Conference Myths in south-eastern European textbooks 22-24 October 2014, Tirana Myths in south-eastern European textbooks

The mythical representations of the conflict: ideology, collective identity and political legitimacy

Hitherto there have been three definitions of the same event: the war, the rebellion, the “war”. A fourth implies the definition of sheer silence, that is amnesia. Albanian historiography refers to the Vlora war - Lufta e Vlorёs -, as “one of the most enlightened pages in the history of Independent Albania”¹⁴⁹. Official historiography affirms that “the freedom war of Vlora stands among the greatest events of our national history of XX century that played a decisive role for the defense of Albanian territorial integrity and in reestablishing the independence.”¹⁵⁰ On the other side of the Adriatic a much darker spot is reserved to the same facts. Italians label it a rebellion or insurrection which in a way means to negate or drastically reduce the manifestation of the war as a military phenomenon. Sporadically, Italian historians speak of a war only in between inverted commas or using italic letters thus underscoring that events have been overly estimated by their colleagues beyond the sea¹⁵¹. Besides, Italian historiography treats the Vlora conflict only in specialized books dedicated to the analysis of the direct relations with Albanians or specifically to the Adriatic question. History manuals and textbooks written in Italy and designed for high schools and universities bypass the facts as nothing ever happened. Hardly Italian history and political science students that do not study in depth the events of those years might know that Italians fought against Albanians in Vlora the 1920. How to explain such dissimilar representations? The simplest answer is to affirm that the events did not bear the same weight for the two countries. The burden of the conflict was diametrically different because Albania was in a more endangered position. Moreover, the battles on the outskirts of Vlora were just little skirmishes if compared to the massive undertakings of the Great War. But still, a relativist consideration cannot explain the amnesia of Italian history manuals where the conflict appears as a phantom whose presence is perceived only by the measurement of its specter. On the other hand Albanian historiography is far too confident with the idea that the events were part of a coherent national war for independence.

The Italian perspective

Italian presence in Albania sipped from the state much greater costs then the other occupied territories.¹⁵² Surprisingly, Italian history books conceived for divulging purposes ignore the Italian – Albanian realities of the time, while more space is dedicated to the Dalmatian or the colonial affairs overseas. I will limit here to present few examples that demonstrate how Italian historiography proves reluctant to embrace the topic. A famous work by Federico Chabod (L’Italia Contemporanea) dated in 1961 omits any reference to the conflict even from the chronologies, although it is mentioned that Italy was to gain Vlora from the Treaty of London.¹⁵³ Monumental work by Indro Montanelli, Storia d’Italia dedicates space to the events concerning the Italian involvement in the Dalmatian coasts, but suffers amnesia for what concerns Albania. Reference to the conflict is avoided even when the author explains the ministerial crises which followed the attack on Vlora of June 1920 and that brought to the resignation of Nitti and the formation of the Giolitti government.¹⁵⁴ It curious that Montanelli, who visited Albania and wrote a book on the issue, simply disregards the impact that the Vlora conflict produced in the evolution of Italian internal politics. Complete amnesia has hit the writers of the Manuale di Storia, L’età Contemporanea which is a history manual designed for high school and university use. The book does not refer to Albania even when the Treaty of London is discussed. ¹⁵⁵ Throughout the whole of 1000 pages volume the term Vlora appears just once, involuntarily, in the last chapter on a picture of half –naked Albanians struggling to get in and out of an overcrowded ship named, ironically, Vlora.¹⁵⁶ This feature I think exemplifies how a simple term, the city name Vlora, can epitomize two different historical idealities. On one hand Vlora is the symbol of Albanian unity, strength and freedom where Italians were forced to withdraw from Albanian coasts. Simultaneously, following the events of 1991 that this picture shows, Vlora has become also the symbol of Albanian poverty and failure that revaluates Italy as its natural, because most proximate, hope for salvation. Italian historiography has clearly preferred to transpose the latter at the expense of the former. Why it is so? In the following section I will try to answer this question.

