Factionalism and Islamisation
77
this fact.
7
While there is no doubt that the acceptance of ‘Umar as a
genuine caliph
(khalifa),
unlike the other Umayyads who count only
as kings
(muluk),
is based to some extent on historical facts and on
this caliph’s personality and actions, it is also clear that much of the
traditional writing about him should be regarded as pious and
moralistic story-telling in keeping with
the needs and outlook of
tradition. Consequently, there is some difficulty in saying precisely
what he did as caliph, let alone assessing his motives, and in any
case, his reign was a very short one. Early western scholars tended
to portray him as an impractical idealist, but following Wellhausen
most see him as a pious individual who attempted to solve the
problems of his day in a way which would reconcile the needs of his
dynasty and state with the demands of Islam.
8
Before
becoming caliph, he had been for some time (706–12?)
governor of Medina for his cousin al-Walid. He was removed from
this post at the insistence of al-Hajjaj, who complained about his
giving shelter there to subversive elements from Iraq. This
association with Medina, traditionally regarded as the home of the
Sunna,
goes far to account for his reputation and outlook, and it is
no surprise to find that some reports say he was born there (others
say Egypt).
As caliph he is remembered above all as someone who attempted to
solve, in a manner satisfactory to Islam and to those non-Arabs
wishing to become Muslims, the problems
arising from the fact that
acceptance of Islam conferred fiscal privileges. Put generally, the
problem was that Muslims did not, or at least should not, pay certain
taxes to which non-Muslims were, or should have been, liable. This
provided an incentive for non-Muslims to become Muslims, but the
widespread acceptance of Islam then caused a decrease in the
revenues of the government, so the
Umayyad rulers had a vested
interest in preventing the conquered peoples from accepting Islam or
forcing them to continue paying those taxes from which they claimed
exemption as Muslims. It is in this sense that al-Hajjaj’s driving out of
the
mawali
from the garrison towns is to be understood. ‘Umar II, on
the other hand, attempted to put into practice a system which
recognised the right of anyone who wished to accept Islam to do so,
gave them the advantages associated with the status of a Muslim, but
went some way to preventing a complete collapse in the revenue of the
government.
Difficulties arise, though, when we try to ask more precise
questions. How were non-Muslims taxed and how did they hope to
78
Factionalism and Islamisation
benefit by accepting Islam? What did ‘Umar
do in attempting to
reconcile the rights of the new Muslims
(mawali)
with the revenue
needs of the government? How far were his measures effective and, if
they were not, why not? The difficulties arise because the sources
rarely supply the detailed and precise information we need, or if they
do, the information may relate to only a limited area of the problem or
a part of the Umayyad territories. There is too the danger that the
information represents anachronistic reading back of later conditions
into the time of ‘Umar II. Even the lengthy
and quite detailed so-
called ‘Fiscal Rescript of ‘Umar II’ is subject to these remarks. It has
generally been accepted as a copy of a document sent by ‘Umar to his
governors giving them precise instructions on certain questions
concerning taxation and the rights of non-Muslims to accept Islam,
but it is clear from the attempt of H.A.R.Gibb to explicate it that it
leaves a number of issues in doubt, and, in spite of the general
acceptance of its authenticity, its ascription to ‘Umar as a whole can
only be impressionistic and open to question. Like almost all of our
Umayyad ‘documents’, it survives only
as part of a later literary
text—there is no archive and we do not have the document itself, if
there was one.
9
If we take first the question of the taxation of non-Muslims and
Muslims in the Umayyad state and the advantages to be hoped for
from acceptance of Islam, it would be fairly easy, in theory at any rate,
to provide an answer if the classical Muslim fiscal system had existed
from the beginning. In this classical system Muslims specifically pay
a religious tax, the
zakat,
which is levied at different rates on different
types of property and wealth. Non-Muslims
specifically pay a poll
tax, the
jizya,
payable on the person of each non-Muslim, both as a
sign of their inferior status in the Islamic state and as a return for the
protection which this state offers them. Thirdly there is the
kharaj
.
This is a tax payable equally by Muslims and non-Muslims on land
which is liable for it, generally land which was conquered and became
the property of the Muslim state but which was left under the
cultivation of those who had worked it before its conquest, subject to a
tax which was to be gathered for the
benefit of the Muslims as a
whole. When this land changed hands it remained liable for the
kharaj,
no matter what was the religion of its proprietor. In this
system, then, there is likely to be some incentive for the adoption of
Islam by the non-Muslims, so long as the financial burden of the
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