Case Law Update: 2011-2014 Cumulative Edition

Holding: Where the federal gov’t sought to obtain custody of Defendant for death penalty charges under Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) but State governor refused to allow the transfer since State had no death penalty, the federal government was then precluded from seeking to obtain Defendant’s custody through a writ of habeas corpus ad prosecquendum since it had originally sought to use the IAD.
U.S. v. Cuti, 2013 WL 3213343 (2d Cir. 2013):

Holding: Defendant’s 6^th Amendment speedy trial rights were violated where Gov’t was not reasonably diligent in pursuing his arrest for marijuana offense; Gov’t did not arrest Defendant for more than two years after his indictment, and although Gov’t was initially diligent in trying to arrest Defendant, there were long periods where Gov’t was making only minimal efforts to find Defendant and Gov’t ultimately found him by reviewing phone records, something it could have done two years earlier.
U.S. v. Ortiz, 2012 WL 2892396 (5^th Cir. 2012):

Holding: A co-defendant was not an “essential witness” whose absence would toll the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day time provision.
U.S. v. Burrell, 2011 WL 507431 (5^th Cir. 2011):

Holding: Even though Officer-Witness was attending training, this time was not excluded from the Gov’t’s speedy trial clock because there was no evidence of where the Officer was attending the training, its hours of operation, or why it was not feasible for Officer to be able to testify.
U.S. v. Heshelman, 2013 WL 1489389 (6^th Cir. 2013):

Holding: The Gov’t’s 39-month delay between indictment and attempting to seek extradition of Defendant who was living in Switzerland weighs heavily against Gov’t, because Switzerland has extradition treaty with US and once the Gov’t sought extradition, it was fast; Gov’t deliberately chose not to extradite Defendant sooner to gain an advantage.
U.S. v. Ferreira, 90 Crim. L. Rep. 393 (6^th Cir. 11/30/11):

Holding: 3-year delay in bringing a Defendant, who was already incarcerated on an unrelated charge, to trial violated 6^th Amendment right to speedy trial.
U.S. v. Young, 89 Crim. L. Rep. 857 (6^th Cir. 9/21/11):

Holding: A criminal trial begins with voir dire for purposes of determining speedy trial claims.
U.S. v. Alvarez-Perez, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 393 (9^th Cir. 12/22/10):

Holding: Even though Defendant changed his mind after waiving his right to indictment and filing a notice to plead guilty, this time was not excludable from the speedy trial clock under the Speedy Trial Act.
U.S. v. Mackie, 93 Crim. L. Re. 191 (C.A.A.F. 4/19/13):

Holding: Defendant can claim violation of his due process rights to a speedy trial, even if much of the delay occurred after an appeal and remand of the case.
U.S. v. Marshall, 2011 WL 7331763 (D.C. Cir. 2011):

Holding: The government’s pretrial evidentiary notice of its intent to introduce defendant’s prior conviction was not a “motion” that tolled the Speedy Trial Act clock.
State v. Glushko, 2011 WL 5429691 (N.D. Ind. 2011):

Holding: Defendants’ failures to appear at scheduled hearings did not constitute consent to delay under speedy trial statute.
U.S. v. Toma, 2012 WL 1371434 (D. Kan. 2012):

Holding: A 72-month delay after indictment in bringing Defendant to trial on charges of falsely claiming U.S. citizenship violated Defendant’s rights to a speedy trial where the delay resulted primarily from Gov’t negligence, the case was not complex, and Defendant made no effort to conceal his whereabouts while on release awaiting trial.
U.S. v. Dellinger, 2013 WL 5946086 (E.D. Mich. 2013):

Holding: Even though Defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial for a period of time, this did not trump another provision in Speedy Trial Act that counts delay of more than 10 days resulting from transporting Defendant to hospital for examination; thus, three-month delay in transporting Defendant from jail to hospital was not excluded from the Act’s time limits.
U.S. v. Montecalvo, 2012 WL 1862381 (E.D. N.Y. 2012):