By reading Italian newspaper of 1920 it seems evident that the loss of Vlora implemented the myth of the “mutilated victory” as much as did the loss of Dalmatian territories that Italy was not able to obtain in the Peace Conference. The whole issue was one of the main subjects were opinions from the left and from the right found terrain for crashing. Nationalist and the rising fascist forces were extremely disappointed when the treaty of Tirana was signed.¹⁵⁷ Major themes in Mussolini’s newspaper were that Italy’s prestige was being profoundly wounded and that attacks on Vlora were stimulated by foreign powers such as Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁸ The 15 of July he wrote that Valona was “another Caporetto, worst than the first one”¹⁵⁹. The 5 of august, in commenting the treaty of Tirana, he affirmed that “Consequences of our disaster may be incalculable” dreading that Italy had lost authority in the region. ¹⁶⁰ The same day, nationalist paper L’Idea Nazionale opened with the title “the Italian prestige sacrificed to the Balkan gangs“.¹⁶¹ Few days later on the same paper D’Annunzio released a note claiming that the whole conflict was an attempt to emasculate the Italian people and that, “because of being expelled from Vlora, Italy today is a grand soprano choir of castratos in a Sistine chapel without Michelangelo”¹⁶². Even many years after the conflict, Mussolini’s henchman Dino Grandi commented that Vlora was after Adua “the greatest humiliation Italy had suffered”¹⁶³. Nevertheless the government worried about saving face in front of the public opinion. The 7 of August, foreign minister Carlo Sforza, in a clear attempt to present what nationalist considered a military defeat as a draw, affirmed in front of the parliament that “we left Vlora after a brilliant fighting that showed to Albanians that never they would manage to force us out”¹⁶⁴.

Since that time, the Vlora conflict has been described by terms that aimed to prove that the rebellion was settled by foreign powers which manipulated Albanian peasants and that Italy, beside adversities, did not lose the city but delivered it voluntarily to Albanians. It is not possible to trace a genealogy of the Vlora conflict representations on Italian historiography because, as I have already explained, analysis of subject are only made in few specialized studies whose opinion has been here already discussed. For this reason my survey focuses on encyclopedic works that have been published from the ventennio to later on. The Treccani encyclopedia saw the light in the years of the fascist regime but its last print reports unchanged narration of the conflict:

International intrigues, which manipulated the Albanian soul that exited the war diffident of any organizational work made also at her advantage, led to the Vlora insurrection against Italian occupation of the city. After having lost few external positions, the city of Vlora stayed in Italian hands until when the Tirana protocol, (…) determined the evacuation of Vlora from Italy that maintained only the small island of Sazan.¹⁶⁵

Italian encyclopaedias written afterwards transpose slighter representations of the Vlora question and references to the conflict are avoided. Consequently a forgetting process is enhanced that characterizes most of Italian historiography in relation to the Vlora conflict; a process that had already begun during the Fascist period. Garzanti encyclopaedia of 1976 gives the following insight:

At the outbreak of the First World War Albania suffered a new occupation by Greeks, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and French who attempted to split it, until when in June of 1917 became a protectorate of Italy. After that the independence was gained back it was admitted to the Society of Nations (1920), and it became a republic under the presidency of Ahmet Zogu (1925), who in 1928, with the support of Italy, proclaimed himself king imposing a dictatorial regime.¹⁶⁶

In this representation not only any reference to armed struggle is omitted, but even Italian presence in Vlora is considered salutary for Albania in spite of other nations. Instead the Italian allies, like France, which carried with Italy conjoined war operations during the war, seem to be the one who actually tried to divide the country. Any reference to London Treaty and Tittoni – Venizelos agreement is simply bypassed. The Grande Dizionario Enciclopedico UTET reveals great confusion concerning the events and dates that articulated the conflict: “The Peace conference of 1919 reconfirmed the borders decided in London in 1913, and in the June of 1920, the last Italian presidium in Vlora was withdrawn. An Italian – Albanian agreement the 3- VIII – 1920 gave to Italy the occupation of Sazan Island.”¹⁶⁷ Here there are at least two mistakes and one misrepresentation of an international treaty. As it is known in fact the Peace conference did not reconfirm the 1913 borders. The Italian troops were withdrawn from Albania only in September, thus well after the Tirana agreement as the same agreement prescribed. It seems also that Italy forced Albania to give away Sazan and not the other way around as Albanians might argue.

