138
practices, they say much less about what, if anything, ought to
replace
the “police” order.
29
Instead, democratic action is reduced to temporary moments of intervention and resistance.
Sheldon Wolin has perhaps given the clearest expression of this view:
democracy can
never function as a sustained political system or as mode of collective self-governance. History
demonstrates that moments of democratic commonality are rare and, when they do occur, they
are fleeting. Wolin argues that such an outcome in inevitable: “Democratic political
interventions are, at the national level, necessarily episodic or fugitive” (Wolin 2008, 290).
Though Wolin (1992, 251) acknowledges that participants in disruptive actions aim to create
new norms – “bearing the markers of an obsession with participation
and equality as well as an
intoxication with the first experience of power, the experience of cooperation, common sacrifice,
and common concern” – attempts to forge a lasting democratic practice are doomed. Thus, for
Wolin, democracy is consigned to the fleeting moments in which citizens reassert themselves to
challenge exclusion
or injustice, or otherwise address an issue of common concern. As such,
citizens are constantly stuck in the defensive position of trying to “recover lost ground” (Wolin
2008, 258). Disruptive democratic actions, then, are theorized as reactions and resistance.
As Dean (2009, 178, fn. 24) puts it in relationship to Ranciere’s thought:
If disruption is the essence of politics, then governance is necessarily
depoliticizing. This view of governance allows for a kind of permanent
contestation without any responsibility for actual decisions and implementation.
The resulting left politics is reduced to a politics of resistance.
While I might eschew the language of “governance” as the only alternative to
a language of
“resistance,” I generally agree with her point. I believe that we both want to move left politics
beyond a politics of resistance (without denying that disruption and resistance are critical) and
29
This is perhaps not a problem for Ranciere who conceptualizes the “police” as a necessary counterpart to
“politics,” but it is a problem for anarchists and others like Dean who wish to not just intervene upon, but to change,
the social order.
139
towards a positive vision of an alternative society.
Contrary to Dean, however, I do not believe
this requires that we abandon democracy. The way that direct action combines disruption and
prefiguration offers a way out of this dilemma. To put this differently, I contend that radical
democrats like Ranciere and Wolin have taken seriously the anarchic
project of disruption and
resistance, while neglecting, if not rejecting, anarchists’ positive political commitments to the
creation of a free, egalitarian and radically democratic society.
Democracy, therefore, becomes a
mere intervention on the ‘police’ order, rather than a radical (in the sense of advocating
fundamental, social, economic and political change) vision of how to change the ‘police’ order
itself. While Ranciere conceptualizes democracy in a way that foregrounds the
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: