Beyond the democratic state: anti-authoritarian interventions in democratic theory

II. The Reduction of Democracy to Deliberation and Communication
Habermas’s Deliberative Ideal and its Limits 
Jurgen Habermas seeks to understand how democracy is possible in the context of large-
scale, complex and pluralistic societies – in particular how decisions in such a society are 
democratically legitimated. He proposes a discourse-based approach to legitimating decisions 
democratically. The discourse principle states: “Just those action norms are valid to which all 
possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses” (Habermas 1996, 
107). The venues through which citizens can express their agreement or disagreement are the 
multi-leveled networks of the public sphere. 
The public sphere cannot be conceived as an institution and certainly not as an 
organization…The public sphere can best be described as a network for 
communicating information and points of view (i.e. opinions expressing 
affirmative or negative attitudes) (
ibid.
360).
Examples of the public sphere, then, can include television, radio and newspapers, blogs and 
websites, popular and academic presses, concerts and art performances, and public meetings and 
protests.
The public sphere arguably plays 
the
central role in Habermas’s account of deliberative 
democracy. It is the primary mechanism for collective will formation and only through its 
proper functioning can democratic decisions be legitimated. The main functions Habermas 
outlines for the public sphere are to identify problems in society, set the agenda for legislative 
bodies, and, finally, to propose and critique various policy options and potential solutions.
“From the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must…amplify the pressure of 

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problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and 
influentially 
thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they 
are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes” (
ibid.
359; emphasis in original). Thus, 
Habermas ascribes important functions to an educated, engaged and active citizenry and 
maintains that citizens can and should be involved in politics as more than an occasional voter.
That said, the chief political activities of most citizens will not be in drafting legislation or voting 
on specific policies, but in participating (to greater or less degrees) in the conversations of the 
public sphere. Thus, for deliberative theorists such as Habermas, “democracy is envisioned as 
the exchange of reasons by participants in a discussion characterized by equality, inclusivity, 
reciprocity, and transparency” (Dean 2009, 78-79). Through a process of reasonable 
argumentation, citizens aim to reach a mutual understanding and come to an agreement that is 
satisfactory to all involved.
Despite his apparent emphasis on rationality Habermas argues that protests, disruptive 
actions and other kinds of contentious politics are an important precursor to deliberative 
democracy. 
Sometimes the support of sensational actions, mass protests, and incessant 
campaigning is required before an issue can make its way via the surprising 
election of marginal candidates or radical parties, expanded platforms of 
‘established’ parties, important court decisions, and so on, into the core of the 
political system and receive formal consideration (Habermas 1996, 381). 
Moreover, Habermas endorses nonviolent lawbreaking as a legitimate means for civil society 
actors to press their case and have their message heard. As “protest movements reach a high 
point by escalating their protests…their last means for obtaining more of a hearing and greater 
media influence for oppositional arguments are acts of civil disobedience” (
ibid.
382). In other 
words, symbolic acts of rule violation constitute a legitimate action for those actors who are 

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marginalized by the political public sphere. For Habermas, the role of disruptive or unlawful 
civic action is that it can itself enhance broad deliberative processes. Due to deep and persistent 
structural inequalities, some issues and voices are likely to be excluded from the ‘normal’ 
deliberative avenues of the public sphere (e.g. mass media). As such, other types of 
interventions are necessary in order to put an item on the public agenda and stimulate political 
dialogue. Put simply, Habermas is supportive of contentious politics of social movements to the 
extent that they are ways of facilitating public conversation.
For Habermas, while citizens can try to influence discursive processes they cannot and 
should not actually seek to govern themselves directly. Citizens can “thematize” and 
“dramatize” problems, but only in an effort to have them “taken up and dealt with by 
parliamentary complexes” (