Understanding International Relations, Third Edition

part a reflection of this changing ethos (Coker 1994, 1998; Ignatieff 2000).
The Kosovo Campaign of 1999 represents the apotheosis of this approach –
a ‘zero casualty’ war, for NATO at least, and to most people’s surprise
apparently actually won by air-power. On the other hand, apparent politi-
cal acceptability of the level of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq, modest
though they have been by the standards of the twentieth century, may suggest
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Understanding International Relations 

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that, for some Americans at least, 9/11 and the War on Terror have changed
the nature of this particular game.
A central feature of this kind of warfare is that it cannot so easily be seen
as a viable means of conflict resolution. In the 1860s there were conflicting
views of the future shape of German politics. Prussia under Bismarck settled
the matter by allowing von Moltke to win him three Western, Clausewitzian
wars in succession – decisive battles at Sadowa in 1866 and Sedan in 1870
determined the outcome. Defeat was reluctantly accepted, peace treaties
were signed, and the German Empire was formed under the aegis of Prussian
military might. A problem was solved, although a new problem emerged, as
is usually the way. It seems inconceivable that a sequence of events such as
this could happen today. Wars are not formally declared, they do not for-
mally end; they peter out or they fester on. Sometimes a stalemate emerges,
sometimes imposed from outside – the ‘non-war’ in Cyprus in 1973 has
been stifled by a UN peacekeeping force but the conflict remains unsolved;
indeed, the very stalemate removes the impetus for solution. In other cir-
cumstances, such as Somalia and Rwanda, the impact of informal war may
be the collapse of a society and a descent into anarchy, a descent which out-
siders are effectively powerless to halt because, in the absence of clear ene-
mies, clear battle lines and regular armies, external intervention becomes
almost impossible. Even in Kosovo, where the military outcome was deci-
sive, it is by no means the case that the losers have accepted the verdict of
the (air) battlefield – instead NATO is faced with the prospect of maintain-
ing Kosovo as a protectorate for the foreseeable future. All this suggests that
any account of war which tries to give the modern phenomenon its older,
European function will miss the point in a very big way.