The Piccola Treccani of 1997 shortly reports description of the event in a form that reveals how Sforza’s speech has been metabolized by educational historiography: “Vlora (…) occupied by Italian troops from 1914 to 1929, was an important base of military operations in the Balkans. In the august of 1920, the Tirana agreement, returned Vlora to Albania.”¹⁶⁸ In this case also reference to armed struggle is omitted and the delivery of the city to Albanian government seems to have occurred peacefully. It is interesting to notice that non Italian encyclopedias reserve a much greater function to violent confrontations that took place among Albanians and Italians.

A fine illustration of how State – centric perception of historical events forge an historiography biased by ideological myths turns up in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1973 where merit of the successful Albanian revolt is somehow claimed by soviets:

The Victory of the Great October socialist revolution created the preconditions for the successful struggle of the Albanian people for independence. The Albanian National congress, which assembled Jan. 21 – 31, 1920, in Lushnje, proclaimed the independence of Albania and declared Tirana the country’s capital; a result of the ensuing armed struggle led by the government created in Albania against feudal separatists and foreign occupiers, in the spring and summer of 1920 southern and southwestern regions of Albania were liberated from Italian troops;¹⁶⁹

The representation that emerges in the French Encyclopaedia Universalis of 1973 is akin to that of the Albanian historiography. The Vora conflict is presented as part of a greater plan of the Albanian government to obtain freedom and integrity:

(…) L’Italie prenait Vlora, Sazan et recevait mandat sur l’Albanie; les frontières de 1913 étain maintenues au nord et à l’est; les frontières sud seraient déterminées plus tard, mai laisseraient sans doute Korça et Gjirokaster a la Gréce. Ce mémorandum discrédita le gouvernement provisoire, qui dut démissionner a la suite du congrès de Lushnja (janvier 1920). Le nouveau gouvernement transporta son siège à Tirana, obtint le retrait des troupes français mata un rébellion d’Esat Toptani bientôt assassiné, profita d’une révolte réussie à Vlora pour obliger les Italiens à évacuer le pays (sauf Sazan) et put faire admettre l’Albanie à la SDN, le 17 décembre 1920, comme Etat souverain dans ses frontières de 1913.¹⁷⁰

The Italian encyclopaedias mirrors the perception that governments and scholars conjointly implemented on the conflict after the Tirana agreement. Such perception was conceived for reducing possible traumatic effects that an unfortunate struggle against a poorly armed neighbour could produce in the long run thus affecting military confidence as well as relations with Albanians. The Vlora conflict caused an anomalous precedent Italian and Albanians were in good relations, although the Albanians were often considered in a subaltern position in respect to Italians. Even during the Vlora conflict, relations between Italians stationed in Shkodёr and in Durrёs were not affected by the fighting. Fascism, by means of foreign policies which evidently concerned both ministerial and academic fields, tried to reduce or even avoid speaking of the conflict. A book printed in 1938 on Italian assault troops Arditi, who participated also in the Vlora conflict is perhaps emblematic of this censorship toil. The text was published in two different editions the same year. In the latest edition the entire chapter dedicated to the Vlora fighting has been completely scissored.¹⁷¹ Sometimes, references to the conflict were made only to prove the failures of the liberal system that preceded the march on Rome¹⁷². Not surprisingly historiography during fascist regime defined the 1919 – 1922 period as “one of the saddest times of Italian foreign policy”.¹⁷³ Italian history books on foreign policy clearly reveal that the new political system promoted the idea that fascism recovered the international prestige that Italy had lost after the war.¹⁷⁴ The critique toward the preceding liberal government which led to the “loss” of Vlora became instrumental to the new regime in order to legitimize itself as well as to justify internal authoritarian turns and external aggressiveness in the region as it happened in September 1923, when Mussolini ordered the occupation of Corfu in retaliation to the murder of General Tellini inside Greek territory, during the Albanian – Greek border settlement procedures. Italian historiography that developed after the Second World War has followed the reductive approach adopted by historians before them. The prestige of Italian military and foreign diplomacy capabilities is precious to democratic Italy as much as were to the totalitarian state of the ventennio. Slightly more attention has been dedicated by authors who are openly inspired by leftist ideas. But also in this case the Vlora conflict is subject to the same ideologically binding interpretation with the purpose of exalting the merits of the proletarian movements.¹⁷⁵

