Human Rights
Under Karimov Uzbekistan was rightly seen as a global pariah on human rights. The regime was
marked by the mass jailing political prisoners, widespread use of torture and deaths in custody
(including infamous cases where prisoners were believed to have been boiled to death), poor prison
conditions as well as wider problems around corruption, rule of law, freedoms and minority rights
addressed in other sections of this collection.
143
Mirziyoyev has made substantive changes in this
area, recognising not only the impact that loosening the pressure on dissent has only on the internal
environment but in changing Uzbekistan’s international reputation.
Over 50 political prisoners have been released since 2016, including almost all of those imprisoned in
the Karimov era.
144
Those released now included a number of figures arrested in the early phase of
the Mirziyoyev era, with the release of Andrei Kubatin in September 2019, a scholar and supporter of
pan-Turkism, arrested and tortured in December 2017. In his case and many others the finger of
blame has been pointed at the security services, including by the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers Diego Garcia-Sayán.
145
As time has gone on the political
rivalries between Mirziyoyev and the Karimov era security establishment have also helped opened
up opportunities for replacing key personnel and evolving practices at a grassroots level, including
reducing the use of blacklists of human rights activist and journalists with 20,000 people removed
according to Human Rights Watch (HRW). HRW have also been told that the Uzbekistan has stopped
applying Section 221 of the Criminal Code on ‘violation of prison rules’ that was often used to extend
the sentences of political prisoners.
146
In December 2017, a Presidential Decree declared that evidence obtained through torture would be
inadmissible in court.
147
While in 2019 the notorious Jaslyk Prison, renowned as ‘the house of
torture’ and home to a number of political prisoners was closed.
148
On March 14
th
2019, President
141
Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Failure to Register – Please Submit Again: Uzbek Human Rights NGO Rejected Once More, April 2020,
https://www.uzbekforum.org/failure-to-register-please-submit-again-uzbek-human-rights-ngo-rejected-once-more/; Uzbek Forum for
Human Rights, Tricks, Threats and Deception: Registering an NGO in Uzbekistan, March 2020, http://uzbekgermanforum.org/tricks-
threats-and-deception-registering-an-ngo-in-uzbekistan/
142
Ozodlik, Under the President of Uzbekistan, a Public Chamber is being created, April 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30560581.html
https://twitter.com/akmalburhanov/status/1250855810789490688
143
HRW, Uzbekistan: Two Brutal Deaths in Custody, August 2002, https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/09/uzbekistan-two-brutal-deaths-
custody
144
HRW, Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/charting-progress-
mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan
145
Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Scholar imprisoned for espionage absolved and released, September 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-
scholar-imprisoned-for-espionage-absolved-and-released
146
HRW, Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/charting-progress-
mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan
147
RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Uzbek President’s Decree Says Evidence Obtained Though Torture Inadmissible, RFE/RL, December 2017,
https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-presidential-decree-evidence-from-torture-inadmissible/28890570.html
148
Mansur Mirovalev, Uzbekistan closes infamous prison, but experts question motive, Al Jazeera, August 2019,
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/uzbekistan-closes-infamous-prison-experts-question-motive-190811101338923.html;
Farangus Najibullah, Uzbekistan’s ‘House of Torture’, RFE/RL, August 2012, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistans-house-of-
torture/24667200.html
Spotlight on Uzbekistan
32
Mirziyoyev signed into law new provisions mandating the Ombudsman (about which more below) to
establish a National Preventive Mechanism in relation to Uzbekistan’s international commitments
under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
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However, it has yet to sign the ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ which sets the international
benchmarks for how national monitoring mechanisms should operate. The relative relaxation in the
political environment has facilitated an almost tenfold increase in the number of formal complaints
to the prosecutor’s office about incidents of torture and mistreatment but the rise in official
investigations into malpractice has not been commensurate with the increase in complaints
according to HRW.
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Overall most observers believe there has been a significant reduction, though
not elimination, of the use of torture, though sometimes because more devious methods, including
pressure on families. The recent deaths of Farrukh Hidirov, where activist have shown pictures
believed to show evidence of burning and scaring (while the authorities argue that these were
symptoms of Tuberculosis) and Alijon Abdukarimov (discussed below) suggest that more still needs
to be done to stamp out this previously endemic scourge.
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There are two official bodies with particular roles in addressing human rights in Uzbekistan; the
Office of the Authorised Person of the Oliy Majlis for Human Rights (Ombudsman) which handles
complaints from members of the public on human rights issues, and the National Human Rights
Centre (NHRC), an NGO founded in by Presidential Decree in December 2018 with a focus on
improving standards, informing legislation and international engagement (PR role).
