purposes of illustration. His view enables one to see why political equal-
ity is sometimes regarded as less essential
than equal liberty of con-
science or liberty of the person. Government is assumed to aim at the
common good, that is, at maintaining conditions and achieving objectives
that are similarly to everyone’s advantage. To the extent that this pre-
sumption holds, and some men can be identified as having superior wis-
dom and judgment, others are willing to trust them and to concede to
their opinion a greater weight. The passengers of a ship are willing to let
the captain steer the course, since they believe that he is more knowledge-
able and wishes to arrive safely as much as they do. There is both an
identity of interests and a noticeably greater skill
and judgment in realiz-
ing it. Now the ship of state is in some ways analogous to a ship at sea;
and to the extent that this is so, the political liberties are indeed subordi-
nate to the other freedoms that, so to say, define the intrinsic good of the
passengers. Admitting these assumptions, plural voting may be perfectly
just.
Of course, the grounds for self-government are not solely instrumental.
Equal political liberty when assured its fair value is bound to have a
profound effect on the moral quality of civic life. Citizens’ relations to
one another are given a secure basis in the manifest
constitution of soci-
ety. The medieval maxim that what touches all concerns all is seen to be
taken seriously and declared as the public intention. Political liberty so
understood is not designed to satisfy the individual’s desire for self-mas-
tery, much less his quest for power. Taking part in political life does not
make the individual master of himself, but rather gives him an equal voice
along with others in settling how basic social
conditions are to be ar-
ranged. Nor does it answer to the ambition to dictate to others, since each
is now required to moderate his claims by what everyone is able to
recognize as just. The public will to consult and to take everyone’s beliefs
and interests into account lays the foundations for civic friendship and
shapes the ethos of political culture.
Moreover, the effect of self-government where equal political rights
have their fair value is to enhance the self-esteem and the sense of politi-
cal competence of the average citizen. His awareness of his own worth
developed in the smaller associations of his community is confirmed in
the constitution of the whole society. Since
he is expected to vote, he is
expected to have political opinions. The time and thought that he devotes
to forming his views is not governed by the likely material return of his
political influence. Rather it is an activity enjoyable in itself that leads to
a larger conception of society and to the development of his intellectual
205
37. Limitations on Participation
and moral faculties. As Mill observed, he is called
upon to weigh interests
other than his own, and to be guided by some conception of justice and
the public good rather than by his own inclinations.
19
Having to explain
and justify his views to others, he must appeal to principles that others
can accept. Moreover, Mill adds, this education to public spirit is neces-
sary if citizens are to acquire an affirmative
sense of political duty and
obligation, that is, one that goes beyond the mere willingness to submit to
law and government. Without these more inclusive sentiments men be-
come estranged and isolated in their smaller associations, and affective
ties may not extend outside the family or a narrow circle of friends.
Citizens no longer regard one another as associates with whom one can
cooperate to advance some interpretation of the public good; instead, they
view themselves as rivals, or else as obstacles to one another’s ends.
All of these considerations Mill and others have made familiar. They
show that equal political liberty is not solely a means.
These freedoms
strengthen men’s sense of their own worth, enlarge their intellectual and
moral sensibilities, and lay the basis for a sense of duty and obligation
upon which the stability of just institutions depends. The connection of
these matters to human good and the sense of justice I shall leave until
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