Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

ibid
.
 
50). Young usefully shows why, in the 
context of inequality, dominated and oppressed people will often need to rely on disruptive 
actions in order to put an issue on the agenda or gain a seat at the table. To state the claim more 
22
Young (2001) goes into some detail in outlining how this marginalization occurs even in formally deliberative and 
inclusive institutions through mechanisms such as “constrained alternatives” and “hegemonic discourse.” 

---

127 
strongly, Young provides reasons for thinking that sometimes the right way to “deliberate” – that 
is, to contribute to and participate in the process of critiquing and presenting ideas – is to disrupt 
formally deliberative processes.
23
As Young (2001, 673) notes:
Often activists make public noise outside when deliberation is supposedly taking 
place on the inside. Sometimes activists invade the houses of deliberation and 
disrupt their business by unfurling banners, throwing stink bombs, or running and 
shouting through the aisles.
In short, where the “unforced force of the better argument” fails – that is, where structural 
inequalities or other factors prevent reasonable outcomes – these activists force a conversation 
by shutting down a conversation. If democracy today talks without responding, as Dean 
suggests, disruptive direct action forces a response.
However, as is clear from Young’s analysis, she remains wedded to conceptualizing even 
disruptive action as primarily communicative. She urges democratic theorists to “conceive the 
exchange of ideas and processes of communication taking place in a vibrant democracy as far 
more rowdy, disorderly, and decentered” (
ibid.
688). Even as Young pushes on deliberative 
democrats to see disruption as democratic, she sees the actions as primarily oriented toward 
communication. As such, the democratic justification for disruptive activities is that they further 
communicative goals, such as having one’s voice heard and improving the quality of 
conversations in the public sphere. For example, Young (
ibid
. 676) contends that one of the 
primary reasons for disruptive protests… 
…is to make a wider public aware of institutional wrongs and persuade that 
public to join…in pressuring for change in the institutions. While not 
deliberative, then in the sense of engaging in orderly reason giving, most activist 
political engagements aim to
 communicate
specific ideas to a wide public.
23
Take, for example, the rowdy and disruptive protests that shut down the World Trade Organization meeting in 
Seattle in 1999. There is no doubt that these protests effectively stopped a conversation from happening. However, 
the protests are frequently credited with initiating a serious public debate about and reconsideration of neoliberal 
globalization, as well as the role of corporations in society and politics. It is likely that without such disruptive 
protests, those critical issues would not have been raised and the public discussion – carried on through a wide 
variety of media outlets – would not have happened.

---

128 
Certainly, she is not wrong that communicating ideas to a general public is an important goal of 
protest. However, it is not the only goal of protests in general and it is certainly not the only goal 
of direct action in particular.
24
If direct action is to offer an alternative way out of the problem Dean has identified, I 
will need to show how direct action can be conceptualized in non-communicative terms and also 
why this type of action should still be theorized as democratic. To make this argument, I turn to 
Frances Fox Piven and Jacques Ranciere, who provide distinct, but related accounts of disruptive 
democratic action that is best understood as being oriented toward reconfiguring power, rather 
than reinvigorating conversation.