delivery of future outcomes or nonlinearity in the utility function). But the spec-
tacular cross-study differences in discount rates also reflect the diversity of con-
siderations that are relevant in inter-temporal choices and that legitimately affect
different types of intertemporal choices differently.
Thus there is no reason to
expect that discount rates
should
be consistent across different choices.
The idea that intertemporal choices reflect an interplay of disparate and often
competing psychological motives was commonplace in the writings of early
twentieth-century economists. We believe that this
approach should be resur-
rected. Reintroducing the multiple-motives approach to intertemporal choice will
help us to better understand and better explain the intertemporal choices we
observe in the real world. For instance, it permits more scope for understanding
individual differences (for example, why one person
is a spendthrift while his
neighbor is a miser, or why one person does drugs while her brother does not),
because people may differ in the degree to which they experience anticipatory
utility or are influenced by visceral factors.
The multiple-motive approach may be even more important for understanding
intra
individual differences. When one looks at the behavior of a single individual
across different domains, there is often a wide range of apparent attitudes toward
the future. Someone may smoke heavily, but carefully study the returns of various
retirement packages. Another may squirrel money away while at the same time
giving little thought to electrical efficiency when purchasing an air conditioner.
Someone else may devote two decades of his life to establishing a career, and then
jeopardize this long-term investment for some highly transient pleasure. Since the
DU model assumes a unitary discount rate that applies to all acts of consumption,
such intraindividual heterogeneities pose a theoretical challenge. The
multiple-
motive approach,
by contrast, allows us to readily interpret such differences in
terms of more narrow, more legitimate, and more stable constructs—for example,
the degree to which people are skeptical of promises, experience anticipatory util-
ity, are influenced by visceral factors, or are able to correctly predict their future
utility.
The multiple-motive approach may sound excessively open-ended. We have
described a variety of considerations that researchers could potentially incorpo-
rate into their analyses. Including every consideration would be far too compli-
cated, while picking and choosing which considerations to incorporate may leave
one open to charges of being ad hoc. How, then, should economists proceed?
We believe that economists should proceed as they typically do. Economics has
always been both an art and a science. Economists are forced to intuit, to the best
of their abilities, which considerations are likely to be important in a particular
domain and which are likely to be largely irrelevant. When economists model la-
bor supply, for instance, they typically do so with a utility function that incorpo-
rates consumption and leisure, but when they model investment decisions, they
typically assume that preferences are defined over wealth. Similarly, a researcher
investigating charitable giving might use a utility function that incorporates altru-
ism but not risk aversion or time preference, whereas someone studying investor
behavior is unlikely to use a utility function that incorporates altruism. For each
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