD candidate

Ben Gurion University of the Negev

Conflict Management & Resolution Program

The Vlora conflict from a trans-Adriatic perspective: History, Myth and Ideology

Fabio Bego

Introduction

This article aims to explain why the conflict between Italians and Albanians for Vlora in 1920 is subject to different interpretations and representations in Italian and Albanian historiographies. My answer will focus on the analysis of mythologies that have conditioned the development of historiographies on both sides of the Adriatic. Based on the Vlora conflict the main assumptions made hereafter are that myths generate collective identity, determinate the establishment of the social order of nation states we live in and legitimize the political system that governs us. By confronting different fonts, such as official historiography, monographs, history text books, encyclopedias and the press of that period is possible to pinpoint the relation between the representation of the conflict and incipient myths of ideologies that define the social order of states where historiographies are developed. In order to better comprehend the topic it is necessary to start with a brief enquiry on how history and myth merge together in our modern historiographies. Roland Barthes has observed that “there are formal limits to myths, there are no substantial ones”⁹⁷. This affirmation entails that the study of myths can be deceiving, and so I believe. I therefore must restrain to a concise and functional epistemological enquiry of the subject that is only useful for the analysis of social and political phenomena related to the Vlora conflict. The theoretical perspectives that I here discuss are borrowed from anthropologists, historians and philosophers who have engaged in understanding what is the relationship between myths and social order and the impact of mythical thought in the social and political life of different societies. I will not follow a chronological exploration of the debates since it is not my ambition to trace the evolution of this multifaceted issue. Instead I will briefly discuss current critique concerning the function of myth in the dominant social and political forms of organization - the nation states - in order to have a broader view of the relationship between myths and nation states since the phenomena related to the Vlora conflict that I here expose belong specifically to this realm.

The mythical imperative: how history becomes myth and how myth becomes reality

What is here intended as a myth? One possible definition consists in the etymological sense of the word which remotely means “story” or “legend”. But obviously a myth is not common anecdote conceived for entertainment purposes. Mircea Eliade distinguishes myths from ordinary fiction because contain a sacred history that informs of something that has happened in primordial time, or as he names it “the imaginary time of the origins”.⁹⁸ Many historians do implicitly accept this definition and in general terms, when they speak of a myth they refer to a fantastic story that religious or political propaganda purport as an undisputable truth. Most of modernist critique to nation state and ethnic identity has been carried by demystifying the mythical conception of the past as a pathology that affects many national historiographies and have thus tried to dismantle the idea that a nation is a cultural community integrally coherent.⁹⁹ Antony D. Smith has improved such theorizations claiming that national identity is not merely a product invented by the elites of the XIX century as modernists profess.¹⁰⁰ Instead “is from (these) elements of myth, memory, symbol, and tradition that modern national identities are constituted in each generation, as the nation becomes more inclusive and as its members come with new challenges”.¹⁰¹ Similar conclusions were reached before by Broinslaw Malinowski whose analysis of Melanesian cultures comes to consider myth not “merely a story told but a reality lived”:

(…) a living reality believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and human destinies. The myth is to the savage what, to a fully believing Christian, is the Biblical story of Creation, of the Fall, of the Redemption by Christ’s Sacrifice on the Cross. As our sacred story lives in our ritual, in our morality, as it governs our faith and controls our conducts, even so does his myth for the savage”¹⁰².

Malinowski and Anthony D. Smith suggestions imply that myths have a strong and long – lasting pedagogical function for the whole of society. They forge collective identity by providing knowledge on matters that would be otherwise impossible to fully understand such as the ancient origins of the people, the purpose of life, cognition on ethics, on the nature of the divine and so on. Myths, by assuming a narrative form, perpetuate the memory of the moment when a cosmological order was founded. But the story contains also a moral teaching that establishes an ideal pattern of behavior that members of a society must follow in any practical situation. Therefore individuals never get rid of the constraints of the myth because the latter implies not just knowledge of the origin but also their behavior in the everyday life. For simplifying the issue, this conditioning power that the past embeds on the present can be here named mythical imperative.