Holding: Appropriate remedy for violation of Speedy Trial Act is dismissal of charge with prejudice, not without prejudice.
U.S. v. Edwards, 2011 WL 1454077 (E.D. N.C. 2011):

Holding: Brady v. Maryland applies to SVP proceedings.
U.S. v. Salad, 2011 WL 1541358 (E.D. Va. 2011):

Holding: Gov’t had a duty to produce a boat used in the offense for inspection by the defense under discovery rules, even though Gov’t planned to turn the boat back over to its owners soon.
People v. Hajjaj, 2010 WL 4342331 (Cal. 2010):

Holding: Even though a courtroom only became available at 4:15 p.m. in a distant location on the day the speedy trial clock was scheduled to run out, this was not good cause to delay the trial beyond the speedy trial period.
State v. Buckner, 92 Crim. L. Rep. 549 (Ga. 2/4/13):

Holding: Delay of 4 years between indictment and trial for murder violated right to speedy trial where there was evidence that police had tampered with evidence and that memories of witnesses had faded so that Defendant was prejudiced.
State v. Wing, 2010 WL 4912853 (Iowa 2010):

Holding: Even though police had a conditional plan to arrest Defendant only if he refused to be an informant for police, where a large amount of marijuana had been discovered in Defendant’s car and he was put in handcuffs and read Miranda, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave and, therefore, Defendant was “arrested” for speedy trial clock purposes.
Goncalves v. Com., 2013 WL 646171 (Ky. 2013):

Holding: In computing whether speedy trial rights were violated, the time to count is the total time from arrest to trial, and any intervening mistrials are just one factor to consider; the mistrial does not “restart” the speedy trial clock.
Com. v. Denehy, 94 Crim. L. Rep. 502 (Mass. 1/8/14):

Holding: The time between a trial court’s dismissal of charges and the Defendant’s arraignment on new, identical charges counts against the State for speedy trial purposes.
Com. v. Butler, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 17, 2013 WL 1189144 (Mass. 3/26/13):

Holding: (1) The filing of a complaint, not the later indictment date, starts “speedy trial” clock,” and (2) speedy-trial clock “resumes” rather than “restarts” when Prosecutor dismisses charges and then refiles them; to hold otherwise would allow Prosecutor to nullify speedy-trial clock whenever time was close to expiring.
State v. Tamayo, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 257 (Neb. 11/19/10):

Holding: Even though Defendant requested a mental exam to pursue NGRI defense, the time for the exam is not automatically excluded from the statutory speedy trial clock.
State v. Cahill, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 52 (N.J. 4/1/13):

Holding: Unexplained 16-month delay in setting a court date for a DWI trial violated 6^th Amendment right to a speedy trial.
State v. Springer, 93 Crim. L. Rep. 542, 2013 WL 3156535 (Tenn. 6/24/13):

Holding: The phrase “term of imprisonment” under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers includes a convicted and sentenced defendant’s stay in a temporary detention facility or county jail; the term of imprisonment indicates the time period begins when the prisoner is imprisoned after being sentenced, and does not refer to the place of incarceration.
State v. Poore, 88 Crim. L. Rep. 256 (W.Va. 11/19/10):

Holding: Trial court should have ordered an evidentiary hearing, sua sponte, to determine if Defendant was prejudiced by delay of 25 years between offense and indictment.
People v. Maxey, 2013 WL 3192013 (Ill. App. 2013):

Holding: Even though Defendant filed three pre-trial motions, the period of time after the motions were ruled upon was not attributable to Defendant for speedy-trial time clock purposes.
People v. Hunter, 2012 WL 638069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1^st Dist. 2012):

Holding: A cannabis charge and gun-related charges were based on the same act of constructive possession, requiring the State to comply with the compulsory joinder-speedy trial rule.
State v. Gill, 2012 WL 3537844 (Kan. App. 2012):

