A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part of the theory of justice and must not be mistaken for a theory of the
political system. We are in the way of describing an ideal arrangement,
comparison with which defines a standard for judging actual institutions,
and indicates what must be maintained to justify departures from it.
By way of summing up the account of the principle of participation,
we can say that a just constitution sets up a form of fair rivalry for
political office and authority. By presenting conceptions of the public
good and policies designed to promote social ends, rival parties seek the
citizens’ approval in accordance with just procedural rules against a back-
ground of freedom of thought and assembly in which the fair value of
political liberty is assured. The principle of participation compels those in
authority to be responsive to the felt interests of the electorate. Repre-
sentatives are not, to be sure, mere agents of their constituents, since they
have a certain discretion and they are expected to exercise their judgment
in enacting legislation. In a well-ordered society they must, nevertheless,
represent their constituents in the substantive sense: they must seek first
to pass just and effective legislation, since this is a citizen’s first interest
14. My remarks draw upon F. H. Knight, 
The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays
(New York,
Harper and Brothers, 1935), pp. 293–305.
199
36. Political Justice and the Constitution

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in government, and secondly, they must further their constituents’ other
interests insofar as these are consistent with justice.
15
The principles of
justice are among the main criteria to be used in judging a representa-
tive’s record and the reasons he gives in defense of it. Since the constitu-
tion is the foundation of the social structure, the highest-order system of
rules that regulates and controls other institutions, everyone has the same
access to the political procedure that it sets up. When the principle of