In order to understand how the mythical imperative has structured the perception and the interpretation of the Vlora Conflict the notion “our sacred history” needs to be questioned. Malinowski compared the Bible and the myths of native Melanesians affirming that both stories affect the attitude and the feelings of individuals in their everyday life. But is there any history safe from being potentially considered as “sacred” which in virtue of this extraordinary quality may produce enough strength to determine thoughts and actions of individuals who strictly believe it?

Let aside conventional sacred histories that belong specifically to religions, in modern philosophy, the idea of history as a coherent and natural process that withstands a greater design beyond human ability of comprehension is traceable in the work of jurist and philosopher Gianbattista Vico.¹⁰³ In the close of the eighteenth century similar assumptions are found in Herder who saw a “God in history” just as there was one after natural phenomena since man too was part of the creation and thus subdued to the same natural laws.¹⁰⁴ The definitive consecration of history as divine will was eventually professed by Hegel who affirmed that “God governs the world; the actual working of his government – the carrying out of his plan – is the history of the world (…).”¹⁰⁵

Ernest Cassirer has dedicated a significant work to the philosophical enquiry of how mythical thought has affected the evolution of the state since antiquity. He found society of his time (1946) being profoundly under the spell of myths.¹⁰⁶ He argues that philosophers who have questioned the legal claims of authority, from Plato to Hegel and further, have always given transcendent explanations to power, justice, rights and so on. In Cassirer’s work myths are treated as cognitive processes of codification of reality which the Greeks already viewed as opposed to logos,¹⁰⁷ because mythical narratives where perceived in contradiction with empirical reality.¹⁰⁸ The win of myth over reason seems to have occurred when romantic thought overtook the influence of enlightenment rationalism in defining ideas concerning social and political life. Romantics, attracted by the sense of unity that was considered a characterizing feature of the middle ages, showed a great interest for history and the study of folklore. They put myth at the root of history of peoples which became not only a source, but the “very origin of right”¹⁰⁹. In Cassirer’s words: “The idealization and spiritualization of the past is one of the most distinctive characteristics of romantic thought. Everything becomes understandable, justifiable, and legitimate as soon as we can trace it back to its origin”¹¹⁰

The idealization and spiritualization of the past that Cassirer explicates was not just an intellectual pastime. Instead, already at the beginning of the nineteen century it became a policy conceived and deployed for the education of progressively growing masses. In 1807 Fichte considered the teaching of history the greatest tool for building a national character.¹¹¹ In his ideal, a national history book was to accompany the people as a “Bible or as a hymn (…), until the day we in turn accomplished something worthy of being recorded”¹¹². This message was directed to the German nation at the time when Napoleonic wars had disrupted social order all over the continent and threatened traditional forms of collective identification. In Fichte’s mind clearly myth ascended into reality. Acquaintance with a mythizied history is in fact not just meant for forging a collective identity through the absolute acceptation of its authenticity, but contains explicitly an imperative character. On account of the same spirit and ethics that people putatively inherit from the origin, history drags collective action from the past to the present in uninterrupted continuity. History writing and history making are then complementary parts of a teleological approach not only to knowledge but to practice.

The ideologies that developed in the course of the nineteen century claimed legitimacy on account of historical arguments. Pioneers of nationalist, socialist and racist thought gave particular readings of history that were instrumental to prove scientifically the existence of the collective identity that they were interested to purport and that each theorist defined on different metaphysical grounds in respect to another. Such collective identities have developed independently, simultaneously and/or in opposition to one another. Marx, Engels and their followers were to read history as an endless circle of class struggles and subjugations. Giuseppe Mazzini, whose thought had profound impact on the development of national emancipation movement throughout Europe and inspired Adriatic foreign policy of Italy, saw in history the natural process of emancipation of all people. De Gobineau instead wanted to prove that race differentiations is determined by physical and cultural factors and that such differences conditioned the evolution of history. Just as the myths of Melanesians studied by Malinowski, according to these three perspectives, entities as “class”, “people”, or “race” were living realities and so had been through unmemorable time. Peculiar social and economic conditions of the nineteenth century put the premises and called for actual political action from such entities, which - in virtue of being bearers of the same collective identity - were to move forward the realization of the prophetic vision entailed by their historical development. This original push toward social fragmentation structured on the belief that human groups are characterized by different collective identities continued and reached acme in the twentieth century. The globalizing world of the nineteen century had already become small for so many emerging mythical imperatives. Members of opposing living realities such as nationalists of different cultural backgrounds, enthusiasts of imperialistic adventures, and socialists were to violently clash because their conceptions of an ideal world were simply antithetic. Thenceforth history became a science useful for galvanizing the engagement in conflict of intellectuals and soldiers meanwhile the development of physics provided new deadly weapons for the battlefields.

The mythical imperative, that is the power of the ideal (or mythical) thought to intercede in the real world, causes two complementary processes that are both equally necessary for (a) the affirmation of myth into reality and (b) its transformation in historiography. The dynamic of the first process has been observed by Marshall Sahlins in Polynesian cultures where “myth is used to found actual action that will be recorded as a historical event”.¹¹³ In a further study Sahlins employed the term “mytho – praxis” for indicating the arbitrary enactment of history as the fulfillment or the reiteration of the mythical narrative that characterized Maori society.¹¹⁴ As I will argue below, Italians ambitions to control the Adriatic on behalf of their mythical self – ascribed role as agent of civilization was in flagrant contradiction with Albanians will for self-determination, who in turn employed myths of national unity and local love for freedom to fight back. The second process regards the mythization of events that has largely influenced Albanian and Italian historiographies concerning the Vlora conflict. By mythization I mean the extraction of fact, of a language or of an object from its context in order to give scientific proof or political legitimacy to the ideological dialectics that is actually, perhaps unconsciously, being propagandized by the historian. The dynamic of such process occurs by what Roland Barthes defined as a language robbery that transforms meaning into form. ¹¹⁵ Ideologically driven instigation and representation of events are made by choosing elements that turn convenient to the adaptation of myths in practical use. Anthropologist Jonathan Friedman observes that “the discourse of history as well as of myth is simultaneously a discourse of identity; it consists of attributing meaningful past to a structured present.”¹¹⁶ The story that historiographies give account of cannot be simple stories for merely “scientific” purposes. Instead must highlight determinate cultural features or social patterns that prove the existence of a certain institution or a certain collective identity through time. By proving their existence, such entities claim authority on the surrounding political environment as they purport legitimacy on both historical and natural legal grounds. The myth of collective identity is in fact eternalized by the scientific authority through which modern ideologies defend their affirmations. Patterns of social/cultural identity are fixed within the framework of the unchanging laws of nature. By focusing on the mythical causes of the conflict I do not intend to minimize the economical and political regional causes, instead it is my aim to highlight how myths are deployed from the ideologies that stand behind organizations or institutions which govern passively or actively the activities of the agents involved in the conflict, be it by the pen or by the gun.

Mytho – praxis in the Adriatic, or the Vlora conflict

After the armistices of November 1918, Italian troops in Albania awaited for the Paris Peace Conference to decide the fate of the country. Unfortunately for Albanians and Italians the peace delegations gathered in Paris could not fulfill the task probably because, as Ivo Lederer noticed, few delegations possessed the experience and the talent that it was required in that occasion.¹¹⁷ Tensions among locals and occupants developed gradually into open hostility as Italian diplomacy proved detrimental to Albanian integrity and independence. Armed conflict broke out the night between 5 and 6 June 1920 after one year and a half of fruitless diplomatic discussions which frustrated public opinion in Italy and Albania. Irregular Albanians from the south attacked the remnants of the Italian contingent, which was caught in course of a drastic demobilization process ordered by the Nitti government.¹¹⁸ In the first days of fighting Albanians overtook on Italian army with unexpected rapidity. The latter was forced to hold position inside the campo trincerato di Valona (entrenched field of Vlora). Combats formally ended the 2 of August when representatives of both governments signed the Tirana agreements that in its main traits, delivered Vlora to Albanian sovereignty and Sazan to Italy as a military base for the control of the Adriatic.¹¹⁹

