A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

(continued)
condition of human sociability, 433;
why stronger in justice as fairness,
436–440; Mill on, 439–440; and evolu-
tion, 440–441; capacity for as basis of
equality, 442–446; genesis of and
soundness of its dictates, 451–452;
defines the shared final end of society
as a social union of social unions, 462–
463; Freud on genesis of, 472–474;
See also next entry
Sense of justice, good of, §86:496–505;
problem of belongs to thin theory, 350;
problem of defined 450–451, 496–499;
and obvious interpretation of, 498–
499; argument from connection with
natural attitudes, 499–500; argument
from Aristotelian principle and human
sociability, 500–501; argument from
Kantian interpretation, 501; balance of
reasons favoring, 501–502; and haz-
ards of love, 502–503; argument from
finality, 503; just conduct toward those
for whom not a good, 503–505; con-
nection with stability of justice as fair-
ness, 504–505
Serial order, 
see
Lexical order
Shaftesbury, Lord, 20n
Shame, 388–391; defined as injury to self-
respect, 388; natural, 389–390; moral,
390–391; as a moral feeling, con-
trasted with guilt, 391, 422, 423–424;
relation to morality of self-command,
391, 424; relation to aspects of moral-
ity and to supererogation, 424; connec-
tion with finality condition, 503. 
See
also Self-respect; Excellences
Shand, A. F., 426n
Sharp, F. C., 161n
Shklar, J. N., 206n, 540n
Sidgwick, Henry, 23n, 26, 28, 29, 79,
351n, 401; taken as representative of
classical utilitarianism, 20; on priority
problem, 36; conception of moral the-
ory, 45n; on formal justice, 51, 442n;
definition of equality of opportunity
adopted, 63n; rejected average utility,
161; conflation of persons in, 164n; his
objection to Kant, 221n, 224–225; on
time preference, 259–260; on delibera-
tive rationality, 366, 370; on psycho-
logical under standability of utilitarian-
ism, 417; hedonism in, 487, 488; on
strictness of utilitarianism in requiring
sacrifices, 501–502
Similar cases, precept of, 208–209
Simon, H. A., 124n, 367n
Singer, Milton, 389n
Slaveholder’s argument, 145
Slavery, 137, 218, 286
Smart, J. J. C., 20n, 140n, 164n
Smith, Adam, 20n, 49, 161n, 233, 419n,
457n, 460n
Social contract, traditional theory of, 10–
11, 14–15, 28–29, 96–97
Social ideal, defined, 9
Social interdependency, facts of, 373–374
Social minimum, 244–245, 251–252,
267, 278–280
Social nature of humankind, 433, 458–
460, 463, 494–495
Social union, §79:456–464; defined, 459–
460; two interpretations of circum-
stances of justice, 456–457; concept of
private society defined, 457; social na-
ture of humankind explained, 458–
460; illustrations of social union, 460–
462; well-ordered society as social
union of social unions explained, 462–
463; collective activity of justice in, a
value of community, 463; division of
labor in, 463–464
Socialism, 235, 239–242, 247–249
Socrates, 286
Solow, R. M., 252n, 262n
Sovereign, role of in stability, 211, 237–
238, 296, 435, 504–505
Special psychologies, problem of, 124–
126, 464–465, 474
Spiegelberg, Herbert, 86n
Spite, 467–468, 470
Splitting, idea of, 166–167
Stability, inherent, 436
Stability, of conceptions of justice:
defined, 398; knowledge of, counts
among general facts, 119; relation to
publicity condition in argument for
two principles, 154–159; relied on in
toleration of the intolerant, 192–193;
and problem of congruence, 350, 496–
503; distinguished from unchanging ba-
sic structure, 400–401; inherent stabil-
ity of and psychological laws, 436;
relative stability of and psychological
laws, 436–439; and tendency of evolu-
tion, 440-441
Stability, of social cooperation: as social
problem, defined, 6, 434–436; role of
sovereign in maintaining, 211, 237–
238, 296, 435, 505; role of public
sense of justice in maintaining 236,
295–296, 305–306, 436; two kinds of
instability defined, 295–296, 435; in ar-
gument for duty of justice, 295–296;
536
Index