The Albanian perspective

The Vlora conflict has been recorded into national historiography largely more than in Italy. Apart from a great number of folk songs and lyrical compositions that celebrate the heroism of the conflict¹⁷⁶, also a film has been released in 1977, Guna Pёrmbi Tela that describes in a highly idealistic fashion the events of what Albanians call Lufta e Vlorёs (Vlora war). Historian Bernd J. Fischer has dedicated an article to the mythization of Vlora conflict claiming that the Albanian success over Italy increased collective mythical perception of military skills that are celebrated in national historiography, but that ultimately led to the effortless defeat of Albanians in the second Italian occupation of April 1939¹⁷⁷. My aim in the present treatment is not to deepen the analysis of artefacts that prove the mythization of the events, but to understand how historiography works under the constrains of ideology. Under such constrains historiography, just as any other institution, becomes a tool for the legitimization of the political system where it is developed. By operating arbitrarily on the representation of the fact, history becomes a myth in the form by emphasizing facts that have a strong symbolic appeal able to generate collective identification; and in the function because its goal is to prove scientifically the benefits and the legitimacy of the ideology that determines the social order.

Albanian historiography clearly presented the Vlora conflict as a result of the rising force of three different layers of identity. The first, the dominant one, is the national identity that drove to the constitution of the state in 1912 and claimed its sovereignty starting from the Lushnje Congress of January 1920. Secondly, Albanian historiography has underscored the role played by the local southern or lab identity. Locals, who bore almost all the military effort, appear as naturally gifted by spirit of freedom, honour, strength and national pride. Lastly historians have often highlighted the war as a class awareness raising process that ultimately brought to the establishment of socialism. Such traits are synthetically reported in a history text book for Albanian high schools dated 1965 where the Vlora war is described as “liberating, popular and anti-imperialist” war: “By winning on the Italian imperialists, the detested enemies of the Albanian people were kicked out from the Albanian land.”¹⁷⁸ How could all these different identities coexist altogether in the same group of people?

Albanian government formed in Lushnje could not declare war to Italy for two reasons. First it was not internationally recognized entity and therefore did not possess the interlocutory authority for a similar act. Secondly, declaring war to Italy would have provoked a more energetic reaction not just from Italy but from great powers who, in quality of members of the League of Nations, were obliged to assist a fellow member country under threat. However, Albanian historiography adamantly presents the conflict as part of a bigger plan that was conceived from the government with the purpose to obtain sovereignty on the territories that foreign armies still occupied from the First World World.¹⁷⁹ The enactment of this plan is proven by a series of diplomatic moves that paved the way to the armed showdown. According to Arben Puto the Vlora question was treated in the first session of parliamentary life in Albania. It was since then decided to undertake underground action through the “national defence” (mbrojtja kombёtare) organization based in Vlora.¹⁸⁰ The 3 of April, the government of Albania that meanwhile moved the capital from Durrёs to Tirana, asked to the command of Italian troops in Vlora to deliver peacefully the civil administration of the city of Vlora and Gjirokastёr, threatening also possible retaliation.¹⁸¹ Italian response was negative. Later in April the government sent representative Sejfi Vllamasi in Belgrade to ask military and diplomatic support from Yugoslavia in order to fight against Italy.¹⁸² He apparently obtained only the kindness of the Southern Slav nation¹⁸³. However Albanian government passed into action the 17 may by asking to the Italian contingent in Tepelena to deliver the town to local administrators. Italians answered by opening fire.¹⁸⁴ The last diplomatic effort ensured neutrality of the Greek troops in the south – eastern frontier by the Kapёshtice agreement of late may. The role of the government in the conflict was thus of a diplomatic kind, by carrying discussion with Italian representatives, but also spreading war propaganda elsewhere in Albania.¹⁸⁵ Finally, the assassination of Esat Pasha by Avni Rustemi in Paris and the annihilation of his faction in central Albania seem to have fulfilled the political action undertaken in support of the Vlora conflict.