From the disengaged historical perspective that I adopted in the last paragraph the Vlora conflict seems to have had no mythical roots but only contingent causes that brought two parties to fight against each other. But if we interrogate the reasons why Italians thought they were in a legitimate position to claim a piece of Albanian coast, then suddenly we face arguments that defy logical or contingent explanations. Instead, Albanian reaction to Italian claims unraveled as a strong emotional response to the fear of being disposed and humiliated in their own ground. Speeches and appeals, memorandums, and peculiar events that involved or impressed the public were largely conceived and expressed in symbolical form which recalled the mythical conceptions of collective identity such as origin, unity, freedom, kin and foe.

Italy as the natural civilizing agent and protector of Albanian independence

Italian expansionist policy in the Mediterranean and specifically in the Adriatic was carried as a natural continuation of the civilizing mission of ancient Rome and Venice.¹²⁰ Albania was often described as one of the most uncivilized parts of the continent which stood only a few miles from Brindisi. For its geographical position, the former Ottoman region seemed perfectly entitled for the assistance of an enlightened tutor. Italy entered the war joining the Entente by the (secret) Treaty of London of the 26 April of 1915 which ensured her the posses of Vlora and primacy in the conduct of Albanian affairs. The clauses of that document left open the possibility for repartition of Albanian territory in the north and in the south between Serbia and Greece, if this was to turn useful to regional balances.¹²¹

The 3 of June 1917 the commander of Italian troops in Albania general Giacinto Ferrero made e public declaration in Gjirokastёr promising to Albania, on behalf of Italian Kingdom, full support for national independence and integrity. The declaration was in manifest contradiction with the Treaty of London and later Italian historiography has remarked that it was a bluff, only conceived to gain popular support from Albanians.¹²² Bluff or not, the words used by the general supposed a past when Italy and Albania were naturally bound in alliance. Thence was created the myth of Italy as the “protector” of Albania. The speech deserves partial citation as it shows how political discourse exploited the myth of “civilization” in order to gain Albanian sympathies by caressing their desire for liberty and self – esteem.

To all the Albanian people. Today, 3 of June 1917, delightful celebration of Italian statutory freedoms, (…) Albanians, wherever you might be, (…) you who are of an ancient and noble progeny who have old memories and traditions that rejoin you to the roman and venetian civilizations; you who are aware of the common Italian – Albanian interests on the sea that separates but at the same time conjoins us; All of you men of good will unite the destinies of your beloved country (…) for and independent Albania, with the friendship and the protection of Italy.¹²³

The bluff was never called. Quickly after the end of the first World War Italy demanded the possession of Vlora and a protectorate on the rest of Albania¹²⁴. Italian opinions were then radically different toward Albanians. The latter suddenly appeared as “primitive people, divided in tribes that often fought each other and were exploited by the local lords: the beys created from Turkey”¹²⁵. The efforts for building a modern state would thus definitely beneficiate from Italian assistance and protection¹²⁶. Even few months before the attacks on Vlora, there was who in Italy dreamed of moving Italian peasants from the region of Emilia in Albania with the double purpose to ease the demographic weight in Italy and

bring civilization among the barbarians by cultivating lands, opening the road to the Orient, refining natives by the contact with a superior life form, until when the long awaited dawn will rise, in which, once aligned with more advanced people and equipped with necessary means, the Albanians, can make an independent and sovereign state, adequate enough for sitting next to the civilized nations.¹²⁷