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role of promises in, 304–305; role of
civil disobedience in, 336–337
Stability, relative, §76:434–441; for con-
ceptions of justice, defined, 436; prob-
lem of explained, 398–399, 434–435;
inherent stability defined and related to
three psychological laws, 436; relative
stability of principles of justice and util-
ity, 436–439; Mill’s view concerning
not really utilitarian, 439–440; and ten-
dency of evolution, 440–441
Stability, of systems, 399–401
Stace, W. T., 111n
Standard assumptions of utilitarianism,
137–138, 189, 247, 284–285, 290, 445
Starting places, 82–83, 85–86
Status, desire for, 477–479
Stein, Walter, 335n
Steinhaus, Hugo, 74n
Stevenson, C. L., 420n
Stopping points, plurality of, 432, 434,
484
Strains of commitment, 126, 153–154,
255, 371, 475
Strawson, P. F., 113n
Strict compliance, as formal condition,
127
Strict compliance theory, see Ideal theory
Strict liability, 213
Structure of ethical theories, 21–22, 490–
491, 493n, 493–496
Subjective rationality of plans, 366, 370–
371
Supererogation, moralities of, 419, 424
Supererogatory acts, 100–101, 167, 298–
299, 385, 482–483
Sympathy, in utilitarianism, 24, 155, 161–
164, 437–438
System of natural liberty, 57, 62–63, 65
Tawney, R. H., 63n
Taxation, 245–247, 249–251
Taylor, C. C. W., 490n
Teleological theories: defined, 21–22; in-
tuitive appeal of, 22; may be intuitionis-
tic, as in perfectionism, 35–36; equal
liberty insecure in, 185, 289–290; basis
of equality in, 445; hedonism as symp-
tomatic drift of, 490–491; role of domi-
nant ends in, 495–496; structure of con-
trasted with contract theory, 496
Terrell, Huntington, 453n
Thoreau, H. D., 320n, 323
Thorpe, W. H., 378n
Time preference, §45:259–262; defined,
259–262; in classical utilitarianism,
252–253, 262; Sidgwick on, 259–260;
opposition to policies related to in con-
stitutional regime, 261–262; as parame-
ter for ad hoc adjustment, 262
Time-related principles, 360–361, 369–
370
Tinbergen, Jan, 369n
Tobin, James, 252n
Toleration of the intolerant, 190–194
Transfer branch, 244–245
Transitivity, as formal condition, 116
Treating persons as ends, 156–159, 437
Trial by combat, 116
Trivers, R. B., 440n
Troeltsch, Ernst, 479n
Tucker, A. W., 238n
Tucker, R. C., 249n
Tullock, Gordon, 61n, 173n
Tussman, Joseph, 99n
Unanimity: as formal condition, 106; as
not unreasonable condition given veil
of ignorance, 120–122; relation to
Kant’s ethics, 226; in philosophical tra-
dition, 232–233; does not apply to thin
theory of good, 392; relation to unity
of the self, 494–495
Uncertainty, choice under: knowledge of
special attitudes toward excluded by
veil of ignorance, 118, 149; two princi-
ples of justice and maximin rule for,
132–133; original position as case of,
134–135; use of Laplacean rule for in
average utilitarianism, 146–148; ab-
sence of in classical utilitarianism and
splitting, 165–166; various rules for
and thin theory, 392–393
Universality, as formal condition, 114,
160, 221
Unjust man, 385–386
Urmson, J. O., 20n, 351n, 352n, 357n,
419n
Utilitarianism, average, §§27–28:139–
153; defined, 139–140; preferred to
classical in contract theory, 140–141;
reasoning leading to and taking
chances in, 141–144; slaveholder’s ar-
gument for, 145; objected to as using
principle of insufficient reason, 145–
147; Edgeworth’s objective interpreta-
tion of probability in unrealistic, 147–
148; concept of probability discussed,
150–153; lack of unity of expectations
in, 150–153; in argument from finality
and stability, 154–159; role of sympa-
thy in, 155, 437–438; as grounds for
equal liberty, 181–182, 184–185;
and embedding of ideals; use of
537
Index

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Utilitarianism 
(continued)
discounting in savings problem, 262;
and mixed conceptions, 279; relative
vagueness of, 281–282; as principle
for individuals, 294–295, 298; and in-
determinacy of right, 394–396, 494; as
psychologically understandable, 417–
418; relative stability of, 437–439; and
evolution, 440–441; and basis of equal-
ity, 445; as teleological theory, hedon-
ism the tendency of, 490–491; Mill’s
proof of interpreted, 492–493; struc-
ture of contrasted with contract theory,
493–496; ostensibly less congruent
than contract theory, 501–502
Utilitarianism, classical, §§5–6:19–30,