Chapter 5
1
In 2001 Pret A Manger’s growth potential triggered McDonald’s to buy a 33
percent share of the company for £50 million. After the McDonald’s investment,
the company began to aggressively expand overseas. But after a spectacular
start, losses quickly accumulated as Pret’s zealous expansion led it to take its eye
off the ball. After pruning back its overseas operations and getting back to the
basics, Pret turned around very quickly and went into steady sales growth, with
only a blip in the recession. There is an important lesson here for companies that
create a blue ocean. While excitement in the market will be great and new
demand for blue ocean offerings strong, companies need to remain vigilant and
not become lax or compromise their standards as they roll out their blue ocean
offering.
2
JCDecaux is also the world’s largest provider of airport advertising and
transport advertising. The company has over 1 million advertising panels and
reaches some 300 million people every day. JCDecaux generated revenues of
€2.676 billion in 2013.
3
See Committee on Defense Manufacturing (1996), James Fallows (2002),
and John Birkler et al. (2001).
4
Department of Defense (1993).
5
For more on the specifics on what the JSF was designed to achieve, see Bill
Breen (2002), Fallows (2002), Federation of Atomic Scientists (2001), David H.
Freedman (2002),
Nova
(2003), and United States Air Force (2002).
6
See, for example, Miller (2003) and Gasiorek-Nelson (2003). Miller, who
was vice admiral of the US Navy at the time, notes in his 2003 article, “The Joint
Strike Fighter acquisition program began with early and sustained cooperation
among government, industry, and the military and included designing with
commonality among the services in mind—which has kept costs down—as well
as plenty of testing. The program is proving to be a model for success.”
Relatedly, in Gasiorek-Nelson’s (2003) article, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology Edward C. Aldridge Jr., speaking at the Defense
Transformation Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Conference in 2003, is
noted as saying that the Joint Strike Fighter, “now, is a hugely successful
international program.”
7
Given the almost ten-year time lag from the conception of the JSF F-35
strategy to its planned realization in 2010 and the unusual high dependence on a
complex web of external stakeholders outside of the military’s hierarchical
control, as we noted in our original book, the conceptual strength of this strategic
move does not in itself secure success. Here execution challenges are very steep;
the key decision makers of the military and Pentagon changed during the ten-
year realization time and external stakeholders had diverging interests and
understandings.
Chapter 8
follows up the F-35 and discusses how it evolved to
date in the context of the execution issues involved with both internal and
external stakeholders.
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