A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

parties must assume that they may have moral, religious, or philosophical
interests which they cannot put in jeopardy unless there is no alternative.
One might say that they regard themselves as having moral or religious
6. The notion of equal right is, of course, well known in one form or another and appears in
numerous analyses of justice even where the writers differ widely on other matters. Thus if the
principle of an equal right to freedom is commonly associated with Kant—see 
The Metaphysical
Elements of Justice,
trans. John Ladd (New York, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1965), pp. 43–45—it
may be claimed that it can also be found in J. S. Mill’s 
On Liberty
and elsewhere in his writings, and
in those of many other liberal thinkers. H. L. A. Hart has argued for something like it in “Are There
Any Natural Rights?” 
Philosophical Review,
vol. 64 (1955); and similarly Richard Wollheim in the
symposium “Equality,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
vol. 56 (1955–1956). The principle of
equal liberty as I shall use it may acquire, though, special features in view of the theory of which it is
a part. In particular, it enjoins a certain structure of institutions to be departed from only as the
priority rules allow (§39). It is far removed from a principle of equal consideration, since the intuitive
idea is to generalize the principle of religious toleration to a social form, thereby arriving at equal
liberty in public institutions.
180
Equal Liberty

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obligations which they must keep themselves free to honor. Of course,
from the standpoint of justice as fairness, these obligations are self-im-
posed; they are not bonds laid down by this conception of justice. The
point is rather that the persons in the original position are not to view
themselves as single isolated individuals. To the contrary, they assume
that they have interests which they must protect as best they can and that
they have ties with certain members of the next generation who will also
make similar claims. Once the parties consider these matters, the case for
the principles of justice is very much strengthened, as I shall now try to
show.
The question of equal liberty of conscience is settled. It is one of the
fixed points of our considered judgments of justice. But precisely because
of this fact it illustrates the nature of the argument for the principle of
equal liberty. The reasoning in this case can be generalized to apply to
other freedoms, although not always with the same force. Turning then to
liberty of conscience, it seems evident that the parties must choose princi-
ples that secure the integrity of their religious and moral freedom. They
do not know, of course, what their religious or moral convictions are, or
what is the particular content of their moral or religious obligations as
they interpret them. Indeed, they do not know that they think of them-
selves as having such obligations. The possibility that they do suffices for
the argument, although I shall make the stronger assumption. Further, the