Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: (1) Where Defendant said he wanted to speak with an attorney, Officer violated his 5^th Amendment right to counsel by continuing to question him about weapons and whether he would consent to search of his vehicle, and (2) where Defendant was handcuffed and in-custody away from his vehicle, the public safety exception to Miranda did not apply to allow questioning about weapons in his vehicle since there was no realistic risk of Defendant regaining access to any weapons in vehicle.
Gennusa v. Shoar, 2012 WL 2918487 (M.D. Fla. 2012):

Holding: Attorney and client had reasonable expectation of privacy in attorney-client visiting room at sheriff’s office, so that secret recordings by sheriff violated 4^th Amendment.
Richardson v. Mason, 2013 WL 3325520 (M.D. Ga. 2013):

Holding: Even though Officer had reasonable suspicion that Defendant’s vehicle contained drugs based on a tip, Officer violated 4^th Amendment when he ordered Defendant to lower his pants and conducted a full body cavity search of Defendant by the road when there were not exigent circumstances.
U.S. v. Dixon, 2013 WL 6055396 (N.D. Ga. 2013):

Holding: Where Officer took Defendant’s cell phone back to his office after Defendant’s lawful arrest, and searched and extracted all data, this was not a valid “search incident to arrest” to under 4^th Amendment even though Defendant was still being booked and interviewed; there was no indication that the data on the phone could be remotely wiped or destroyed.
U.S. v. Roberts, 2012 WL 3544838 (N.D. Ga. 2012):

Holding: The taint of an initial illegal entry into Defendant’s room was not attenuated by later officers coming to the room as “back up” and securing a written consent to search form from Defendant.
U.S. v. Johnson, 2012 WL 1680786 (W.D. La. 2012):

Holding: The “workplace exception” to the warrant requirement set out in O’Connor, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), did not extend to search of a school resource officer’s desk; the sole purpose of the search was to search for evidence of crime.
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Information of a Specified Wireless Telephone, 2011 WL 3423370 (D.Md. 2011):

Holding: Even though warrant was out for Defendant’s arrest, 4^th Amendment prohibited using future, real time cell phone information to locate Defendant because this raised legitimate privacy concerns; there was no probable cause to believe that Defendant was attempting to flee from his location or that his location itself constituted evidence of crime.
U.S. v. Janvier, 2011 WL 3100938 (D. Mass. 2011):

Holding: There was no reasonable suspicion to do Terry stop of Defendant after anonymous 911 call about a man with a gun where the location identified covered a lot of different houses, Defendant’s clothing did not match suspect, Defendant weighed less than suspect, and Defendant was just on the porch of his own house.
U.S. v. Powell, 2013 WL 1876761 (E.D. Mich. 2013):

Holding: Even though substantial evidence existed to find probable cause to believe Defendant was a drug dealer and that tracking his cell phone would lead to evidence of crime, the Gov’t failed to set forth facts to show that there was a nexus between the cell phone and criminal activity, or between Defendant’s location in protected areas and the criminal activity in order to have probable cause for a search warrant for long-term, real-time tracking of Defendant via his cell phone.
U.S. v. Culp, 2012 WL 1390182 (W.D. Mich. 2012):

Holding: Even though Officer had probable cause for initial traffic stop of Defendant, where Office had returned his driver’s license, registration, insurance and had just issued a warning, the stop was over and Officer’s subsequent extensive questioning and search of vehicle violated scope of detention and was unreasonable.
U.S. v. Lopez, 2011 WL 4790639 (S.D. Miss. 2011):

Holding: Where it was clear that defendant was not a native English speaker and was having difficulty understanding the officer’s questions, the state failed to prove that defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his car.
U.S. v. Demings, 2011 WL 2050921 (D.N.J. 2011):

Holding: Even though Defendant’s car was parked with the front end angled out in the street and Defendant in the driver’s seat, this did not provide grounds to search Defendant’s car.
U.S. v. Castro, 2013 WL 1010655 (D.N.M. 2013):

Holding: Even though Defendant-Driver made a U-turn one mile before a border patrol checkpoint, where there was no evidence that Defendant knew he was approaching a checkpoint, this did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.
U.S. v. Christy, 2011 3933868 (D.N.M. 2011):

Holding: Exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless entry of defendant’s house for the purpose of finding a 16-year-old girl police believed defendant had brought from another state without her parents’ permission did not exist where officers had information from the girl’s parents and from the girl’s journal indicating that she had attempted suicide before, but where her last known suicide attempt had been seven months earlier.
U.S. v. Bershchansky, 2013 WL 3816570 (E.D. N.Y. 2013):

Holding: Agents exceeded scope of search warrant issued for “Apartment 2” when they searched “Apartment 1” instead, even though the search warrant described “Apartment 2’s” location in the building incorrectly.
U.S. v. Metter, 2012 WL 1744251 (E.D. N.Y. 2012):

