A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part as well. I shall not pursue these matters further. We have still to com-
plete the theory of justice by seeing how it is rooted in human thought
and feeling, and tied in with our ends and aspirations.
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59. The Role of Civil Disobedience

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PART THREE. ENDS

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CHAPTER VII. GOODNESS AS RATIONALITY
In this final part I proceed as follows. First, I present in more detail the
theory of the good which has already been used to characterize primary
goods and the interests of the persons in the original position. Since a
more comprehensive view is required for the subsequent argument, this
theory must be given a firmer foundation. The next chapter is largely
concerned with moral psychology and the acquisition of the sentiment of
justice. Once these matters have been dealt with, we are in a position to
discuss the relative stability of justice as fairness and to argue in the last
chapter that, in a sense to be defined, justice and goodness are congruent,
at least in the circumstances of a well-ordered society. Last of all I ex-
plain how the theory of justice connects up with the social values and the
good of community. Sometimes in this part the overall direction of the
exposition may seem less clear, and the transition from one topic to
another more abrupt. It might help to keep in mind that the central aim is
to prepare the way to settle the questions of stability and congruence, and
to account for the values of society and the good of justice.
60. THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF THE GOOD
60. The Need for a Theory
So far I have said very little about the concept of goodness. It was briefly
mentioned earlier when I suggested that a person’s good is determined by
what is for him the most rational plan of life given reasonably favorable
circumstances (§15). All along I have assumed that in a well-ordered
society citizens’ conceptions of their good conform to the principles of
right publicly recognized and include an appropriate place for the various
primary goods. But the concept of goodness has been used only in a
rather thin sense. And in fact I shall distinguish between two theories of
the good. The reason for doing this is that in justice as fairness the
concept of right is prior to that of the good. In contrast with teleological
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theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with
the principles of right already on hand. But to establish these principles it
is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions
about the parties’ motives in the original position. Since these assump-
tions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, the
theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is re-
stricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good I call the thin
theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required
to arrive at the principles of justice. Once this theory is worked out and
the primary goods accounted for, we are free to use the principles of
justice in the further development of what I shall call the full theory of
the good.
In order to clarify these matters, let us recall where a theory of the
good has already played a role. First of all, it is used to define the least
favored members of society. The difference principle assumes that this
can be done. It is true that the theory need not define a cardinal measure
of welfare. We do not have to know how disadvantaged the least fortunate
are, since once this group is singled out, we can take their ordinal prefer-
ences (from the appropriate point of view) as determining the proper
arrangement of the basic structure (§15). Nevertheless, we must be able
to identify this group. Further, the index of well-being and the expecta-
tions of representative men are specified in terms of primary goods.
Rational individuals, whatever else they want, desire certain things as
prerequisites for carrying out their plans of life. Other things equal, they
prefer a wider to a narrower liberty and opportunity, and a greater rather
than a smaller share of wealth and income. That these things are good
seems clear enough. But I have also said that self-respect and a sure
confidence in the sense of one’s own worth is perhaps the most important
primary good. And this suggestion has been used in the argument for the
two principles of justice (§29). Thus the initial definition of expectations
solely by reference to such things as liberty and wealth is provisional; it is
necessary to include other kinds of primary goods and these raise deeper
questions. Obviously an account of the good is required for this; and it
must be the thin theory.
Again, some view of goodness is used in defending justice as fairness
against various objections. For example, it may be said that the persons in
the original position know so little about their situation that a rational
agreement upon principles of justice is impossible. Since they do not
know what their aims are, they may find their plans utterly ruined by the
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Goodness as Rationality

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principles to which they consent. Therefore how can they reach a sensible
decision? One might reply that the rationality of a person’s choice does
not depend upon how much he knows, but only upon how well he reasons
from whatever information he has, however incomplete. Our decision is
perfectly rational provided that we face up to our circumstances and do
the best we can. Thus the parties can in fact make a rational decision, and
surely some of the alternative conceptions of justice are better than oth-
ers. Nevertheless, the thin theory of the good which the parties are as-
sumed to accept shows that they should try to secure their liberty and
self-respect, and that, in order to advance their aims, whatever these are,
they normally require more rather than less of the other primary goods. In
entering into the original agreement, then, the parties suppose that their
conceptions of the good have a certain structure, and this is sufficient to
enable them to choose principles on a rational basis.
Summing up these points, we need what I have called the thin theory
of the good to explain the rational preference for primary goods and to
explicate the notion of rationality underlying the choice of principles in
the original position. This theory is necessary to support the requisite
premises from which the principles of justice are derived. But looking
ahead to other questions yet to be discussed, a more comprehensive
account of the good is essential. Thus the definition of beneficent and
supererogatory acts depends upon such a theory. So likewise does the
definition of the moral worth of persons. This is the third main concept of
ethics and we must find a place for it within the contract view. Eventually
we shall have to consider whether being a good person is a good thing for
that person, if not in general, then under what conditions. In some cir-
cumstances at least, for example those of a society well-ordered or in a
state of near justice, it turns out, I believe, that being a good person is
indeed a good. This fact is intimately connected with the good of justice
and the problem of the congruence of a moral theory. We need an account
of the good to spell all this out. The characteristic feature of this full
theory, as I have said, is that it takes the principles of justice as already
secured, and then uses these principles in defining the other moral con-
cepts in which the notion of goodness is involved. Once the principles of
right are on hand, we may appeal to them in explaining the concept of
moral worth and the good of the moral virtues. Indeed, even rational
plans of life which determine what things are good for human beings, the
values of human life so to speak, are themselves constrained by the
principles of justice. But clearly, to avoid moving in a circle, we must
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60. The Need for a Theory

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distinguish between the thin and the full theory, and always keep in mind
which one we are relying upon.
Finally, when we come to the explanation of the social values and the
stability of a conception of justice, a wider interpretation of the good is
required. For example, one basic psychological principle is that we have a
tendency to love those who manifestly love us, those who with evident
intention advance our good. In this instance our good comprises final
ends and not only primary goods. Moreover, in order to account for the
social values, we need a theory that explains the good of activities, and in