A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Partial com-
pliance
Nozick, Robert, 30n
Objective rationality of plans, 366, 370–
371
Objectivity, 452–455
Obligations, 
see
Fairness, principle of
Olson, Mancur, 236n
Oppressive conscience, 428–429
Oppenheim, Felix, 177n
Ordering, as formal condition, 115–116,
117
Original position, §4:15–19; defined as fa-
vored interpretation of initial situation,
16, 105; relation to social contract the-
ory, 10–11; as hypothetical situation,
11, 19, 104, 145, 587; as fair initial
status quo, 15–16, 104, 116n; and
justification, 18–19, 510–513; as guide
to intuition, 19; nature of arguments
from, 102–105; presentation of alterna-
tives in, 105–109; and circumstances
of justice, 109–112; formal constraints
of concept of right in, 112–118; and
veil of ignorance, 118–123; present
time of entry interpretation of, 119–
120, 254–255; unanimity in, 120, 233;
rationality of parties in, 123–130; list
of elements of, 126–127; highest-order
interests of parties, 131–132, 475–476;
choice under uncertainty in and maxi-
min rule, 134–135; conditions of con-
trasted with impartial sympathetic spec-
tator, 163; Kantian interpretation of,
221–227; as procedural interpretation
of Kant, 226–227, 233; and savings
problem, 121, 254–256; and time pref-
erence, 259–260; form of in deriving
law of nations, 331–332; and responsi-
bility to self, 371; and autonomy and
objectivity, 452–454; conditions of and
problem of envy, 472; embodies reci-
procity and equality between free and
equal moral persons, 475
Ought implies can, precept of, 208, 213
Overlapping consensus, 340
Pacifism: general, 325, 335; contingent,
334–335
Page, A. N., 58n
Pareto, Vilfredo, 58, 103
Partial compliance theory, 8, 212–213,
215–218, 309, 504–505
Paternalism, 183, 218–220
Paton, H. J., 221n, 351n
Pattanaik, P. K., 140n
Paul, G. A., 184n
Pearce, I. F., 37–38n
Pennock, J. R., 90n, 313n
Perelman, Ch., 51n
Perfectionism, §50:285–292; defined as a
teleological theory, 22; scope of intui-
tion in, 35–36, 286–287, 290–291;
claims of culture in, 218, 285–286;
two forms of distinguished, 285–287;
relation to want- and ideal-regarding
532
Index

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principles, 287; argument against strict
view from equal liberty, 287–290; inter-
pretation of original position in, 288–
289; analogue of standard assumptions
in, 290; argument against moderate
view, 290–292; claims of culture in jus-
tice as fairness, 291–292, 470; rejec-
tion of as political principle and democ-
racy of association, 387–388, 462; as
psychologically understandable, 417
Pericles, 114
Permissions, 100
Perry, R. B., 21n, 90n, 351n, 358n; his
view compared with justice as fairness,
122, 128; and principle of inclusive-
ness, 362
Person, and rational plans, 358, 370–371
Petrarch, 488
Piaget, Jean, 403n, 404n
Piers, Gerhart, 389n
Pigou, A. C., 20n, 28, 272n
Pitcher, George, 420n
Pitkin, H. F., 97n, 99n, 200n, 217n
Plamenatz, J. P., 99n
Planning activity, rationally of, 371–372
Plans of life; §63:358–365; defined 79–
80, 358; rationality of defined, 358–
359; as determining a person’s good.
75–80, 358–359, 370; maximal class
of, 359; features of, 359–361; subplans
of, 361; principles of rational choice
for, 361–364; and Aristotelian princi-
ple, 364, 376–377, 379; possibility of
choice between, 364–365; objectively
and subjectively rational defined, 366–
367; satisfactory plans, 367; as deter-
mining shame, 390
Plato, 398n, 457n
Pleasure, 486–490
Poincaré, Henri, 19n
Pole, J. R., 204n
Political duty, §53:308–312; for citizens
generally, 100, 310n, 330–331; to just
laws, 308; cases of ideal and partial
compliance theory distinguished, 308–
309; two contexts of unjust laws, 309–
310; duty to unjust laws as duty to just
constitution, 310–312; and majority
rule, 311–314
Political economy, §41:228–234; concep-
tion of defined, 228–229; and welfare
economics, 228–229; need for ideal of
the person in, 229–232; problem of Ar-
chimedean point and embedding of ide-
als, 230–232; and assumption of una-
nimity, 232–233; and values of
community, 233–234
Political justice, defined, 194. 
See also
Equal participation, principle of
Political obligation, 
see
Fairness, princi-
ple of
Political settlement, principle of, 318
Population size, 140–141
Postponement, principle of, 360, 369
Potter, R. B., 332n
Precepts of justice; §47:267–273;
defined, 31–32; in utilitarianism, 23,
25, 268; in rule of law, 207–210; bal-
ance of, 244–245, 268, 270–271, 279–
280; in pure procedural justice and fair
wages, 268–270; subordinate place of,
270–271; and imperfections of compe-
tition, 272–273; and moral worth, 274
Prescriptive theory of meaning, 357–358
Pribram, K. H., 358n
Price, Richard, 30n
Prices, allocative and distributive func-
tions of, 241–242
Prichard, H. A., 30n, 305, 307–308
Primary goods; §15:78–81; defined, 54–
55, 79; social and natural distin-
guished, 54; self-respect as most impor-
tant, 54, 155–156, 348, 386; index of
basis of expectations, 79–81; role of in
interpersonal comparisons, 79, 81, 285;
index problem for, 80–81; reasons for
using to define expectations, 80–81,
and rationality of so doing in original
position, 123; derived from general as-
sumptions, 223, 230; accounted for by
thin theory of the good, 348–349, 380–
381, 392. 
See also
Expectations
Principle of insufficient reason, 144–145,
145–147, 148
Priority of fair opportunity: defined, 77;
cases illustrating, 264–265; rule of
stated, 266–267
Priority of justice, 3–4, 69, 263–264; rule
of stated regard in savings, 266–267
Priority of liberty, §39:214–220, §82:541–
548; meaning of, 132, 214–220; rule of
stated, 220, 266; cases illustrating, 200–
205, 212–213, 215–216, 216–218; best
secured by justice, 214; ideal and
nonideal theory defined, 216–217; and
paternalism, 218–220; and conscrip-
tion, 333–334; reasons for from first