Holding: Even though Gov’t imaged Defendant’s hard drive and returned it to him promptly, the Gov’t’s retention of the imaged drive for 15-months before reviewing it for evidence was an unreasonable seizure under 4^th Amendment.
U.S. v. Lahey, 2013 WL 4792848 (S.D. N.Y. 2013):

Holding: Search warrant for Defendant’s home was based on affidavit that contained recklessly made sequencing misrepresentations and related omissions, and was not corrected by a “hypothetical corrected affidavit” that contained further information.
Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 2012 WL 141741 (D. Or. 2012):

Holding: A police officer’s warrantless search of an environmental activist’s digital camera, conducted incident to the activist’s arrests while handing out leaflets, violated the Fourth Amendment.
U.S. v. Martinez, 2013 WL 5525107 (E.D. Pa. 2013):

Holding: A Penn. search warrant to obtain DNA from a suspect was not supported by probable cause where the affidavit in support of the warrant was sworn by a N.J. officer based on a “emergent order” obtained from a N.J. court without any credible reason to believe 5 years after the crime that emergent circumstances existed; the affidavit provided only that the victim had been murdered in a N.J. town and the suspect was a Penn. resident and may have been one of victim’s drug couriers and had a serious criminal record.
U.S. v. Ortiz, 2012 WL 2951391 (E.D. Pa. 2012):
Holding: Even though (1) Davis holds that exclusionary rule should not apply when police rely on binding judicial precedent to search and (2) other circuits had held that GPS monitoring of people without a warrant was constitutional, the exclusionary rule would apply in circuit at issue because this circuit had not previously ruled on the constitutionally of GPS monitoring.
U.S. v. Gooch, 2012 WL 6737490 (W.D. Pa. 2012):

Holding: Even though Driver consented to allowing Officer to take a “quick peek” into her book bag in trunk, a reasonable person would not believe this consent extended to allowing Officer to pull down the trunk liner (where he found drugs), so such search exceeded the scope of consent.
In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 2012 WL 2120492 (S.D. Tex. 2012):

Holding: Equipment designed to capture cell phone numbers in vicinity of a criminal investigation required a warrant, not an application under the pen register statute which requires a telephone number or similar identifier.
U.S. v. Campbell, 2011 WL 1883044 (D. Vt. 2011):

Holding: Even though (1) Defendant was in “trunk” portion of out-of-state SUV, (2) there were air fresheners in the SUV, and (3) Officer thought another person in the SUV answered questions falsely and had red, watery eyes, there was no probable cause to arrest Defendant.
U.S. v. Cole, 2013 WL 2435567 (W.D. Wash. 2013):

Holding: Even though Defendant was driving a quarter mile with his left turn light activated, this did not provide probable cause to stop Defendant for violating state negligent driving laws where the highway had left exits.
U.S. v. Toan Phuong Nghe, 2013 WL 692649 (W.D. Wash. 2013):

Holding: Officer did not have reasonable belief that hotel manager had authority to consent to Officer’s warrantless entry into Defendant’s hotel room, where Officer knew that Defendant had not been required to sign registration papers consenting to search of room, since Defendant was frequent guest of hotel and hotel did not require him to sign registration papers.
State v. Schesso, 2011 WL 6989822 (W.D. Wash. 2011):

Holding: A search warrant for general search and seizure of any electronic storage devices was overbroad because the warrant application included generalized statements regarding cybercrime and pornography collector profiles, but the only crime described was a single incident of file sharing, and nothing in the affidavit demonstrated that the suspect was likely to have committed other crimes.
U.S. v. Taylor, 2013 WL 2102698 and 2013 WL 4059654 (S.D. W.Va. 2013):

Holding: Where Defendant refused to allow Officer to enter vehicle, Officer violated 4^th Amendment when without probable cause he entered vehicle anyway, started the car, and turned on the fan in order to allow drug dog to smell the car better.
U.S. v. Griffin, 2012 WL 330129 (E.D. Wis. 2012):

Holding: Even though Defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat of a car for a minute or two and watching a house where a controlled delivery of drugs happened, there was not reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop since there was no prior information connecting Defendant to the residence or the drugs.
U.S. v. Rock, 2011 WL 2945799 (E.D. Wis. 2011):

Holding: Even though Defendant had only moved into house a few hours before police arrived and lived there rent-free, he had standing to challenge search because he had permission from owners to live there and he planned to make the house his residence.
State v. Gibson, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 601 (Alaska 1/13/12):

Holding: The state constitution’s emergency aid doctrine requires courts to consider law enforcement officers’ subjective motives for making warrantless entries of homes.
State v. Butler, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 313, 2013 WL 2353802 (Ariz. 5/30/13):