Holding: Whether constitutional speedy trial period begins anew with new charge depends on necessity of dismissing former charge or whether charges are identical; thus, when the State dismisses a charge against a Defendant but later files another charge, the speedy trial clock starts anew only if the State dismissed the first case because of necessity; if not dismissed because of necessity, the speedy trial clock is merely tolled and so the time period before dismissal and after re-filing will be counted together.
State v. Bell, 2012 WL 6621448 (La. App. 2012):

Holding: 30-month delay in murder prosecution violated Defendant’s speedy trial rights and warranted dismissal where State had sought six of eight continuances, State failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain missing supplemental police report, and State flaunted its authority by entering a nolle prosequi and re-filing changes in response to denial of another continuance.
State v. Black, 2013 WL 1092775 (Ohio App. 2013):

Holding: A Maryland county jail in which Defendant was incarcerated was a “penal or correctional institution” within the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) guaranteeing a speedy trial to incarcerated persons; thus, Defendant’s request for disposition of all charges against him pursuant to the IAD triggered the period under which Ohio authorities were required to bring him to trial.
In re Dacus, 2011 WL 1331850 (Tex. App. 2011):

Holding: Trial court had to dismiss murder indictment with prejudice where State violated Interstate Agreement on Detainers by securing Defendant’s temporary custody in Texas when he had been incarcerated in an out-of-state federal prison, but then returning him to the federal prison without proceeding to trial.


Discovery
State ex rel. Dept. of Social Services, Division of Children Services v. Tucker, 2013 WL 6198188 (Mo. banc Nov. 26, 2013):

Sec. 210.150 prevents a trial court from ordering disclosure of the identity of persons who voluntarily report suspected instances of child abuse to the Department where the reports are unsubstantiated.

Facts: Husband and Wife were involved in a contested divorce proceeding in which Husband sought to learn the identity of person who made hotline reports about their children. Husband claimed Wife made these unsubstantiated hotline reports. Trial court ordered the Department to reveal identity of the reporter. Department sought a writ of prohibition.

Holding: There are separate exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality of hotline reports depending on whether the allegations reported are substantiated or unsubstantiated. This case involves unsubstantiated allegations. Secs. 210.150.3 (2) and (3) allow a parent of a child or alleged perpetrator of abuse named in a report to have a copy of the report, but provides that “[t]he names or other identifying information of reporters shall not be furnished to persons in this category.” Thus, since Husband is a parent or alleged perpetrator at issue, Husband may obtain the report, but not the identity of the reporter. The statutorily mandated confidentiality of the identity of the reporter is not overcome by demonstrating relevance or the absence of a traditional evidentiary privilege. Writ of prohibition made permanent.
Ballard v. City of Creve Coeur, 2013 WL 5458971 (Mo. App. E.D. Oct. 1, 2013):

Holding: Plaintiff, who is challenging “red light camera” ordinance, has right to discovery to develop claim that purpose of ordinance is to generate revenue, rather than ensure public safety. Missouri Supreme Court has previously held that a city can only use its police power to regulate traffic, not use a traffic ordinance as a tax ordinance in disguise.

State v. Henderson, 410 S.W.3d 760 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013):

Where the State failed to disclose a booking form that showed that Defendant admitted having a certain address that was at issue at trial, this violated Rule 25.03(A), which required disclosure of statements of Defendant.

Facts: Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, for having a gun at a certain residence and address. The defense at trial was that this was not Defendant’s residence or address. After opening statements in which the defense had claimed Defendant did not live at the address, the State obtained and introduced at trial Defendant’s booking form, which listed the address at issue as his address; an officer testified that Defendant had stated this as his address. The defense objected that the State had failed to disclose this form and statement under Rule 25.03(A).

