motion) by means of which the positivist theory attempts to explain the 'higher' (life
and thought)
is itself unknown.
Consequently it is impossible to explain anything else
by
it.
On the other hand, the higher, i.e.
thought,
is the only quantity we possess, the
only thing we know and are aware of in ourselves, the only thing about which we
cannot be mistaken or have any doubts. And, since thought can evoke and
release
physical energy, whereas motion can
never
evoke or release thought (a rotating wheel
can never evoke thought), it obviously follows that we must strive to define not the
higher
by means of the lower, but the lower by means of the higher. And, since the
invisible, such as the
contents of a book
or the
purpose of a watch,
defines the visible,
we must also strive to understand not the visible, but the invisible.
Starting from the false assumption of the
mechanical
character of the noumenal
aspect of nature, positivist science, on which the view of the world of the majority of
modern educated humanity is founded, makes yet another mistake in examining the law
of cause and effect or the law of function - namely, it mistakes what is cause for what is
effect.
Just as the two-dimensional plane-being regards the phenomena which reach its
consciousness
as lying on one plane, so the positivist view strives to interpret on one
plane all phenomena of different orders, i.e. to explain all visible phenomena as effects
of other visible phenomena and as the inevitable cause of subsequent visible phen
omena. In other words, it regards as having causal and functional interdependence only
those phenomena which take place on the surface, and it studies the visible world or the
phenomena of the visible world, refusing to admit that causes not contained in this
world could have penetrated into it or that phenomena of this world could have
functions outside it.
But again this could be true only if this world contained no phenomena of life and
thought, or if phenomena of life and of mental processes were actually
derivatives
from
physical phenomena instead of being endowed with an infinitely greater hidden force
than the latter. Then we would have been justified in
examining the chains of
phenomena only in their physical or visible sequence, as positivist philosophy does. But
if we take into consideration the phenomena of life and thought, we are forced to admit
that the chain of phenomena very quickly passes from a purely physical sequence into a
biological sequence, i.e. one which already contains much that is hidden and invisible
to us, or to a psychological sequence where still more is hidden.
We must admit too that in the reverse transition into the physical sequence
from the biological and the psychological spheres actions proceed, often if
not always, precisely from those sides which are hidden from us, i.e. that the
cause of the visible is the invisible. As a result we are
bound to admit that it is
impossible to consider chains or sequences solely in the world of physical
phenomena. When such a sequence touches the life of a man or that of a
human community, we see clearly that it often goes out of the 'physical
sphere' and then once more returns to it. Looking at the matter from this point
of view we shall see that both in the life of an individual man and in the life
of a human community there are many streams which at times emerge upon
the surface, breaking through in boisterous torrents, and at times go deep
underground and become hidden from view,
not disappearing altogether, but
merely biding their time to emerge once more upon the surface.
We observe in the world continuous chains of phenomena and we see these
chains pass from one order of phenomena to another without interruption. We
see how phenomena of consciousness -thoughts, feelings, desires - are
accompanied by physiological phenomena, possibly even creating them, and
give rise to a series of purely physical phenomena; and we see how physical
phenomena, in becoming the object of sensations of sight, hearing, touch,
smell and others, provoke
physiological phenomena, and then psychological.
But, looking at life from outside, we only see physical phenomena and,
having persuaded ourselves that they alone represent reality, we may not
notice the others at all. Here is where the enormous power of suggestion of
current ideas makes itself felt. To a sincere positivist every metaphysical
argument proving the unreality of matter or energy seems sophistry. To him it
seems something unnecessary, annoying, interfering
with the proper progress
of thought, a senseless and aimless attack against that which, in his opinion,
is alone firmly established, is alone immutable and lies at the foundation of
everything. He impatiently waves away 'idealistic' and 'mystical' theories as
he would a buzzing mosquito. . . .
But the fact of the matter is that
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