«zamonaviy lingvistika» fanidan «types and classification of speech acts»

Declarative speech acts are the acts whose successful performance is based on the authorized and highly institutional framework. In other words, declarative speech acts are extremely ceremonial. Leech observes (1983) that successful performance of declarative speech acts brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality. For the successful performance of declarative speech acts, the speaker must have a special institutional role in the specific context. For instance, in Hindu religion all the religious rituals are performed by a socially and conventionally authorized person in a traditional sequence by chanting some holy words in a particular manner and tone. This class includes resigning, dismissing, christening, naming, appointing, sentencing, excommunicating, declaring war, marrying, firing, etc. Following are some of the glaring examples of declaratives in which the words are immediately transformed into actions: i. Umpire: You are out! ii. Boss: You are fired! iii. Police: You are under arrest! Hence, this classification of speech acts by Searle is considered the most important and helpful tool to study the utterances. Thus, it seems to me that Searle's analysis should be seen as an elegant characterization of how certain general conditions on action and communication interact with the lexical content of certain communicative activity verbs and with the conventional force connected with certain mood markers. Such an analysis is valuable since it is of interest to find out exactly what combinations of general conditions and idiosyncratic factors that can be denoted by the various communicative activity terms of a natural language. Finally, Austin's and Searle's approaches have in common that they concentrate on single communicative acts. I think there is a certain danger inherent in this, namely that it is easy to lo se perspective on communication as a whole. After all, communicative acts seldom occur in isolation, but rather sequentially in interaction. It might therefore be better to study larger chunks of communication, a study for which we might use Wittgenstein's term language games. Secondly, there is always a danger that the analysis of communication becomes too linguistic by focusing on the meaning of certain communicative activity verbs. The analysis of such meanings should be as clearly separated from the study of actual communication phenomena as possible. If this can be accomplished, the results will probably be positive in both 7 directions. Not least linguistically, since we would then get a better idea of the conceptual parameters that underlie the lexical field of communicative activity terms.