152
The
Ombudsman’s office has been gradually increasing its independence and ability to address more
challenging issues as the climate of repression lifted. This has included engaging with independent
campaigners on issues including torture and prison inspection (reporting 138 allegations of torture in
2019, mostly in prisons).
153
However, the annual budget of the Ombudsman is currently
3,600,300,000 soms ($350,000) and it has been seeking international funding to help expand its
capacity. The NHRC has received significantly more funding in recent years with its government
funding for 2020 is 7,254,000,000 soms ($715,000) and it plays an active role in promoting the
progress of the Mirziyoyev reforms to the international community.
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Uzbekistan took the opportunity provided by the international goodwill generated by the initial burst
of reforms to convene host an ‘Asian Forum on Human Rights’ in November 2018 at a convention
centre in Samarkand, which as HRW noted the event was heavy on international observers and
Uzbek dignitaries (facilitating dialogue between the two groups) but few independent local activists
were able to attend.
155
It had planned to create a follow-up event in May 2020, the Samarkand
Human Rights Forum, before being postponed due to COVID-19.
156
The forums form part of
Uzbekistan’s campaign a seat on the UN Human Rights Council for 2021-23.
157
Uzbek Government is
in negotiations with the UN about the number of UN special rapporteurs able to visit each year,
building on recent visits but the ability to deliver these visits rely perhaps more on availability and
global on the UN side than on the Uzbek side. As discussed below Uzbekistan is in the process of
mounting a bid to join the UN Human Rights Council for 2021-23.
149
The editor is grateful for input from Penal Reform International in relation to these issues.
150
HRW, Uzbekistan: Torture Widespread, Routine, December 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/09/uzbekistan-torture-
widespread-routine
151
Will Nicol, A Torture Scandal Is Prompting Scrutiny For Uzbekistan’s Bid To Host The 2027 Asian Cup, Forbes July 2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/willnicoll/2020/07/03/a-torture-scandal-could-end-uzbekistans-bid-to-host-the-2027-asian-
games/#af5aba824786
152
NHRC website: http://nhrc.uz/; Ombudsman website: http://ombudsman.uz/
153
Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, May 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1266384893703073794?s=20
154
Funding figures provided to the FPC in PDF format.
155
HRW, Beyond Samarkand: Can Uzbekistan Turn Its Nascent Reform Efforts into a Clear Break with Its Brutal Past?, March 2019,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/08/beyond-samarkand
156
Asian Forum website: https://asianforum.uz/en
157
NHRC, Voluntary Obligations of Uzbekistan, http://nhrc.uz/uz/menu/zbekistonning-ihtierij-mazhburijatlari
Spotlight on Uzbekistan
33
Despite the identifiable progress there is still much to do before international human rights
standards are fully met. The case and treatment of former diplomat Kadyr Yusupov was convicted by
a closed court of treason in January 2020 has rung alarm bells due to allegations of torture, threats
to his family members and prior mental health issues that included a suicide attempt immediately
prior to his arrest.
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This and other cases show that all though progress has been made in checking
the power of the security services, including reducing their political threat to the regime, there are
still credible concerns that some of their arrests are for the purposes of perpetuating their own
existence at current resourcing levels (by keeping Uzbekistan safe from spies whether real and
imagined) than meeting the wider needs of Uzbek national security.
159
Campaigners have argued for
reforms to Article 157 of the Criminal Code, which sets out the criteria for High Treason though in
practice it will take further reform of the security services and of the courts to reduce the risk of
national security cases being made on dubious grounds. Further evidence for the need for more
security service reform has been set out by Amnesty International who have identified a
sophisticated phishing and spyware campaign to try to monitor a number of Uzbekistani human
rights activists.
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In principle provisions for freedom assembly are enshrined in the constitution and law. However, in
practice under Karimov protests were virtually prohibited in practice and continue to be difficult to
organise to this day. While, prior to the COVID-19 lockdown, the Government had become less heavy
handed in its response to spontaneous public protests, such as over natural gas prices and the
housing protests mentioned above, attempts to address formal restrictions on freedom of assembly
have stalled.
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In the summer of 2019, the Government consulted on the ‘Draft Law on Rallies,
Meetings and Demonstrations of the Republic of Uzbekistan’. Following criticism by international
experts convened by the OSCE/ODIHR that the proposed law was ‘
generally not compliant with
international human rights standards, and there are a several areas that may be considered
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