Holding: Even though State has an implied consent law for DWI, the voluntariness of Driver-Defendant’s consent must still be based upon the totality of the circumstances, not just invocation of the implied-consent law because Missouri v. McNeely (U.S. 2013) teaches that a blood draw in DWI is subject to 4^th Amendment constraints; here, Juvenile’s consent was not voluntary because his parents were not notified before the chemical test.
Mario W. v. Kaipio, 2012 WL 2401343 (Ariz. 2012):

Holding: Taking DNA samples from juveniles who had been charged but not yet adjudicated violated 4^th Amendment.
State v. Fisher, 2011 WL 1885952 (Ariz. 2011):

Holding: Even though a gun used in a crime was unaccounted for, police could not conduct a protective sweep of Defendant’s apartment after all the occupants were outside, when police could not state any facts to show that they believed another person was still inside.
State v. Allen, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 578 (Ark. 2/7/13):

Holding: 4^th Amendment does not allow state officials to stop boats for safety checks in the absence of reasonable suspicion or a plan with express, neutral limitations; Defendant had been charged with boating while intoxicated.
Robey v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr.3d 261 (Cal. 2013):

Holding: Where shipping company had alerted police that a package smelled of marijuana and police lawfully seized the package as a result, police still were required to obtain a warrant before opening the package, and opening it without a warrant was not justified under “exigent circumstances” exception since the package was already in police custody.
O’Hara v. People, 2012 WL 691541 (Colo. 2012):

Holding: Wiretapping statute’s reference to application of attorney general or district attorney requires attorney general or district attorney to personally authorize application.
State v. Ryder, 2011 WL 3189182 (Conn. 2011):

Holding: Even though a parent thought their missing “disobedient” teenage son might be at Defendant’s residence, the “emergency doctrine” did not justify the police searching the home without a warrant.
State v. Abel, 2012 WL 6055799 (Del. 2012):

Holding: Even though motorcyclist-Defendant who was stopped for speeding was a Hells Angel, this did not provide reasonable suspicion that he was armed to justify a pat down search.
Smallwood v. State, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 177, 2013 WL 1830961 (Fla. 5/2/13):

Holding: 4^th Amendment “search incident to arrest” exception does not authorize police to automatically search the contents of cell phones of persons they arrest.
Jardines v. State, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 85, 2011 WL 1405080 (Fla. 4/14/11):

Holding: 4^th Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches prohibits a drug-dog sniff of threshold of a residence without probable cause.
State v. Cable, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 343, 2010 WL 4977491 (Fla. 12/9/10):

Holding: Under Florida law, violation of knock and announce rule requires suppression of evidence (disagreeing with Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)).
Williams v. State, 2013 WL 4708610 (Ga. 2013):

Holding: DWI checkpoint/roadblock violated 4^th Amendment where Sheriff Office’s two-sentence roadblock policy authorized “general roadblocks which serve legitimate law enforcement purposes” without limitation, and there was no testimony that the roadblock program excluded checkpoints for general crime control.
Luangkhot v. State, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 470 (Ga. 1/7/13):

Holding: Even though courts in Georgia have jurisdiction over crimes committed in other circuits, courts can only issue warrants for wiretaps within their own circuit’s jurisdiction.
Brundige v. State, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 88 (Ga. 10/15/12):

Holding: State statute authorizing search warrants for “tangible evidence” does not authorize a warrant for a thermal imaging scan of a house since heat loss from a house is not “tangible evidence,” i.e., evidence which can be touched.
Wilder v. State, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 235 (Ga. 11/7/11):

Holding: Where Officer instructed a third-party to bring a briefcase which was believed to contain evidence of crime to the police station and once at the station Officer obtained a search warrant for briefcase, the initial seizure violated the 4^th Amendment and evidence should be suppressed as fruit of that initial illegality, even though Officer obtained a warrant; the independent source exception did not apply because this case involved only a single search preceded by an unlawful seizure.
State v. Rodrigues, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 110 (Haw. 10/12/12):

Holding: “Inevitable discovery” doctrine did not allow admission of drugs found in Defendant’s pocket during an illegal search after an arrest where the State failed to prove that Defendant would have had no opportunity to get rid of the drugs while being transported to the police station.
State v. Torres, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 120, 2011 WL 1549526 (Haw. 4/15/11):

Holding: Hawaii Constitution is broader than 4^th Amendment on exclusionary rule because the Hawaii rule exists not only to deter illegal police conduct but also to protect citizen privacy rights; Hawaii rule applies even to evidence obtained by federal authorities in compliance with 4^th Amendment.
State v. Ruck, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 337 (Idaho 11/26/13):

