China only uses nuclear weapons for defensive strategy: they wouldn’t use them offensively
Federation of American Scientists 6. (“Report: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.” Ch. 1, p. 31. Federation of American Scientists. November 30, 2006. http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-15-34.pdf) LRH.
Whether or not the policy would constrain China in a war, the declaratory policy in fact does seem to influence China’s acquisition and employment policies, with the result that the country keeps its nuclear forces relatively small. A more ambitious strategy would require larger forces as well as much improved command and control and early warning capabilities. But words mean little to U.S. nuclear war planners, who are tasked to plan and deploy forces based on China’s actual capabilities (the so-called capability-based planning).
China will not initiate nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict
Yao 5. (Yunzhu, Senior Colonel of the People’s Liberation Army in China, and Dir. of the Asia-Pacific Office and Dpt. of World Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science. “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence.” Strategic Insights. 4(9) September 2005. http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Sep/yaoSep05.html) LRH.
With the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has somewhat committed itself to the defense of Taiwan. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released (or leaked) by the U.S. Department of Defense even implies the use of nuclear weapons in “military confrontation over the status of Taiwan.” Such confrontation is categorized as “immediate contingencies” for which the United States has to set “requirements for nuclear strike capabilities.”[10] So far, China has never—in any government statements or official documents—threatened nuclear use in the cross-strait conflict.[11] Taiwan is China’s top security concern,[12] and the only scenario for which China seriously considers the use of force. Do nuclear weapons really play a role in such a scenario? My judgment is “no.” If what we are talking about is a “local war under the conditions of internationalization,”it would be useless for China to try to deter U.S. conventional intervention with nuclear weapons. It is the United States, not China that has the nuclear capabilities to control or even dominate conflict escalation. To win a nuclear war over the United States is quite different from deterring a nuclear war with the United States. China is definitely the much weaker side, so far as the nuclear balance is concerned. Faced with a similar situation, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had decided the option for China decades ago—that is to use nuclear weapons only as a deterrent against all nuclear uses, be it strategic or operational. To prevent the opponent’s nuclear use is the only way to neutralize his nuclear superiority. China’s long standing nuclear policy still serves China’s national interests even today.
NFU Prevents Escalation
The Chinese No-First-Use Policy will prevent China from launching a nuclear strike
Federation of American Scientists 6. (“Report: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.” Ch. 1, p. 30-31. Federation of American Scientists. November 30, 2006. http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-15-34.pdf) LRH.
Official Chinese statements continue to ascribe to a no-first-use policy, but leave some confusion about the scope of the policy and its conditions. A 2005 Chinese Foreign Ministry white paper reiterated the pledge by stating that the “Chinese government has solemnly declared that it would not be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstance,” and that this policy “will remain unchanged in the future.” In addition, the paper reiterated that “China has committed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”73 This language is consistent with earlier declarations made by China, including the security assurances statement issued at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in April 1995 and the working paper issued to the Conference on Disarmament in August 1981. Interestingly, in the 1995 statement China appears to have avoided the temptation to place conditions on its security assurances by saying that the “commitment naturally complies” to members of the NPT or others that have made similar binding commitments.74 Yet the Chinese policy raises several questions.
Beijing is against the use of nuclear weapons and the nature of their force is too defensive to pose a threat
National Intelligence Council 99. (“China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States.” National Intelligence Council. November 5, 1999. http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/china_wmd.html). LRH.
The small, defensive nature of China's nuclear force and China's general opposition to nuclear blackmail and intimidation are reinforced by the public enunciation of a supposed commitment never to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict and never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states or nuclear free zones.432 Hence, China formally opposes offensive-based nuclear deterrence doctrines and extended nuclear deterrence guarantees, and is against the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories.433 The Chinese explicitly oppose doctrines based on "war-winning" nuclear war strategies,434 in favor of the above summarized self-defense stance purportedly designed to oppose and check the outbreak of a nuclear war. This so-called NFU principle is valued for its political effect, both on the superpowers and toward lesser powers. Specifically, Beijing intends to show its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons by any power, in an attempt to politically coerce or subjugate other nations. This stance reinforces, in the public arena at least, the impression that China does not pose a WMD threat to the superpowers. The latter objective is particularly important, given the absolute WMD superiority of the superpowers over China. The NFU principle also is intended to support the above-mentioned effort at the total abandonment of nuclear weapons, by indicating China's apparent refusal to develop the type of large, offensive, warfighting WMD arsenal possessed by Russia and the United States.
**Nationalism DA