The causal relation that historiography has established between the Lushnje Congress, Tirana government and Vlora conflict constitutes a syllogistic explanation of the event in the high school text books. During the years of communism more space was dedicated to the description of the military and diplomatic evolutions in a clear attempt to demonstrate how popular forces would react to an external threat that jeopardizes the independence of the country and the freedom of its people.¹⁸⁶ The authors ended the chapter by affirming that “the war of Vlora made it clear to the chauvinist circles of the neighbouring countries that their ambitions on Albania would face with rising opposition from the Albanian people.”¹⁸⁷ During the paranoiac regime of Hoxha such a phrase contained likewise evocative and imperative power. Recent school books dedicate lesser space to Albanian politics in the period between the two world wars. However the basic idea that the Lushnje Congress made the Vlora war is still presented as an axiomatic dogma.¹⁸⁸

But historiography cannot deny that combats, with rare exceptions, actually engaged only the local community. Only people from Vlora and its outskirts attended the Barçalla convention of the 28 may where the decision for war was taken. The attack of the 5 June was ordered by the insurgents’ commander Qazim Koculi without consulting the government of Tirana.¹⁸⁹ The symbol of the war is a local dress, the guna, which is a mantel made of sheep fur that insurgents presumably used for crossing the barbed wire around the Italian presidiums. The most famous war hero became a man who fulfilled the archetype of an emblematic lab, Selam Musai, who courageously led the attack at the age of 76 years old. His bravery is narrated in lyrical songs as well as in the film Gunat Pёrmbi Tela. What then linked the local people that made the war to the rest of the Albanians was the “common ideal of liberating the fatherland from occupants, thus ensuring full independence and integrity of the Albanian state.¹⁹⁰

Muin Ҫami has claimed that the uprising resulted as a consequence of a slow social evolution process that concerned Albania in the preceding years. The national bourgeoisie had increased the ranks and was the first class to raise the national question and to spread it among the rest of the population. Its ideological ascendance on the popular masses of cities and villages was greater than before.¹⁹¹ According to Ҫami the Vlora war was a stepping stone toward a higher class conscience and was not, as Italians argue, a local insurgence.¹⁹² It was a war organized at a local scale and at the same time at a national scale and so it developed.¹⁹³ Arben Puto in a recent text affirms that the war was made by the peasants and the middle classes.¹⁹⁴ Puto’s assessment is based on the opinions expressed by Eqerem bej Vlora who was a member of the aristocratic family that ruled the city in ottoman times. Although he initially thought that fighting Italians was a “suicide”, when reality proved different, he affirmed that military success was probably due to the motivational factors that animated the insurgents. But the remarks of Eqerem Vlora highlight a local feature of the war instead of a greater national commitment. The interests that they were presumably protecting according to Eqerem bej Vlora appear thoroughly contingent and personal: “it was their war, it was the battle for their social position, for the properties, for their women, their children, their honour and surviving”.¹⁹⁵

