A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Four Essays on Liberty,
pp. 130, 165.
202
Equal Liberty

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rather evenly divided. Everything depends on the probable justice of the
outcome. If the various sectors of society have reasonable confidence in
one another and share a common conception of justice, the rule by bare
majorities may succeed fairly well. To the extent that this underlying
agreement is lacking, the majority principle becomes more difficult to
justify because it is less probable that just policies will be followed. There
may, however, be no procedures that can be relied upon once distrust and
enmity pervade society. I do not wish to pursue these matters further. I
mention these familiar points about majority rule only to emphasize that
the test of constitutional arrangements is always the overall balance of
justice. Where issues of justice are involved, the intensity of desires
should not be taken into account. Of course, as things are, legislators
must reckon with strong public feelings. Men’s sense of outrage however
irrational will set boundaries upon what is politically attainable; and
popular views will affect the strategies of enforcement within these lim-
its. But questions of strategy are not to be confused with those of jus-
tice. If a bill of rights guaranteeing liberty of conscience and freedom of
thought and assembly would be effective, then it should be adopted.
Whatever the depth of feeling against them, these rights should if pos-
sible be made to stand. The force of opposing attitudes has no bearing
on the question of right but only on the feasibility of arrangements of
liberty.
The justification of unequal political liberty proceeds in much the
same way. One takes up the point of view of the representative citizen in
the constitutional convention and assesses the total system of freedom as
it looks to him. But in this case there is an important difference. We must
now reason from the perspective of those who have the lesser political
liberty. An inequality in the basic structure must always be justified to
those in the disadvantaged position. This holds whatever the primary
social good and especially for liberty. Therefore the priority rule requires
us to show that the inequality of right would be accepted by the less
favored in return for the greater protection of their other liberties that
results from this restriction.
Perhaps the most obvious political inequality is the violation of the
precept one person one vote. Yet until recent times most writers rejected
equal universal suffrage. Indeed, persons were not regarded as the proper
subjects of representation at all. Often it was interests that were to be
represented, with Whig and Tory differing as to whether the interest of
the rising middle class should be given a place alongside the landed and
203
37. Limitations on Participation

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ecclesiastical interests. For others it is regions that are to be represented,
or forms of culture, as when one speaks of the representation of the
agricultural and urban elements of society. At the first sight, these kinds
of representation appear unjust. How far they depart from the precept one
person one vote is a measure of their abstract injustice, and indicates the
strength of the countervailing reasons that must be forthcoming.
17
Now it frequently turns out that those who oppose equal political
liberty put forward justifications of the required form. They are at least
prepared to argue that political inequality is to the benefit of those with
the lesser liberty. Consider as an illustration Mill’s view that persons with
greater intelligence and education should have extra votes in order that
their opinions may have a greater influence.
18
Mill believed that in this
case plural voting accords with the natural order of human life, for when-
ever persons conduct a common enterprise in which they have a joint
interest, they recognize that while all should have a voice, the say of
everyone need not be equal. The judgment of the wiser and more knowl-
edgeable should have a superior weight. Such an arrangement is in the
interest of each and conforms to men’s sentiment of justice. National
affairs are precisely such a joint concern. Although all should indeed have
the vote, those with a greater capacity for the management of the public
interest should have a larger say. Their influence should be great enough
to protect them from the class legislation of the uneducated, but not so
large as to allow them to enact class legislation in their own behalf.
Ideally, those with superior wisdom and judgment should act as a con-
stant force on the side of justice and the common good, a force that,
although always weak by itself, can often tip the scale in the right direc-
tion if the larger forces cancel out. Mill was persuaded that everyone
would gain from this arrangement, including those whose votes count for
less. Of course, as it stands, this argument does not go beyond the general
conception of justice as fairness. Mill does not state explicitly that the
gain to the uneducated is to be estimated in the first instance by the larger
security of their other liberties, although his reasoning suggests that he
thought this to be the case. In any event, if Mill’s view is to satisfy the
restrictions imposed by the priority of liberty, this is how the argument
must go.
I do not wish to criticize Mill’s proposal. My account of it is solely for
17. See J. R. Pole,