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Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (2000)
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| Bog'liq Attorney General v Blake
Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (2000)
© 2023 Thomson Reuters.
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I should add that in his judgment Lord Woolf MR
[1998] Ch 439 , 463, referred to several cases
where interlocutory injunctions were granted to chief
constables freezing the suspected proceeds of crime in
circumstances
*290
where there had not yet been a
conviction for a criminal offence. In this House Mr
Clayton mounted a sustained attack on these decisions.
For his part the Solicitor General did not seek to
rely on these decisions in support of the Attorney
General's case. As Lord Woolf MR noted, the Attorney
General stands in an altogether different legal and
constitutional position. Since the House has not heard
contrary argument, it would not be right to express any
views on Mr Clayton's submissions regarding these
cases.
LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY.
My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft
the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend,
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. I agree with it and for the
reasons which he has given I would dismiss this appeal.
LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON.
My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft
the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend,
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. I agree with it and for
the reasons which he gives I would dismiss this appeal
but vary the order of the Court of Appeal to declare
that the Attorney General is entitled to be paid a sum
equal to whatever amount is due and owing to Blake
from Jonathan Cape under the publishing agreement of
4 May 1989.
LORD STEYN.
My Lords, in law classification is important. Asking
the right questions in the right order reduces the
risk of wrong decisions. This truth is illustrated by
the case before the House. Blake is a convicted
traitor. From 1944 to 1961 he was a member of the
intelligence services. In 1944 he was required to and
did sign a contractual undertaking "not to divulge any
official information gained by me as a result of my
employment, either in the press or book form". This
undertaking still binds Blake. In flagrant breach of
the terms of the undertaking Blake published a book
in September 1990 dealing in part with his period
in the intelligence services. This appeal concerns a
sum of about £90,000 payable by Jonathan Cape
Ltd, the publishers, to Blake. The Court of Appeal
upheld the decision of Sir Richard Scott V-C, that
Blake is not liable to account for his profits as a
fiduciary: Attorney General v Blake[1998] Ch 439 .
Despite the encouragement of the Court of Appeal
Mr John Smith QC, the Attorney General at that
time, declined to pursue a claim for restitutionary
damages for breach of contract. While recording its
view that such a claim, if made, might be sound,
the Court of Appeal was powerless to act on that
view: at pp 456-458. In a case crying out for effective
relief against Blake, the Court of Appeal devised an
injunction, the objective of which was to prevent the
money reaching Blake. Due to an initiative taken by the
House, the issue of the availability of a restitutionary
remedy is now before the House. At the hearing of the
appeal counsel for Blake addressed first the public law
question whether the Court of Appeal had the power to
grant the injunction before he dealt with the question
whether a restitutionary remedy is available. My
Lords, taxonomy requires that the question whether
there is such a private law remedy should be considered
first. This is so because the Court of Appeal in
granting the injunction undoubtedly extended the reach
of existing powers of the Attorney General. And that
course could only sensibly be entertained if there was
not a restitutionary law remedy. It is therefore to the
private law position that I first turn.
*291
In the Court of Appeal in Surrey County Council v
Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 I discussed
some of the difficulties inherent in creating a general
remedy for the recovery of restitutionary damages
for breach of contract. On that occasion I remarked
that it is not traditional to describe a claim for
restitution following a breach of contract as damages.
The terminology is however less important than the
substance: under consideration are claims for the
disgorgement of profits against a contract breaker.
There has been a substantial academic debate on the
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