To understand what pushed local population to embrace the risk of fighting Italians is one of the biggest historiography challenges on the Vlora conflict. There is an interesting book of memories written by a veteran, Ago Agaj, who wrote it far from communist Albania and was thus out of the reach of its ideological constraints. The illustration of the conflict is contoured with vivid details which portray the social life and psychology of the combatants. In the pages of this book Albanians who fought Italians appear as ethnical labs, who practiced divination rites¹⁹⁶ and were strict observant of local customs.¹⁹⁷ Fear is certainly an element that national historiography is likely to keep away from the description of a warring events were national unity is at stake. But indeed Albanians were scared of Italians, and the decision to fight them matured after fearing to become a colony of Italy. Agaj affirms that it was even difficult to find volunteers for delivering the ultimatum to Piacentini as they were scared of a possible immediate retaliation on whoever would hand the letter to the general.¹⁹⁸ Albanian historiography has until now shown scarce interest for the religious feeling that animated Albanians in their struggles, not just in Vlora. According to the memories of Agaj the religious element played a significant part in motivating the combatants. In Barçalla they took oath touching the Koran before starting the fight and saying: may it slay me with all I have got”, and then holding the gun: “may it kill me with a weapon in the heart”.¹⁹⁹ Before an attack, they washed in the river fearing that “there will be no muezzin to wash us and we have to die clean”²⁰⁰.

Albanian historians have cleansed the Vlora war from elements that would stain the idealized image of a fair struggle for national independence. Agaj informs us, without regret, of a summary execution perpetuated on Romani people suspected of being Italian spies.²⁰¹ Gipsy prostitutes that stood by Italian contingent were putatively killed in fire exchange during the night and were left unburied until Albanians ordered Italian prisoners to give them sepulture. This reveals that a strong taboo hit relations with Italians which prevented Albanians to come into contact with what was adulterated by them. Agaj’s account adds gross details concerning a “little suicidal pandemic” as he defines it, which spread in autumn, long after the end of the conflict, among Albanian girls of villages where Italian troops stationed. The author finishes the paragraph with a chilling comment: “And so it was finally solved this nasty problem”²⁰².

Although Agaj considers the war a sterling patriotic fight for the sake of the national cause, ²⁰³ his memories reveal that relationships between war committee and Tirana government were not as splendid as official historiography affirms. When representatives went in Tirana only prime minister Delvina and minister of Interior Zogu received them with due respect to the guests. The other members of the government did not even invite them for a coffee, which means that their mission did not fully succeed in raising consent among Albanian elites. In other terms, even in Tirana only few Albanians supported an attack against Italy. Nonetheless Zogu and Delvina promised just moral support, by indirect means, so not to give Italy reasons for declaring war against the whole country.²⁰⁴ For the message sent to Piacentini the 3 of June “Italy cannot forbid to the small people of Albania to die for their homeland”, Agaj wonders if by “small people of Albania” they meant the whole of the country or just for the Albanians living in Vlora. He cannot find an answer for that.²⁰⁵

The memoires of Agaj opens a perspective on the Vlora conflict that it is impossible to see in the official historiography. Would be perhaps interesting to understand more in depth how were the relations between Albanians and Italians during the years of the occupation as this would give us major insights on the conflict escalation process. The research would need to focus straight on human contacts between the military and local population instead of the diplomatic field. Changing perspective may tell us if and how high politics and propaganda affects interpersonal relations in the everyday life. The reasons that pushed the Southern Albanians to fight the Italians are in my opinion to be searched more into the local than in the high politics. Italians were in fact in good relations with Albanians until they abode to a hierarchy which implied the former being guests and the latter landlords. The riot of 28 November 1919 sanctioned the end of this relationship when Albanians had a taste of colonial rule. Elites emerged from the Lushnje Congress established then links with the local leaders such as Qazim Koculi and Osman Haxhi who managed to drive the fears and the dissatisfaction of the local population that finally attacked the Italians.

For the representation of the Vlora conflict it is, I think, obvious that Albanian historians operated the same way as a gardener would work with a hedge thus scissoring the raw growing of the plant in order to give it a functional shape for fitting harmonically in an architected environment. The image of the Vlora war propagandized during the communist regime has not been subject to particular revision by Albanian historiography nowadays. Perhaps some of the most xenophobic allegations have been rinsed away, but the mythical attributes of the war still stands untouched in Albanian history texts. I personally doubt that it will be possible to have Albanian “official” historiography present the Vlora conflict free of its mythical attributes which is the idea that it was a genuine national fight, involving all the nation. That in fact would not just mean to reduce some exaggerations concerning number of belligerents, victims and acts heroism, but to question the whole function of the conflict in relation to the foundation of the Albanian sovereignty.