Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

International regimes and regime theory
The notion of an international regime emerged out of the complex inter-
dependence model of international relations of the 1970s, which became a
prime focus of debate between neoliberals and neorealists in the 1980s. For
once, there is a generally-accepted (albeit slightly contentious) definition of
a regime which states that it is a set of ‘implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1983: 2). To
illustrate, consider the current trade regime using Krasner’s expansions of
the key terms.
The principles (‘beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude’) upon which the
trade regime is built are that trade is good, free trade is better than
controlled trade and free trade promotes peace. These principles constitute
the ‘embedded liberalism’ of the trade regime, and they exist in the back-
ground even when contrary practices are sanctioned. The norms (‘standards
of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’) of the regime give
these principles some practical content. Thus, for example, it is a norm that
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if it is not possible for trade to be free, tariffs are a better mechanism for
restraint of trade than physical quotas because they cause less interference
in the market and are less discriminatory in impact. The rules (‘specific
prescriptions or proscriptions for action’) of the trade regime set out in
detail what these norms imply, and set out the sanctioned exceptions to
these norms; they are to be found in the WTO Charter, in the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement (MFA) and in various other legal and quasi-legal documents.
The decision-making procedures (‘prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choice’) in this case focus on meetings of the WTO,
the conference diplomacy of bodies such as UNCTAD, and, at a different
level, on the trade disputes procedures set out in the WTO Charter.
Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures may be explicit
or implicit. Explicit rules are written down somewhere, implicit rules are
understood without being written down. Thus, for example, ‘customs
unions’ and ‘free trade areas’ such as the European Union and the North
American Free Trade Area are explicitly licensed even though clearly
discriminatory, while ‘voluntary export restraints’ (VERs) are implicitly
accepted. VERs are agreements whereby one party promises to limit exports
to the other; such restraints are discriminatory and breach the norms and
principles of the trade regime but are acceptable because of the fiction that
they are voluntary, a fiction that everyone goes along with, for their own
reasons. This is a case of an ‘implicit’ rule of the trade regime and it is every
bit as important as the explicit rules set out in the various treaties which
establish the regime.
‘Around which actors’ expectations converge’ – here we come to the heart
of the matter. The ‘actors’ in world trade – firms, states and individual
consumers – have expectations about the principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures that will apply in this area, and if these expec-
tations converge, there is a regime, but if not, not. ‘Converge’ is a word
which was deliberately chosen to avoid the idea that expectations have to be
exactly the same (which, much of the time, they clearly are not) or that rules
will always be obeyed (which, equally clearly, will not always be the case).
Instead ‘expectations converge’ suggests that most of the time the actors
will have similar expectations and most of the time they will be fulfilled –
thus, for example, there is a degree of predictability and regularity about
trade matters that is appreciably greater than would be expected in the
absence of a regime.
Regimes are clearly seen as part of global governance, but it should be
noted that, despite the importance of the WTO in the trade case, they
represent a clear break from the emphasis on institutions characteristic of
the BWS. The WTO is important, but so are other institutions such as
UNCTAD and the MFA, and informal ‘institutions’ based on implicit rules
may be as important as, or more important than, the official bodies. Regime
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