Holding: Rule 25.03 requires the State to disclose statements of a defendant upon request. Here, the defense had filed a motion for disclosure under Rule 25.03. “Statements” are not limited to those made during police interrogation. Because statements of a defendant carry much weight with juries, a violation of discovery rules regarding them is treated with grave suspicion. Even though the State did not intend initially to use the booking form, it was still required to disclose it. The State contends that there can be no prejudice because Defendant knew of his own statements; however, if the State can avoid disclosure of a defendant’s statements on this basis, then Rule 25.03 would be eviscerated. The timing of the disclosure, after Defendant had completed his opening statement where he said this was not his address, was prejudicial to Defendant’s defense and left counsel with no time to investigate or employ another strategy.
State ex rel. Meeks v. Reaves, 2013 WL 6710350 (Mo. App. S.D. Dec. 20, 2013):

Person against whom Order of Protection is sought has right to take deposition of Petitioner under Rule 57.03 in order to prepare for hearing on whether a full Order of Protection should be granted.

Facts: Petitioner filed for an order of protection, Sec. 455.010, against Defendant. After an ex parte order was entered, Defendant, through counsel, sought to depose Petitioner to prepare for the hearing on whether a full order of protection should be granted. Petitioner refused. Defendant sought a motion to compel. The trial court ruled that Defendant did not have a right to depose Petitioner in an order of protection case. Defendant sought a writ of prohibition.

Holding: There are not any rules or statutes that make Rule 57.03 inapplicable to Chapter 455 actions. Respondent Judge compares Chapter 455 actions to unlawful detainer proceedings under Chapter 534, which are “summary in nature,” and where the ordinary civil rules do not apply. However, unlawful detainer actions involve an immediate right of possession. Such “immediate” action is not required in Chapter 455 actions. The right to depose a witness is an absolute one in the absence of a civil rule or statute that makes Rule 57.03 inapplicable to Chapter 455. Thus, Defendant has the right to depose Petitioner to prepare his defense against a full order of protection. Writ made permanent.
State ex rel. Adkins v. Moore, No. SD31503 (Mo. App. S.D. 8/25/11):

Even though local rule said that discovery had to be complete at the time of trial setting, court could not preclude the parties from conducting additional discovery after the trial setting date because that would cause local rule to conflict with Rule 56.01(e).

Facts: Court had local rule which provided that “[r]equests for trial setting shall state that discovery is complete.” Plaintiff requested a trial setting and trial was set in the future. After the setting, the parties sought to take additional depositions. The trial court ordered them to stop discovery under the local rule.

Holding: Prohibition is the proper remedy where a trial court issues a discovery order that is an abuse of discretion. Here, a plain reading of the local rule does not indicate that it is intended to bar discovery after a trial setting. Such an interpretation would be hard to reconcile with Rule 56.01(e)’s supplementation requirements and the practicalities involved in setting a trial more than a year in the future. To bar discovery under these circumstances is against the logic of the circumstances, arbitrary and unreasonable.
State v. Jackson, No. SD30129 (Mo. App. S.D. 8/12/11):

“Internal affairs” report that contained a written statement of charged incident by Officer was discoverable under Rule 25.03 and was not shielded from discovery by the Sunshine Law.

Facts: Defendant was charged with assault on a law enforcement officer. Defendant filed a motion under Rule 25.03 for any written or recorded statements reporting or summarizing witnesses’ testimony. During a deposition of the arresting officer, Officer testified that he had completed a “resistance control form” which contained his written statement of what happened and must be completed whenever a certain level of force is used. The prosecutor refused to provide the form, claiming it was under the control of the police department. Subsequently, Defendant served a subpoena duces tecum on the custodian of records of the police department to produce the document. The police department filed a motion to quash, claiming the document was a privileged personnel record under the Sunshine Law. The trial court denied a motion to compel and held the document was a privileged, closed record under the Sunshine Law. At trial, Defendant sought to question Officer about the report, but the trial court would not allow it.

Holding: The resistance control form was a written statement of a witness that the State was required to disclose to the defense pursuant to their written request under Rule 25.03(A)(1). As a prior statement by the State’s primary witness, the resistance control form contains highly relevant and material information that could be used for impeachment or as substantive evidence if it contained anything inconsistent with Officer’s police report, his deposition or trial testimony. See Sec. 491.074. The fact that the record is closed to the public under the Sunshine Law does not mean that the record is immune from discovery by a party in litigation. The report was not privileged, was discoverable, and its production was required by Rule 25.03. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to compel. For the same reason, the court’s preclusion of defense counsel’s attempt to question Officer about this at trial was erroneous. Reversed and remanded for new trial.


