A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part of argument for the principle, 131–
132, 475–476; basis of in parties’ fun-
damental aims and interests, 131, 475;
basis of in parties’ highest-order inter-
ests, 131–132, 475–476; reasons for
priority from second part of argument,
475–480; and desire for economic
533
Index

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Priority of liberty 
(continued)
advantages, 476–477; argument for
from desire for status and self-respect,
477–479; and publicity condition and
true general beliefs, 479–480
Priority of right: defined, 27–28; in jus-
tice as fairness, 27–28, 38n, 394–395,
396, 494–496; and indeterminacy of
the good, 394–396; and the unity of
the self, 493; how affects indetermi-
nacy of choice, 493–494
Priority problem, §8:36–40; three ways
of meeting, 36–39; in utilitarianism
and intuitionism, 36; in justice as fair-
ness, 37–40, 55; and lexical order, 37–
39, 40; limiting the appeal to intuition
in, 39; and natural duties, 98; rules for
stated for justice, 220, 266–267; and
principles for individuals, 298–299
Prisoner’s dilemma, 238, 505
Private property economy, 235–236, 239–
242
Private society, 457–458
Probability, concept of, 149–150
Procedural justice, perfect, 74, 316
Procedural justice, imperfect: defined, 74–
75; in classical utilitarianism, 77; and
just constitution, 173–174, 194, 310–
312; and ideal procedure, 316
Procedural justice, pure: defined, 74–75;
and background justice, 58, 75–77;
and fair equality of opportunity, 73–
77; advantages of, 76–77; and original
position, 104, 118; and fair wages,
267–291
Procedural justice, quasi-pure, 176, 318
Promises, 97, 98, 303–306, 307–308
Protestant reformers on toleration, 190
Public forum, 197–198, 321, 328–329,
330, 544f
Public goods, 235–239, 295–296
Publicity: as implicit in contract theory, 15,
153; of rules, 48–49; as formal condi-
tion, 113n, 115, 397–398; in argument
for stability, 154–158; of general beliefs,
397–398, 479–480; and envy, 479–
480; in argument for congruence, 499;
and justifications in social union, 510
Punishment, 211–212, 276–277, 504–505
Purely conscientious act, doctrine of,
418, 499
Purely preferential choice, 
see
Indetermi-
nacy of choice
Purity of heart, 514
Quasi-stability, 400n
Quine, W. V., 95n, 113n, 507n
Raiffa, Howard, 74n, 133n, 150n, 238n,
283n, 392n, 489n
Ramsey, F. P., 252–253n, 259n
Ramsey, Paul, 332n
Rancor, 
see
Envy
Raphael, D. D., 86n
Rashdall, Hastings, 287n
Rational choice, principles of: apply to
plans of life, 358–359; at best deter-
mine maximal class, 359, 365–366;
time-related principles defined, 360,
369–370; counting principles defined,
361–364; specify higher-order desires,
364; not unanimously chosen, 392; for
choice under uncertainty, 392–393;
and veil of ignorance, 394. 
See also
Uncertainty, choice under
Rationality of the parties, §25:123–130;
defined, 123–124; and envy, 124–125,
464–474; and mutual disinterestedness,
125; how related to strict compliance
condition, 125–126; elements of initial
situation and variations listed, 126–
127; an aspect of theoretically defined
individuals, 127; relation to egoism
and benevolence, 127–129; and con-
tent of morality, 129–130
Reasonableness, of conception of justice,
277–278, 309–310
Reciprocity: utilitarianism incompatible
with, 13, 29–30, 437–438; in differ-
ence principle, 88–90; in harmony of
interests, 89–90; in argument from sta-
bility and mutual respect, 155–156; in
conditions of consensus, 340; as char-
acterizing psychological laws, 433,
437–439; and the basis of equality,
447; embodied in original position,
475; as ethical variation of initial situ-
ation, 512
Redress, principle of, 86–87
Reflective equilibrium, 18–19, 42–45,
104, 379, 381, 507–508
Region of positive contributions, 68–69,
71, 88
Regret, 370–371, 388–389, 389–390, 421
Relevant social positions, §16:81–86;
defined, 81–82; and starting places, 82,
85–86; two main cases of, 82–83, 84–
85; equal citizenship as, 82–83; least
advantaged as defined, 83–84; and
fixed natural characteristics, 84–85;
need for account of, 85–86
Remorse, 421
Representative persons, defined, 56
Requirements, of obligation and natural
duty, 96–101
534
Index

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Rescher, Nicholas, 30n, 279n
Resentment, 416, 423, 467, 468, 472–474
Respect for persons, 455, 513, in Kant’s
ethics, 225.