Holding: Even though police could seize a laptop of Defendant-probationer because he was on probation, where the laptop was actually owned by Defendant’s employer, the 4^th Amendment required a search warrant to search it, because the employer was not on probation and had full 4^th Amendment rights.
People v. Cummings, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 762 (Ill. 3/20/14):

Holding: Where Officer stopped car because it was registered to a woman with an outstanding arrest warrant, but a man was driving the car, Officer violated 4^th Amendment by detaining male driver and asking for his license and proof of insurance; the reason for the stop ended once Officer knew woman was not driving car.
State v. Clark, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 14 (Ind. 9/17/13):

Holding: Even though Officer’s initial encounter with Defendant was consensual, where Officer ordered Defendant to sit on ground, this was a stop/seizure since no reasonable person would believe they were free to simply get up and walk away; where Officer was called to evict Defendant from a rental unit, Officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop/seizure of Defendant, and drugs found in his backpack were suppressed since they were the fruit of the unconstitutional order to sit on ground.
State v. Kern, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 311 (Iowa 5/24/13):

Holding: 4^th Amendment “special needs” doctrine does not justify warrantless search of a parole’s home even though parole had agreed to warrantless searches as a condition of parole.
State v. Baldon, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 96 (Iowa 4/19/13):
Holding: The consent exception to the warrant requirement does not make it reasonable to conduct a warrantless search of a parolee who has been released subject to a warrantless-search condition; “Considering our obligation to ensure that consent remains a doctrine of voluntariness … we conclude a parole agreement containing a prospective search provision is insufficient evidence to establish consent.”
State v. Lowe, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 626 (Iowa. 1/20/12):

Holding: Police officers’ belief that a home contained a methamphetamine laboratory did not justify a warrantless entry to protect public safety.
State v. Pals, 2011 WL 5110244 (Iowa 2011):

Holding: Under state constitution, motorist’s consent to search of automobile was involuntary where motorist was detained in police cruiser and never advised that he was free to leave or could refuse consent without any retaliation.
State v. Fleming, 2010 WL 4539193 (Iowa 2010):

Holding: Where Defendant rented a room in a single-family home, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in room and a separate search warrant for room was required.
State v. Louwrens, 2010 WL 4750078 (Iowa 2010):

Holding: Where officer made a mistake of law in stopping Defendant for a U-turn (which was legal), this was a 4^th Amendment violation and evidence of DWI found after the illegal stop had to be suppressed.
State v. Ochoa, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 426, 2010 WL 5129869 (Iowa 12/17/10):

Holding: Iowa constitution prohibits conditions of parole allowing suspicionless searches and seizures of parolees (disagreeing with Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)).
State v. Moralez, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 278, 2013 WL 2129114 (Kan. 5/17/13):

Holding: When an illegal detention occurs before Officers discover of an outstanding arrest warrant, the discovery of the warrant is of “minimal importance” in deciding whether the taint of the illegal detention is attenuated from the discovery of evidence during a search incident to arrest on the warrant; were it otherwise, Officers could stop and detain citizens and then run warrant checks despite not having had any reasonable suspicion to stop them, knowing that if the detention leads to finding a warrant that any evidence found in the subsequent search will be admissible; hence, the discovery of an arrest warrant during an unlawful detention is a relevant intervening circumstance for attenuation purposes but is not independently sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal detention.
State v. Campbell, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 178, 2013 WL 1850747 (Kan. 5/3/13):

Holding: Where Officer covered the peephole of a door he knocked on, this exceeded the scope of resident’s implied consent to approach door and knock, and therefore, Officer could not use “exigent circumstances” to justify his warrantless entry into the house when the person who answered door had a handgun as potential protection for himself.
State v. Edgar, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 547 (Kan. 2/1/13):
Holding: Driver’s consent to take breath test was rendered invalid by Officer’s erroneous statement that Driver had no right to refuse.
State v. Bruce, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 190 (Kan. 11/2/12):
Holding: Congress has preempted the field of statutory wiretap authority under the federal wiretap statute, 18 USC 2515, so a Kansas statute cannot permit a broader wiretap authority than the federal law.
State v. Bogguess, 2012 WL 167334 (Kan. 2012):

Holding: Defendant did not waive privilege against self-incrimination by testifying at suppression hearing, where the hearing was for the purpose of determining the voluntariness of defendant’s statements and his testimony was only regarding the voluntariness of his statements, not their truthfulness.
Brumley v. Com., 94 Crim. L. Rep. 301 (Ky. 11/21/13):

Holding: Even though (1) Officers heard shuffling in Defendant’s house when they arrested him outside of the house, and (2) Officers knew that Defendant possessed guns, Officers could not conduct a “protective sweep” inside the house; applying the protective-sweep exception to the 4^th Amendment warrant requirement every time officers hear noises from a residence that they believe contains guns would swallow the rule.
Dye v. Com., 2013 WL 3122823 (Ky. 2013):