State ex rel. Pulitzer Newspapers Inc. v. Seay, No. SD30704 (Mo. App. S.D. 1/24/11):

Holding: Even though Defendant received an SIS, his court file remained an “open record” until the SIS probationary period was completed, and trial court could not order the record sealed before that time; Newspaper was entitled to review file before probationary period was completed under Sec. 610.105.
Wallar v. State, 403 S.W.3d 698 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013):

(1) The “form discovery response” of the Jackson County Prosecutor’s Office is deceptive because it implies that the Office has checked the criminal histories of witnesses when the Office has not, in fact, done so; thus, the response violates Rule 25.03; (2) in a Rule 24.035 motion following a guilty plea, a mere violation of a discovery rule is not cognizable, but the issue can be cognizable if it has “constitutional significance” under Brady; to plead the claim, Movant must plead that had the Brady evidence been disclosed, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial; but (3) the failure to disclose mere impeachment evidence is insufficient, because the government is not constitutionally required to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a defendant.

Facts: Following a guilty plea, Movant filed a 24.035 motion alleging that the Jackson County Prosecutor’s Office had failed to disclose evidence to him in violation of Rule 25.03. The Western District ultimately affirms the denial of postconviction relief, but makes some notable comments about discovery law and postconviction relief.

Holding: (1) The Western District finds that the “form discovery response” of the Jackson County Prosecutor’s Office is misleading because it implies that the Office has already run criminal histories on State’s witnesses when it has not done so. Although this was not prejudicial in this case because the defense attorney testified that he knew the Office did this and knew he would not get discovery of this until closer to trial, the Office’s “standard response” is deceptive and does not comply with Rule 25.03. The Jackson County Prosecutor’s Office should alter this language in its standard response to clearly reflect either that the criminal histories have not been run, or that they have been run and revealed no prior convictions. (2) As for Movant’s claim that he should receive postconviction relief due to violation of Rule 25.03, mere violation of a court rule is not cognizable under Rule 24.035 because court rules do not constitute the “laws of this state.” For the claim to be cognizable, it must have and be pleaded as having “constitutional significance,” i.e., it must violate the U.S. or Missouri Constitutions. Failure to disclose evidence could have constitutional significance if it can meet the test for Brady violations. To plead and prove such a claim, a movant must plead and prove that had the evidence at issue been disclosed, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. This Court recently held that when a defendant has pleaded guilty, “he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights … but may instead attack [only] the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing ineffectiveness of counsel.” The State argues that this holds that movants cannot raise Brady claims or constitutional claims other than ineffective counsel. This reading is too narrow. Rule 24.035 contemplates raising constitutional claims. To be cognizable, the claim would have to be one the defense was unaware of prior to the plea, that could not have been raised prior to the plea, and that rendered the plea involuntary. While such claims are rare, an example would be a Brady claim, but “[s]uch a claim is more likely to be successful if the defendant entered an Alford plea.” Also, the violation of other court rules can have “constitutional significance.” For example, if there is not a factual basis under Rule 24.02(e), this violates due process, and Rule 24.035 allows relief as a violation of due process. (3) The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that the Constitution does not require the government to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a defendant. The undisclosed evidence here is merely impeachment evidence, and therefore, does not affect the voluntary nature of the plea.
State v. Zetina-Torres, 2013 WL 791538 (Mo. App. W.D. March 5, 2013):

The State violated Rules 25.03(A)(1) and (6) where it failed to disclose until two days before trial documents (including fingerprint evidence) allegedly showing that Defendant had previously been arrested (which helped to establish his identity as owner of a truck that contained drugs), and documents from Defendant’s wallet; Defendant had insufficient time to rebut the newly-disclosed evidence, and even though Defendant may have known of documents in his wallet, Rule 25.03(A)(6) requires that the State disclose them if it intends to introduce them.