A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

particular kind of evening dress. In all these cases special interests give
rise to certain appropriate classifications and standards. These complica-
tions are ordinarily gathered from the circumstances and are explicitly
mentioned when it seems necessary. With things that are not artifacts
some elaboration is usually called for to explain one’s meaning since it is
not provided by the reference to the object. Thus, for example, the state-
ment that Wildcat is a good mountain may require the kind of amplifica-
tion provided by adding that it is a good mountain for skiing. Or the
observation that it is a good night may call for the explanation that it is a
good night for seeing the stars, since it is a clear and dark night. Some
terms suggest the appropriate expansion. Consider an example: if we
compare the statement that a body is a good corpse with the statement
that it is a good cadaver, the sense of the first is not clear, whereas
referring to something as a cadaver conveys its use in the study of anat-
omy. A good cadaver is presumably a corpse having the properties (what-
ever they are) which it is rational to want for this purpose.
4
It may be
noted in passing that we can understand at least part of what is meant by
calling something good even though we do not know what are the desired
features of the object being evaluated.
There always stands in the background a point of view from which an
artifact, functional part, or role is being appraised, although of course this
point of view need not be made explicit. This perspective is characterized
by identifying the persons whose concerns are relevant for making the
judgment, and then by describing the interests which they take in the
4. The example is from Ziff, 
Semantic Analysis,
p. 211.
353
61. Simpler Cases

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object. For example, in the case of parts of the body (functional parts of
systems), we normally take up the point of view of the person in question
and presume that his interest is the normal one. Thus good eyes and ears
are those having the properties that it is rational to want in one’s own eyes
and ears when one wishes to see and hear well. Similarly with animals
and plants: when we say that they have a good coat, or good roots, we
appear to adopt the point of view of the animal or plant. No doubt there is
some artificiality in doing this, especially in the case of plants. On the
other hand, perhaps there are other perspectives that would explain these
judgments more naturally. But the definition is likely to be more suitable
for some cases than others, and this fact need not worry us too much so
long as it is satisfactory for the purposes of the theory of justice. Turning
to the category of occupations, in some instances anyway while the de-
sired properties are those of persons belonging to the occupation, the
persons whose point of view we take up do not belong to it. Thus a good
doctor is one who has the skills and abilities that it is rational for his
patients to want in a doctor. The skills and abilities are the doctor’s, the
interest in the restoration of health by which they are assessed are the
patients’. These illustrations show that the point of view varies from case
to case and the definition of goodness contains no general formula for
determining it. These matters are explained as the occasion arises or
gathered from the context.
A further comment is that there is nothing necessarily right, or morally
correct, about the point of view from which things are judged to be good
or bad.
5
One may say of a man that he is a good spy, or a good assassin,
without approving of his skills. Applying the definition to this case, we
would be interpreted as saying that the individual referred to has the
attributes that it is rational to want in a spy, or assassin, given what spies
and assassins are expected to do. There is no implication that it is proper
to want spies and assassins to do what they do. Normally it is govern-
ments and conspirators and the like who employ spies and assassins. We
are simply evaluating certain proficiencies and talents from the point of
view of governments and conspirators. Whether a spy or assassin is a
good person is a separate question altogether; to answer it we should have
to judge the cause for which he works and his motives for doing so.
Now this moral neutrality of the definition of good is exactly what we
should expect. The concept of rationality by itself is not an adequate basis
5. On this point, see Ross,