Attorney General V Blake House of Lords

Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (2000)
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in favour of granting an order for disgorgement of
profits against Blake. The decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Snepp v United States, 444 US
507 is instructive. On very similar facts the Supreme
Court imposed a constructive trust on the intelligence
officer's profits. Our law is also mature enough to
provide a remedy in such a case but does so by the
route of the exceptional recognition of a claim for
disgorgement of profits against the contract breaker.
In my view therefore there is a valid claim vesting in
the Attorney General against Blake for disgorgement
of his gain.
In view of these conclusions the judgment of the Court
of Appeal on the granting of the injunction may appear
to be less important. But in a persuasive speech counsel
for Blake has persuaded me that the judgment of the
Court of Appeal on this aspect cannot stand. First, in
granting the injunction to prevent Blake from receiving
his royalties the Court of Appeal went significantly
beyond the existing law governing the powers of
the Attorney General. Secondly, in this case it was
unnecessary to do so because the Attorney General
in truth had a perfectly good private law remedy
which he chose not to invoke. Giving to a member
of the executive unnecessary powers is never a good
idea. One does not know how such powers may be
employed in future. Thirdly, the decision of the Court
of Appeal is, in any event, an order with confiscatory
effect. Parliament has legislated for the circumstances
in which the profits of crime may be confiscated. An
indispensable statutory requirement is a conviction for
the relevant offence: see Webb v Chief Constable of
Merseyside Police [2000] QB 427 . In this case the
only relevant offence could be the handing over by
Blake of the manuscript to the publishers. He has not
been convicted of that offence. Given the limitations
upon the power to confiscate carefully laid down by
Parliament it is a very strong thing for a court to create
a power to confiscate directly or indirectly the proceeds
of crime. After all, the 
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constitutional function
of the courts in creating law does not go beyond filling
spaces left vacant by Parliament. Lastly, it has been a
longstanding principle of the common law that, absent
legislative authorisation, a court may not confiscate the
property of a citizen: see Malone v Comr of Police of
the Metropolis [1980] QB 49 ; Webb v Chief Constable
of Merseyside Police [2000] QB 427 , per May LJ, at
pp 446-448, per Pill LJ, at p 449. This principle must
also apply to a court granting an injunction designed to
have a confiscatory effect.
My Lords, for these reasons, as well as the detailed and
far more compelling reasons given by Lord Nicholls
of Birkenhead, I would make the order which he has
proposed.
LORD HOBHOUSE OF WOODBOROUGH.
My Lords, when he opened this appeal, Mr Clayton,
to whose pro bono services on behalf of the appellant
George Blake I, too, would wish to pay tribute, warned
your Lordships against being drawn into making bad
law in order to enable an intuitively just decision to
be given against a traitor. It is therefore particularly
important to be clear what are the facts which have
given rise to the Attorney General's claim in the present
case. They are not materially in dispute.
Between 1944 and 1961, Blake was employed by the
Crown as a member of the Secret Intelligence Service.
As such he was subject to the provisions of the Official
Secrets Act 1911 . In August 1944 he signed the
requisite declaration under the Act. The declaration
which he signed included the added sentence:
"I understand that the above clauses [2 and 3] of the
Official Secrets Act 1911 and 1920 cover also articles
published in the press and in book form and I undertake
not to divulge any official information gained by me
as a result of my employment either in the press or in
book form."
It is common ground in the present case that these
words amounted to a contractual undertaking by Blake
in favour of the Crown and that the Crown had a
legitimate interest in asking for this undertaking in
aid of the criminal provisions quoted earlier in the
document. It was not a commercial document and its

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