A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Ancient and Modern Liberty
(1819). His ideas on this are discussed by
Guido de Ruggiero, 
The History of European Liberalism,
trans. R. G. Collingwood (Oxford, The
Clarendon Press, 1927), pp. 159–164, 167–169. For a general discussion, see Isaiah Berlin, 
Four
Essays on Liberty
(London, Oxford University Press, 1969), esp. the third essay and pp. xxxvii–lxiii
of the introduction; and G. G. MacCallum, “Negative and Positive Freedom,” 
Philosophical Review,
vol. 76 (1967).
4. Here I follow MacCallum, “Negative and Positive Freedom.” See further Felix Oppenheim,
Dimensions of Freedom
(New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1961), esp. pp. 109–118, 132–134, where a
notion of social freedom is also triadically defined.
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32. The Concept of Liberty

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individuals to do or not to do something, but government and other
persons must have a legal duty not to obstruct. I shall not delineate these
rights and duties in any detail, but shall suppose that we understand their
nature well enough for our purposes.
Several brief clarifications. First of all, one must keep in mind that the
basic liberties are to be assessed as a whole, as one system. The worth of
one such liberty normally depends upon the specification of the other
liberties. Second, I assume that under reasonably favorable conditions
there is always a way of defining these liberties so that the most central
applications of each can be simultaneously secured and the most funda-
mental interests protected. Or at least that this is possible provided the
two principles and their associated priorities are consistently adhered to.
Finally, given such a specification of the basic liberties, it is assumed to
be clear for the most part whether an institution or law actually restricts a
basic liberty or merely regulates it. For example, certain rules of order are
necessary for regulating discussion; without the acceptance of reasonable
procedures of inquiry and debate, freedom of speech loses its value. On
the other hand, a prohibition against holding or arguing for certain reli-
gious, moral, or political views is a restriction of liberty and must be
judged accordingly.
5
Thus as delegates in a constitutional convention, or
as members of a legislature, the parties must decide how the various
liberties are to be specified so as to give the best total system of liberty.
They must note the distinction between regulation and restriction, but at
many points they will have to balance one basic liberty against another;
for example, freedom of speech against the right to a fair trial. The best
arrangement of the several liberties depends upon the totality of limita-
tions to which they are subject.
While the equal liberties may, therefore, be restricted, these limits are
subject to certain criteria expressed by the meaning of equal liberty and
the serial order of the two principles of justice. Offhand there are two
ways of contravening the first principle. Liberty is unequal as when one
class of persons has a greater liberty than another, or liberty is less
extensive than it should be. Now all the liberties of equal citizenship must
be the same for each member of society. Nevertheless some of the equal
liberties may be more extensive than others, assuming that their exten-
sions can be compared. More realistically, if it is supposed that at best
each liberty can be measured on its own scale, then the various liberties
5. See Alexander Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government
(New York, Harper
and Brothers, 1948), ch. I, sec. 6.
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Equal Liberty

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can be broadened or narrowed according to how they affect one another.
A basic liberty covered by the first principle can be limited only for the
sake of liberty itself, that is, only to insure that the same liberty or a
different basic liberty is properly protected and to adjust the one system
of liberties in the best way. The adjustment of the complete scheme of
liberty depends solely upon the definition and extent of the particular
liberties. Of course, this scheme is always to be assessed from the stand-
point of the representative equal citizen. From the perspective of the
constitutional convention or the legislative stage (as appropriate) we are
to ask which system it would be rational for him to prefer.
A final point. The inability to take advantage of one’s rights and oppor-
tunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means gener-
ally, is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty. I
shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of these things as
affecting the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of the rights that the
first principle defines. With this understanding, and assuming that the
total system of basic liberty is drawn up in the manner just explained, we
may note that the two-part basic structure allows a reconciliation of
liberty and equality. Thus liberty and the worth of liberty are distin-
guished as follows: liberty is represented by the complete system of the
liberties of equal citizenship, while the worth of liberty to persons and
groups depends upon their capacity to advance their ends within the
framework the system defines. Freedom as equal liberty is the same for
all; the question of compensating for a lesser than equal liberty does not
arise. But the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have
greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their
aims. The lesser worth of liberty is, however, compensated for, since the
capacity of the less fortunate members of society to achieve their aims
would be even less were they not to accept the existing inequalities
whenever the difference principle is satisfied. But compensating for the
lesser worth of freedom is not to be confused with making good an
unequal liberty. Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is
to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the
complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. This defines the end of
social justice.
These remarks about the concept of liberty are unhappily abstract. At
this stage it would serve no purpose to classify systematically the various
liberties. Instead I shall assume that we have a clear enough idea of the
distinctions between them, and that in the course of taking up various
cases these matters will gradually fall into place. In the next sections I
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32. The Concept of Liberty

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discuss the first principle of justice in connection with liberty of con-
science and freedom of thought, political liberty, and liberty of the person
as protected by the rule of law. These applications provide an occasion to
clarify the meaning of the equal liberties and to present further grounds
for the first principle. Moreover, each case illustrates the use of the
criteria for limiting and adjusting the various freedoms and thereby exem-
plifies the meaning of the priority of liberty. It must, however, be empha-
sized that the account of the basic liberties is not offered as a precise
criterion that determines when we are justified in restricting a liberty,
whether basic or otherwise. There is no way to avoid some reliance on
our sense of balance and judgment. As always, the aim is to formulate a
conception of justice that, however much it may call upon our intuitive
capacities, helps to make our considered judgments of justice converge
(§8). The various priority rules are to further this end by singling out
certain fundamental structural features of one’s moral view.
33. EQUAL LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE
33. Equal Liberty of Conscience
In the preceding chapter I remarked that one of the attractive features of
the principles of justice is that they guarantee a secure protection for the
equal liberties. In the next several sections I wish to examine the argu-
ment for the first principle in more detail by considering the grounds for
freedom of conscience.
6
So far, while it has been supposed that the parties
represent continuing lines of claims and care for their immediate descen-
dants, this feature has not been stressed. Nor have I emphasized that the