The myth of Italy as a civilizing agent materialized in Albania. Once settled in Vlora in 1914 Italians ameliorated the urban infrastructure and connections with the hinterland in order to guarantee communications along the frontline. These works were then exploited by agonist press in order to prove the benefits of the Italian occupation of Albania and their right to stay. Benito Mussolini in the pages of Il Popolo d’Italia recurrently mentioned the “roads, the bridges, the houses, the hospitals” that Italians built during their “peaceful occupation”, which were then to be bitterly left behind. ¹²⁸ This sentiment was transferred in the Italian historiography that developed during the ventennio¹²⁹ and still survives in recent treatments of the topic. Massimo Borgogni in a monographic study published in 2007 highlights Italian’s merit in Vlora, thus subtly blaming Albanians for being silly and ungrateful:

The construction of roads, bridges, harbor infrastructure, modern buildings, few hospitals, as well as support with clothing, food, medicines, and in some case even cash, and finally all the assistance provided in five years to an impoverished population seemed to end in oblivion because of the emerging of the national feeling that with great exemplification, saw Italian troops as the main obstacle to the birth of a state truly independent.¹³⁰

The socialist press - which work has been appreciated by Albanian historians as a voice in support of the Albanian claims on Vlora¹³¹ - actually divulgated the same misconception and derogatory view on Albania as did their rightist foes. Soon after the attack the socialist press Avanti, although demanding troops to evacuate immediately, affirmed that the rebellion was caused by brigands disguised as patriots, instigated by feudal lords, manipulated by foreign influences and capitalistic interests.¹³² Socialist too employed the myth of civilization but in the opposite sense, thus to dissuade any imperialistic dream. An article appeared on Avanti the 20 of June by the name of Il Paradiso Albanese described Albania as a barren land

sterile by nature: proved by the fact that never in history had a period of fluorescence. The inhabitants of the villages built with primitive material do not have beds or sheets or shirts and live by exploiting the shepherds who, guard the flock of the feudal lords, live on the mountains in little shanties made of land and grass. (…) Between the different localities there is no commerce, they are connected by mule tracks and the trips on the donkey back that Albanians make have only the purpose to find food. (…) after having wasted four billions, we leave it poor and neglected.

Italian historians concord that relations with Albanians swiftly deteriorated after the Tittoni – Venizelos secret agreement of July 1919 which, among other territorial arrangements, partitioned south Albania between Italy and Greece. ¹³³ Greece was to acquire the cities of Gjirokastёr and Korça, Italy Vlora and its outskirts, while Saranda was to be a free harbor.¹³⁴ Italian nationalist press condemned the agreement, even before the attack on Vlora, defining it as the “most cynical and shameful diplomatic document of the third Italy”.¹³⁵ For the nationalists greatest regret was that Tittoni’s agreement turned into dusts all the progresses that Italian diplomacy had made by raising trustfulness among Albanians with the Proclama di Argirocastro. Leading nationalist personalities intervened in the parliament by stating that Italy was not looking for a colonial adventure in Albania, but only to protect Albania’s independence and their own coast.¹³⁶ The term “protection” was thus used to persuade the socialist party to withdraw the veto from sending fresh troops in Vlora, but also to convince Albanians who followed closely Italian political debates, that military presence was beneficial to them too. But it was late for such words to have the desired effect. Leftist propaganda was already successful in mobilizing strikes and manifestations against the Italian presence in Vlora which actually led to military insubordination in Trieste and Ancona. This last event had convinced Italian Prime minister Giolitti that sending new troops would exacerbate even more internal conflict.¹³⁷ He then adopted the only exist strategy available for not displeasing too much interventionists and non interventionist. New troops were not to be sent, but in order to limit damage to Italian prestige, the contingent had to resist the attacks as longer as possible with the soldiers that were still left.

