they’re categorically different.
The stark differences between man and machine mean
that gains from working with
computers are much higher than gains from trade with other people. We don’t trade with
computers any more than we trade with livestock or lamps. And that’s the point:
computers are tools, not rivals.
The differences are even deeper on the demand side. Unlike people in industrializing
countries, computers don’t yearn for more luxurious foods or beachfront villas in Cap
Ferrat; all they require is a nominal amount of electricity, which they’re not even smart
enough to want. When we design new computer technology to help solve problems, we
get all the efficiency gains of a hyperspecialized trading partner without having to
compete with it for resources. Properly understood, technology is the one way for us to
escape competition in a globalizing world. As computers become more and more
powerful, they won’t be substitutes for humans: they’ll be complements.
COMPLEMENTARY BUSINESSES
Complementarity between computers and humans isn’t just a macro-scale fact. It’s also
the path to building a great business. I came to understand this from my experience at
PayPal. In mid-2000, we had survived the dot-com crash and we were growing fast, but
we faced one huge problem: we were losing upwards of $10 million to credit card fraud
every month. Since we were processing hundreds or even thousands of transactions per
minute, we couldn’t possibly review each one—no human quality control team could
work that fast.
So we did what any group of engineers would do: we tried to automate a solution.
First, Max Levchin assembled an elite team of mathematicians to study the fraudulent
transfers in detail. Then we took what we learned and wrote
software to automatically
identify and cancel bogus transactions in real time. But it quickly became clear that this
approach wouldn’t work either: after an hour or two, the thieves would catch on and
change their tactics. We were dealing with an adaptive enemy, and our software couldn’t
adapt in response.
The fraudsters’ adaptive evasions fooled our automatic detection algorithms, but we
found that they didn’t fool our human analysts as easily. So Max and his engineers
rewrote the software to take a hybrid approach: the computer would flag the most
suspicious transactions on
a well-designed user interface, and human operators would
make the final judgment as to their legitimacy. Thanks to this hybrid system—we named
it “Igor,” after the Russian fraudster who bragged that we’d never be able to stop him—
we turned our first quarterly profit in the first quarter of 2002 (as opposed to a quarterly
loss of $29.3 million one year before). The FBI asked us if we’d let them use Igor to help
detect financial crime. And Max was able to boast, grandiosely but truthfully, that he
was “the Sherlock Holmes of the Internet Underground.”
This kind of man-machine symbiosis enabled PayPal to stay in business, which in turn
enabled hundreds of thousands of small businesses to accept the payments they needed to
thrive on the internet. None of it would have been possible without the man-machine
solution—even though most people would never see it or even hear about it.
I continued to think about this after we sold PayPal in 2002: if humans and computers
together could achieve dramatically better results than either could attain alone, what
other valuable businesses could be built on this core principle? The next year, I pitched
Alex Karp, an old Stanford classmate, and Stephen Cohen, a software engineer, on a new
startup idea: we would use the human-computer hybrid approach from PayPal’s security
system to identify terrorist networks and financial fraud. We already knew the FBI was
interested, and in 2004
we founded Palantir, a software company that helps people
extract insight from divergent sources of information. The company is on track to book
sales of $1 billion in 2014, and
Forbes
has called Palantir’s software the “killer app” for
its rumored role in helping the government locate Osama bin Laden.
We have no details to share from that operation, but we can say that neither human
intelligence by itself nor computers alone will be able to make us safe. America’s two
biggest spy agencies take opposite approaches: The Central Intelligence Agency is run
by spies who privilege humans. The National Security Agency is run by generals who
prioritize computers. CIA analysts have to wade through so much noise that it’s very
difficult to identify the most serious threats. NSA computers can process huge quantities
of data, but machines alone cannot authoritatively determine whether someone is
plotting a terrorist act. Palantir aims to transcend these opposing biases:
its software
analyzes the data the government feeds it—phone records of radical clerics in Yemen or
bank accounts linked to terror cell activity, for instance—and flags suspicious activities
for a trained analyst to review.
In addition to helping find terrorists, analysts using Palantir’s software have been able
to predict where insurgents plant IEDs in Afghanistan; prosecute high-profile insider
trading cases; take down the largest child pornography ring in the world; support the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in fighting foodborne disease outbreaks; and
save both commercial banks and the government hundreds of millions of dollars
annually through advanced fraud detection.
Advanced software made this possible, but even more
important were the human
analysts, prosecutors, scientists, and financial professionals without whose active
engagement the software would have been useless.
Think of what professionals do in their jobs today. Lawyers must be able to articulate
solutions to thorny problems in several different ways—the pitch changes depending on
whether you’re talking to a client, opposing counsel, or a judge. Doctors need to marry
clinical understanding with an ability to communicate it to non-expert patients. And
good teachers aren’t just experts in their disciplines: they must also understand how to
tailor their instruction to different individuals’ interests and learning styles. Computers
might be able to do some of these tasks, but they can’t combine them effectively. Better
technology in law, medicine, and education won’t replace professionals; it will allow
them to do even more.
LinkedIn has done exactly this for recruiters. When LinkedIn was founded in 2003,
they didn’t poll recruiters to find discrete pain points in need of relief. And they didn’t
try to write software that would replace recruiters outright. Recruiting
is part detective
work and part sales: you have to scrutinize applicants’ history, assess their motives and
compatibility, and persuade the most promising ones to join you. Effectively replacing
all those functions with a computer would be impossible. Instead, LinkedIn set out to
transform how recruiters did their jobs. Today, more than 97% of recruiters use LinkedIn
and its powerful search and filtering functionality to source job candidates, and the
network also creates value for the hundreds of millions of professionals who use it to
manage their personal brands. If LinkedIn had tried to simply replace recruiters with
technology, they wouldn’t have a business today.
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