Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

low discount rates
. They plan to stay in the area and use the 
resource indefinitely, expecting their children and grandchildren to do the same. There is 
relative equality
among the users, such that they are likely to be impacted in similar ways.
Individuals have a 
significant investment
in the resource; it constitutes their livelihood. In other 
words, individuals are “heavily dependent on the CPR for economic returns” (
ibid
. 26).
Private 
solutions are not possible
. Local leaders cannot simply develop private accommodations, but 
must instead organize for common solutions 
In cases of the global commons, 
not one of these conditions holds
– at least not in a 
strong sense. First, many people today are highly mobile and are capable of moving from one 
location to another in search of income or a livable environment. Second, there is anything but 
relative equality at the global level. Instead we see almost unimaginable levels of inequality 
between the best off and the worst off. Third, though we all depend on global CPRs such as the 
ocean and the atmosphere, most people do not have a significant economic (i.e. short-term and 
self-interested) stake in the overall health of those resources. Fourth, private solutions to 
commons problems are possible for some people – especially those with the most resources. For 
example, as public water becomes more contaminated, the well-off can purchase water filtration 
systems or water from clean sources elsewhere in order to avoid the effects of pollution.
In addition to these concerns, there is another way in which Ostrom’s analysis essentially 
brackets the problems of global commons. In her cases, the actors in a given CPR have 
no
“significant impact on the environment of others living outside the range of their CPR” (
ibid.
31). In other words, Ostrom effectively excludes problems of externalities, wherein the activities 
of some have important consequences for others not included in the “transaction.” Because 

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many contemporary problems are of just this type – there are, in other words, boundary-crossing 
effects – a broader theory of self-governance will need to be much more cosmopolitan and fluid.
The task, then, for a theory of self-governance relevant to our contemporary conditions is 
to consider its possibilities and challenges when the conditions that Ostrom identifies largely do 
not apply. “The multitude,” in particular, is a social form that does 
not
share the basic 
components of Ostrom’s examples. First, “the multitude” is global, rather than local. Second, 
“the multitude” is diffuse, rather than clearly bounded. Third, “the multitude” is diverse and 
differentiated, rather than relatively homogeneous. And, yet, despite these apparent challenges, 
Hardt and Negri (2004, 100) argue that “the multitude” is a “
living flesh
that rules itself.” How, 
then, is this possible? What forms will such self-governance take, if indeed it is possible at all?
A preliminary answer to that question will need to engage with the three critical differences 
between Ostrom’s self-governing communities and Hardt and Negri’s self-governing multitude – 
addressing, in particular, “the multitude’s” global, diffuse and unbounded nature, on the one 
hand, and its qualities of being diverse and differentiated, on the other. I take up these two 
challenges in reverse order. In the next section, I take up a slice of the literature in democratic 
theory on difference, diversity and pluralism. The goal is to highlight the potential problems that 
difference and diversity raise for democracy, as well as explain their intractability and, hence, the 
need for democracy to find ways of working with, rather than working against, such facts. I 
position networks as a mode of self-governance that accommodates and, in fact, enables 
difference rather than seeking to suppress it. Then, in the remainder of the chapter, I contend 
that not only are networked modes of organization attuned to the fact of pluralism, but they also 
enable a form of self-governance that is compatible with the diffuse and unbounded nature of 
“the multitude” 

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