I believe that Giolitti’s decision was dictated by pragmatic necessity of avoiding major turmoil that extremists of both sides would have produced if withdraw or reinforcement was ordered to Italian troops. He was aware that the Vlora question was an object of exploitation by maximalist forces from the left and from the right which, although demanded different solutions of the problem, used it to threat the legitimacy of the liberal government. The conflict against Albanians had at the time transcended its contingency as a limited military phenomenon. On the newspapers it assumed symbolic value expressed in terms of national honor and social class struggle against imperialistic wars. These two particular claims deployed respectively by the radical right and left demanded the enactment of history, otherwise mythopraxis, from those who perceived to belong to the self-professed national or social class identity.

“We shall not permit to be treated like cattle”: enacting the myth of collective dignity.

Even after the Proclama di Argirocastro there were Albanians who remained skeptical toward Italy as it was not clear how Rome would affect state sovereignty.¹³⁸ By the end of June 1919 Albanians bore few illusions that Italy could help them restore independence. Epistolary communication of minister of education Luigj Gurakuqi who was in Paris at the Peace Conference in the fall of 1919 reveals that Albanian delegates had lost any point of stability because of Italian unpredictability. In a depressed mood, he advised Sotir Gjika, editor of the Albanian paper based in Rome Kuvendi, not to slander Mustafa Kruja thus contributing to further fragmentation of the delegation. He then wrote that decisions were dictated by winners and that ethnic minorities had no voice. “In any case – affirmed Gurakuqi – Wilson, George and Clemenceau were going to sleep peacefully”. The self determination of the People - continued Gurakuqi -was the last of their worries.¹³⁹

This short remark is enough to understand the whole of Albanian question. Albania was a fragmented reality, both socially and politically and this was plainly visible to the great powers. The country did not have the international favors of Czechoslovakia and Poland which served strategically as barriers to the dead, but still kicking, central and eastern empires. Causalities of the Great War did not count either as they fought for both blocks. In comparison with the Balkan neighbors who had reached independence and unity by fighting in the Balkan Wars and in the First World War, Albania lacked a true martyrdom suffered chorally for the sake of the national cause. Recognition of national rights was not for free, neither obtainable by diplomacy dialectics. It had to be won at the expense of bloodshed in place of a rite of initiation that would found legitimacy for the independence. At the time, only a war, that was expressively and internationally presented and received as “patriotic” could give empirical evidence to the acclaimed existence of a national identity worthy of territorial integrity and self – determination. Gurakuqi seem to implicitly acknowledge this in another letter that he addressed to Myfit Libohova, at the time Albanian ministry of foreign affairs, here he states that he was “ready to die for Gjirokastёr”.¹⁴⁰ Indeed someone had to die but it was not Gurakuqi, not this time at least. The war effort fell on people who lived in nowadays Albanian territories that the Peace Conference had carved out for repartition.¹⁴¹ Their struggle, although restricted to the sole local population, was soon absorbed by Albanian political elites and later by historiography that presented the conflict as a national war.

The Tittoni – Venizelos agreement certainly displeased Albanians in the south, but it was not enough for enhancing a war campaign against Italy. Relationship among them were friendly and collaborative during the great war and is unlikely that only diplomatic disquisition would send Italians and Albanians who defended the same trenches against the Austrians in a deadly fight against each other. The origin of the Vlora conflict springs from a single event when Italians offended local sentiments by disrespecting the symbols of their collective identity. The 28 of November 1919, the day in which citizen of Vlora celebrated the declaration of independence, an incident occurred that seem to have produced irremediable fracture among them. Italian historian Pietro Pastorelli speaks of a celebration organized by Italian authorities that ended in a great failure.¹⁴² On Albanian account, reports on the accident are found in many fonts, especially in memoires.¹⁴³ The official version delivered to the Albanian government stated that military authorities had agreed with citizens that a celebration could take place at the condition that no Albanian flag was lifted on institutional buildings and that no speeches were to be made in public. Participants disobeyed both rules, and according to the report, Muslims and Christians went in the mosque of Tabakhane. The muezzin there gave his blessings first in Arabian and then in Albanian. Afterwards, an intellectual (professor Minga), held a passionate nationalistic speech. When the crowd headed for the exit in order to continue the celebration in the street they found the Carabinieri pointing guns straight against the doors of the mosque. The situation soon degenerated in a street riot. Italian paramilitaries tore Albanian flags into pieces and attached one to their dog named Caporale. He was then let loose around the city. This was the last offence that people of Vlora could take. The document asked the government to take firm position, and ended by declaring that consequences were to be expected: “the people of Vlora, because of the war, perhaps erring, did not want to cause problems to Italy until the conflict continued, but now cannot endure such cruelties and has decided to assume any danger for the salvation of the homeland”¹⁴⁴. Although this account contains figures that I find hard to believe, such as Vlora Christians entering into a mosque to hear the sermon of the muezzin, the fact that the event is reported in many fonts implies that something grave must have occurred in that day.

In the following months tension among Italians and Albanians grew inexorably. By march 1920 the illegal organization Mbrojtja Kombёtare based in Vlora started to recruit people that supported an armed action against Italy. A war committee was formed in Barçalla (near Vlora) the night of 28 may 1920. The 3 o June an ultimatum was sent to Piacentini, the Italian General in Command of the troops in Vlora. He was intimated to retire his men and deliver the city to the Tirana government. The ultimatum could have been delivered before, but Albanians decided to wait four days because the 3 of June was the anniversary of the Proclama di Argirocastro. The choice for a symbolic date shows that actors were willing to define history not erratically but as the precise enactment of a self-fulfilling prophecy that would, perhaps, accomplish national freedom and punish Italy for treachery. In the worst case they would have died but at least with honor and not in anomy in their own land. A participant in the Vlora conflict, Ago Agaj wonders why the war committee did not decide to seize the strongholds by surprise and ensure maximum degree of military success.¹⁴⁵ He suggests that the noble feeling of those men or the little hope for a peaceful disentanglement may have brought to this solution.¹⁴⁶ Most certainly, an attack by surprise would have provoked a different reaction from the Italian government and public opinion. Moreover Albanians were not looking for the conquest of the Vlora territory as a geographic resource, but for the symbolic value of the city where the flag was lifted in 1912, and where it was shattered few months before by Carabinieri. The attack needed a clear declaration of intents that would prove to great powers that it was conceived for national and not local purposes. In May 1920 local Gjirokastёr press “Drita” wrote “Vlora is ours and so it must be. Because Albania maybe exists only because Vlora made it, but she can also destroy it”¹⁴⁷.

The ultimatum was articulated in dramatic tones and blamed Italian administration beyond reason: “Since five years Vlora, cradle of the Albanian independence, is governed like one of the lowest colonies: besides the language, the administration and our flag was negated to us (…) Italy infamously determined the partition of Albania with secret treaties thus dishonoring herself for cancelling a treaty she already signed in London in 1913”. Who wrote it wanted to give to the reader the impression that fighters, if it had to be, would face their destiny with stoic dignity but not permit to be “treated like cattle in the market of Europe”.¹⁴⁸ This last statement was certainly an affirmation of identity and scarcely a war threat as only in the last paragraph the use of force was shyly intimidated. Key words in the paragraph are “flag”, “dishonor” and “cattle”. Decrypted in the context of the mentality that guided the works of the Peace Conference these three words meant that Albanians were not disposed to be treated as humans of an inferior race (the lowest of colonies) that needed to be civilized (that is cattle in the market), because they had a history (the flag), and would not obey to an undignified patron (Italy dishonored). The ultimatum was basically conceived to overturn the mythical conceptions of Albanians as being ruthless, lacking national identity, unable for self government and thus in desperate need for a civilizing companion. The 6 of June was the first Sunday of the month and therefore the celebration day of the Statuto, which is the festivity for the first Italian constitutional chart. However, because of the attack, celebrations in the Italian controlled areas were cancelled; their party, ruined like they ruined the 28 November celebration.