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6.3.2 Monitoring 
In line with the principle of innovative regulation outlined in Section 4, it is essential 
to monitor the effectiveness of regulatory frameworks on domestic work. It has previously 
been argued that regulatory frameworks should be dynamic, in the sense of incorporating 
processes of evaluation and incremental reform. This goal underpins the Model Law, 
which mandates a process of periodic consultation between the government and 
representative organizations of domestic workers and employers at the national level to 
review methods of monitoring domestic workers‘ hours and the implementation and 
enforcement of the legal standards. The Model Law also requires periodic evaluation of the 
influence of the statutory standards, at least once in each seven-year period, and imposes 
an obligation on workers‘ and employers‘ organizations to educate and assist their 
constituents on compliance with the law. 
6.4 Incentives to bargain 
A central objective in the design of the Model Law was to provide incentives for 
collective bargaining. This modern regulatory strategy is adopted to recognize that the 
collective organization of domestic workers is substantially under-developed, even in 
settings in which unionization is otherwise widespread, and that it may not be possible to 
identify an employers‘ association with the capacity to bargain collectively over the terms 
and conditions of domestic workers. Yet, collective bargaining is likely to be the most 
effective method of improving the quality of domestic employment, and encouraging the 

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Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 27 
formation of collective organizations of workers and employers, and of regular bargaining, 
is therefore a central regulatory goal. 
To provide such incentives, the Model Law draws on precursors from the EU legal 
regime, the Parental Leave
42
and Information and Consultation Directives,
43
both of which 
offer statutory frameworks as a default that apply only when not displaced by collectively 
bargained alternatives. In the Model Law, a number of standards can be adjusted by 
collective agreements between representative organizations of domestic workers and 
employers. The incentives it offers, which are intended to ―seed‖ bargaining structures and 
processes, generally take the form of enhanced working time flexibility. Among the 
―framing standards‖, for example, agreements can substitute additional rest periods for 
wage premia in overtime work and work on weekly rest days or public holidays, and 
introduce hours-averaging schemes to address periods of unpredictable demand rather than 
relying primarily on overtime work. The ―flexibility standards‖ are also subject to 
collective derogation. Collective agreements can adjust the limits on external on-call 
periods, while the procedure for working time adjustments is to be established through 
national-level negotiations where possible. The Model Law also endeavours to sidestep the 
limitations of the EU models, which have been criticized for their failure adequately to 
constrain bargained outcomes. To this end, it requires comparable levels of protection (e.g. 
the bargained limits on on-call periods must be ―equally protective‖ to the statutory limits) 
and incorporates a degree of individual choice for workers (e.g. a domestic worker‘s 
agreement is needed in order to swap compensatory rest for overtime premia). 
42
Directive 96/34/EC on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP 
and the ETUC, extended to the United Kingdom by Directive 97/75/EC. 
43
Directive 2002/14/EC ...........[full title needed]. 

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