Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

particularly American, although it still rests on US military power. According
to Hardt and Negri we are all complicit in Empire by acting as consumers
and producers in the global economy – and ‘all’ here means the institutions
of global civil society as well as the familiar suspects, MNCs and the
institutions of global governance. This is a fascinating set of ideas, but the
impenetrability of the prose will limit its influence.
US Hegemony and World Order
249

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One final point before moving to a conclusion to this chapter: critiques of
American power generally ignore the issue of alternatives. What kind of
world would there be if there were no US hegemony, no Empire Lite? This
is not a hypothetical question – it is at least possible to imagine a revived
American isolationism with the US retreating behind its ocean barriers. The
French (and Russians) would like to see the reappearance of an old-style
balance of power system – with themselves in the driving seat naturally –
but the record of such a system over the last three centuries does not make
this an encouraging prospect, especially for the other countries of Europe
who show no desire to replace American with French hegemony, puzzling
though that may be to the political class in Paris. China envisages its own
gradual rise to hegemony; again, not an appealing scenario unless one is
Chinese, and perhaps not even then. Many of the promoters of global civil
society and other left-progressives seem to think that with American power
out of the way, the UN would be democratized, world capitalism would be
tamed, global terrorism would disappear, the lion would lie down with
the lamb in the Middle and Far East, and the peoples of the world would
devote themselves to creating the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth, perhaps
with a kind of global peace corps to bring environmentally-sound wealth to
the impoverished and an unarmed police force to ensure that human rights
are respected everywhere. One may beg leave to doubt this particular scenario
(each element of which I have heard expressed over the last few years, in
case anyone thinks I am making this up).
In short, as, from their different perspectives, both Ignatieff and Ferguson
argue, it is quite likely that much of the rest of the world would come to
regret an American reversion to isolationism. Be careful what you wish for;
it may come true.